White provides readers with a long lead-in to his central account of Franklin itself. His narrative begins in Georgia during early fall when General Sherman finally abandoned further attempts to come to grips with General Hood's elusive Army of Tennessee. Leaving behind their foe of the past several months, Hood and his army struck out from North Georgia, crossed northern Alabama, and drove into the heart of Tennessee. In its coverage of those event-filled weeks, the volume offers brief but excellent summaries of the fierce rear area battle fought at Allatoona Pass and Hood's investment of Decatur (with the Confederates failing to take possession of either well-defended post). In discussing the Confederate treatment of black garrison troops captured during the march to Tennessee, the book does address a frequently overlooked aspect of the campaign. Though not killed, captured USCTs were frequently mistreated by being forced into work gangs or even reenslaved when a prior owner came forth to claim them.
Even after those delays and others, the Confederates still had a narrow window of opportunity in which to strike Union forces to their advantage. White's summary of the infamous Spring Hill Affair, Hood's best opportunity to inflict major damage to a large part of Union general George Thomas's scattered but growing army, is evenhanded in its assessment of shared blame for the failure. Of course, the centerpiece of the book is White's account of the Battle of Franklin. Incorporating numerous firsthand accounts written by participants from both sides, it is an excellent summary and an exceptionally fine example of how to both artfully and informatively craft a condensed Civil War battle narrative.
The author does not attempt any major reinterpretations of events related to Franklin or the campaign as a whole. Chief blame for the Spring Hill fiasco is not directed toward any particular individual, and White certainly has no patience for already discredited notions that Hood operated under the fog of narcotic painkillers and intended to punish his army at Franklin for the lost opportunity at Spring Hill.
The ECW series's trademark emphasis on visual aids is well realized in this title, with 12 maps and nearly 200 illustrations of all kinds included. The Franklin maps in particular offer excellent representations of opposing troop positions (often at regimental scale) and usefully feature the many terrain elements and man-made obstructions that played a major role in aiding the Union defense of the town. There's also a 14-stop battlefield tour complete with detailed directions, guiding text, and modern sight line images. The four-piece appendix section explores the limited use of Confederate artillery at Franklin, provides a list of regimental flags lost during the battle, discusses preservation history, and concludes with the author's brief personal "memories" essay. Orders of battle and a suggested reading list are also present.
Let Us Die Like Men is a fine summary representation and synthesis of current thinking on the Battle of Franklin and the events leading up to those few hours of desperate combat. For those less disposed toward taking on any of the available full-length studies of the Franklin battle or 1864 Tennessee Campaign as a whole, this compact yet fulfilling alternative reading option can be recommended without reservation.
Drew:
ReplyDeleteDoes the author critique Hood's decision to attack at Franklin? Given(1) the 1.7 miles of open ground the Confederates had to cross (2) without adequate artillery support (horse artillery only?)and (3) the contrary opinions of at least three, if not four, of Hood's subordinate commanders (Forrest, Cleburne, Cheatam, and possibly A.P. Stewart)during a council of war, it seems like a foolhardy decision. I accept Sam Hood's opinions about the myths concerning his ancestor, and assume JBH was of clear mind that day. I know he wanted to badly damage Thomas' men at Franklin before they got to Nashville, but at what price. Not only did he fail to do that but his own Army was severely damaged by the losses and the result at Nashville was a foregone conclusion. I always wonder what Hood saw that day that his subordinate commanders did not. One of the worst decisions of the Civil War (and, yes, I put Pickett's Charge in that category). Am waiting for my copy of this book which I had already ordered from Savas, Beatie.
Hi John,
DeleteI don't recall what he had to say about that. He doesn't kill Hood for it. The flanking move is appealing for sure (esp. in retrospect knowing what happened) but it has major drawbacks, too. Organizing and executing a contested river crossing would have left no time for decisive battle, and merely turning Schofield out of Franklin (while it would husband precious Confederate manpower) would go nowhere toward Hood's goal of defeating the scattered federal detachments in detail before they combined into an overwhelming force. A frontal attack, as high risk, costly, and desperate as it was likely to be even with the gift of Wagner's deployment, was the only remaining option available to engage Schofield in isolation, and I still have something of a hard time with wholesale condemnation of the decision.
Thanks for this review, Drew.
ReplyDeleteWe saw your discussion on perhaps using the ECW brand to incorporate other aspects of the war and have been pondering that for some time.
These books appeal on a lot of levels, and even long-time readers are enjoying them. Of more importance is that first-time readers are picking them up at the parks, etc., enjoying them, ordering more, and developing an interest in the Civil War. That was part of our goal from the outset.
Sadly, I haven't had the opportunity to visit a CW park bookstore in a very long time. Are they still well stocked?
DeleteVery well stocked. We sell upwards of 65% of the titles to visitor centers, etc. Sales to individuals have been steadily climbing. Helps the entire CW community by bringing people, in our opinion.
ReplyDeleteThanks for an interesting review of this book and subject. I am forever fascinated by the Battle of Franklin. 'The Black Flower' by Howard Bahr really captured it in novel form and I've tried to read all I can on it from Sword to Horn to Jacobson on the battle. I still find it a stunning tragedy and one of the most heartrending moments in American military history.
ReplyDeleteI don't hate Hood for the decision (in fact I find him more competent than I use to give him credit for) but he was wrong, wrong, wrong to make the attack there. Even with victory the army would have been too weak to follow anything up just like Lee at Gettysburg. I find it one of the great Confederate disasters (along with Nashville). And too many Generals were lost. To lose Cleburne was a grievous loss for the Army of Tennessee. I know Hood wanted to strike a blow but there was just not a victory to be had then that would change the course of the war.
Chris