Review - "Six Days of Awful Fighting: Cavalry Operations on the Road to Cold Harbor" by Eric Wittenberg

[Six Days of Awful Fighting: Cavalry Operations on the Road to Cold Harbor by Eric J. Wittenberg (Fox Run Publishing, 2021). Hardcover, 25 maps, photos, footnotes, OB appendix series, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:vi,270/331. ISBN:978-1-945602-16-0. $36.95]

After nearly a month of continuous fighting in Virginia that resulted in appalling casualties on both sides, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and Union Army of the Potomac found themselves by late May 1864 in yet another close embrace, this time along the North Anna River where another major battle was only narrowly avoided. Up to that time, the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac under its new commanding general Philip Sheridan had performed unevenly, with a rather inauspicious Wilderness debut and a long raid toward Richmond that was successful only in mortally wounding JEB Stuart at Yellow Tavern on May 11. After Sheridan resumed his place alongside the rest of the army, his job was to clear the way for yet another complicated passage of the Army of the Potomac around Lee's right. This new turning movement would involve a jump across the Pamunkey River, a potentially risky endeavor that would embroil the mounted forces of both sides in a week-long series of skirmishes and battles. That drawn-out episode of heated action fought during the 1864 Overland Campaign is the subject of prolific author and eastern theater cavalry expert Eric Wittenberg's latest study Six Days of Awful Fighting: Cavalry Operations on the Road to Cold Harbor.

In the book Wittenberg discusses vividly and in great detail the series of cavalry actions fought amid the late-May repositioning of the main armies in Virginia, first to Totopotomoy Creek then to new opposing lines around Cold Harbor. The first action, a Union victory at Hanovertown on May 27, effectively cleared the way for the Army of the Potomac's Pamunkey River crossing. Seeking to block further progress of the enemy until his own infantry could get into an advantageous position, Lee sent his cavalry toward the front, and a large battle with Sheridan's men developed at Haw's Shop on May 28. Fought mostly dismounted and in rough terrain, it is the action recounted at greatest length in the book. At Haw's Shop, Wade Hampton (the heir apparent to Stuart) was soundly defeated but nevertheless succeeded in keeping Sheridan's otherwise victorious forces from locating the main body of Lee's army.

As addressed in the book, Haw's Shop revealed several themes that developed over the week. The first revolves around Hampton's inexperience in meeting the demands of corps-level leadership. He would prove himself a superb addition to the ANV high command later on, but his decision-making during the battle directly led to unnecessary losses and the near rout of his forces. On the other side, Sheridan, though the victor, is criticized for unimaginative tactics and for not following up on his triumph. A more general Union misuse of cavalry during the Overland Campaign is another major theme explored in the book. According to Wittenberg's analysis, the eastern Union army's high command triumvirate of Grant, Meade, and Sheridan were all guilty of that offense, though for different reasons. Meade wanted to use his mounted forces to closely guard his army's rear, its trains, and its flanks, while Grant and Sheridan favored concentrating the corps for large-scale movements behind enemy lines. All neglected what Wittenberg persuasively maintains to have been of primary importance, the gathering of intelligence as to the exact whereabouts of the enemy and the screening of the main army's advance. Because of this signal failure, the author maintains that Union forces were very fortunate that disaster did not ensue at some point. Wittenberg is also critical of Confederate handling of their own mounted forces, specifically Lee's organizational decision to delay the appointment of a successor to Stuart. In the immediate wake of Stuart's demise, Lee relied on all three division commanders to cooperate with each other and report directly to him for instructions. Leaving the cavalry corps without the strong head needed should any dangerously fluid situation arise, this command structure could have had profoundly negative results, but the author credits Hampton and the two Lees (Fitzhugh and Rooney) for handling the awkward situation as well as could be expected.

On the 29th, instead of using their cavalry to quickly probe ahead to locate Lee's army, Grant and Meade advanced three infantry divisions. That ponderous means of intelligence gathering is justly criticized by the author. The cavalry did remain active, though. With both sides recognizing the need to address their open eastern flank and seeing the value of holding the crossroads at Old Cold Harbor, a sharp fight developed on May 30 at Matadequin Creek that pitted Alfred Torbert's Union division against Matthew Butler's large but inexperienced brigade of South Carolinians. It was yet another Union victory, but, according to the author, it also proved to skeptical ANV veterans the fighting abilities of Butler and his untried men.

Also covered in the book is Union cavalry division commander James Wilson's raid against the South Anna railroad bridges, an operation that started out well with Wilson beating Rooney Lee at Hanover Court House on May 31. To the east on that same day, Torbert drove two brigades of Confederate cavalry and Thomas Clingman's brigade of Robert Hoke's infantry division out of Cold Harbor and repurposed the enemy earthworks there for his own use. On the next day, Confederate reinforcements converged on Ashland to drive Wilson off and nearly destroy one of his brigades, but not before the twin South Anna bridges were successfully burned. With the bridges rapidly repaired, however, Wilson's operation did not have any long-term effect. Finally, the book ends with the return of Confederate forces to Cold Harbor, where a disorganized infantry attack was easily repulsed by the entrenched Union cavalry. This action set up the terrible events that would unfold over the next few days.

One might have expected that by mid-1864 the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac would have been led by grizzled veteran commanders of long-standing mounted service, but that was not the case. Wittenberg interestingly points out the irony that Union success over the week-long period covered in his book was primarily accomplished by generals of little field experience leading cavalry (Wilson) or those with infantry backgrounds (Sheridan and Torbert). Only division commander David M. Gregg was a cavalryman through and through, and he was oddly marginalized by Sheridan. Further, Wittenberg astutely observes that this command arrangement had few negative effects overall, as the cavalry mostly fought dismounted in infantry-style engagements supported by their prodigious firepower advantages in breechloading arms and elite horse artillery. The Union army's Cavalry Corps also possessed an excellent assemblage of veteran brigade commanders. On the other side, the Confederate cavalry had to suffer a bit through Hampton's acclimation to his expanded responsibilities while also laboring under systemic disadvantages stemming from inferior cavalry arms technology and the campaign's sustained operations exposing the lack of a central remount system. Nevertheless, as the author explains, the series of Union victories achieved over the six days covered in the book did not augur a complete mastery over the foe, as Hampton dealt Sheridan a sharp defeat only weeks later at Trevilian Station. Tantalizingly, at least one Union participant quoted in the text claimed that the Confederate cavalry did not fight as hard as they did before Yellow Tavern. This perception from an enemy observer that widespread demoralization existed among the Confederate cavalry corps's rank and file after Stuart's death is not directly addressed by the author at any length, but judging from the content and tenor of the book's narrative as a whole it would not appear that Wittenberg holds much stock in that view.

There is nothing to complain about when it comes to the technical side of the book as well as its overall presentation. Clear and insightful operational and tactical narrative, deep research, and abundant maps are characteristics of all of Wittenberg's military history studies, and we certainly encounter those qualities yet again here with Six Days of Awful Fighting's excellent battlefield accounts, primary source-filled bibliography, and 25 maps. Orders of battle for each major engagement [Hanovertown Ferry (May 27), Haw's Shop (May 28), Old Church/Matadequin Creek (May 30), Hanover Court House (May 31), Cold Harbor (May 31), Ashland (June 1), and Cold Harbor again (June 1)] are also helpfully included in the appendix section. In unprecedented fashion, the book reveals a number of cavalry (as well as army high command) leadership flaws and strengths that emerged on both sides during the 1864 Overland Campaign while also presenting mounted operations fought during a major phase of that campaign in fresh ways that greatly promote higher understanding of decisions and events leading up to the early June climax of the Battle of Cold Harbor. Highly recommended.