Review - "The Atlanta Campaign - Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864" by David Powell

[The Atlanta Campaign - Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864 by David A. Powell (Savas Beatie, 2024). Hardcover, 19 maps, photos, footnotes, orders of battle, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xvi,545/623. ISBN:978-1-61121-695-0. $39.95]

Given the vast scale of opposing forces and the high military and political stakes involved in the western theater's central conflict of 1864, full-length standalone coverage of the Atlanta Campaign's many large battles has taken a puzzlingly long time to gather steam. The only military history students more dismayed by a similar degree of longstanding neglect are 1862 Peninsula Campaign enthusiasts! Thankfully, the floodgates are now wide open, and the past decade and a half have been a godsend for those seeking the most cutting edge understanding of the May-September 1864 chain of events between Dalton and Jonesboro. Oddly enough, the new battle histories released during this grand revival, with its multiple major works from prime contributors Gary Ecelbarger, Earl Hess, and Robert Jenkins, have frequently come in pairs. Ecelbarger opened the ball in 2010 with a fine history of the July 22 Battle of Atlanta, and since then there has been another July 22 book, a Kennesaw Mountain battle history, two Ezra Church studies, and a pair of volumes covering the Battle of Peach Tree Creek (with another addressing its lead in) released. Most recently, the controversial "Affair at Cassville" was thoroughly examined in a groundbreaking book published earlier this year¹. Smaller works of various kinds have also been produced in recent times, and additional major works touch upon the campaign through other angles such as biography and field fortifications.

Of course, when it comes to single-volume military histories of the campaign, Albert Castel's 1992 tome Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 still sets the standard. In perhaps the most exciting development to date, David Powell, best known for his monumental multi-volume study of the 1863 Chickamauga Campaign, has been applying the same level of research, descriptive detail, and keenly informed analysis to an 1864 Atlanta Campaign project of unprecedented scale. A hefty five volumes are planned, the first of which, The Atlanta Campaign - Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864, is the subject of this review.

Studies of this kind routinely begin with descriptive assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of each side's high command leadership and army organization. With knowledge of the personalities involved in the decision-making process, it is clear that no one save U.S. Grant himself was higher on the list than William T. Sherman was when it came to preferred candidates for leading the great western army group. However, from a dispassionate point of view, Powell suggests that George Thomas's record up to that time might have made him the objective (or at the very least safest) choice. There's certainly merit in that. On army group organizational matters, Powell is justifiably critical of the decision to eschew a wholesale, streamlined reorganization of Union forces in favor of simply combining three existing departments, with each field army component being of greatly different size and varying in support apparatus. Beyond that awkward arrangement conferring unnecessary additional layers of command and logistics management upon the army group as a whole, the individual army commanders would also have to attend to their more distant departmental administration duties. Of similarly haphazard organization was the mounted arm of Sherman's army group, which lacked a unified command structure and was unevenly distributed among the three armies. On the Confederate side, there was friction and loss of confidence from the start between Army of the Tennessee commander Joseph E. Johnston and Confederate president Jefferson Davis as neither could agree on an offensive versus defensive stance in the theater. Davis could not understand that his western army simply did not have the transportation resources necessary to conduct offensive operations, and, as expanded upon below, Johnston's overly passive approach to the upcoming campaign offered equally unrealistic prospects for success.

Powell also fully explores the implications of the military maneuvering in North Georgia prior to initiation of the main advance in May. Winter events that preceded the spring offensive are typically glossed over in the Atlanta Campaign literature, but Powell describes them in great detail. While the Union probing advances achieved nothing of tactical significance on the ground, they did confirm the strength of the Confederate forward positions in North Georgia and, much more important, kept Johnston from detaching heavy reinforcements for service in the heart of Mississippi, where forces there were opposing Sherman's Meridian Expedition.

Snake Creek Gap was the earliest of the campaign's great what-ifs, with critics of Army of the Tennessee commander James B. McPherson (including Sherman himself) lamenting the young major general's failure to enter Resaca and destroy the critical rail bridge located nearby. Powell correctly presents the situation as being much more complicated than that, with a lot of blame to go around. First, those who argue that McPherson, an innately cautious personality, could have just waltzed into Resaca are clearly misinformed, as nearly 6,000 Confederate infantry defended the post by the time McPherson's van arrived. Never ordered to grab and hold Resaca, McPherson was directed by Sherman to cut the railroad then safely withdraw to the mouth of the gap and await support. Powell argues strenuously and convincingly that it would not have been in McPherson's nature to exceed his orders nor did he have the troops necessary to simultaneously storm and hold Resaca, guard the army trains well to the rear, and block the several roads between the gap and Resaca that led down from the north into his army's rear. That doesn't leave McPherson entirely off the hook, though. The strongest charges leveled against McPherson in the book, that he did not even attempt to seriously damage the railroad north of Resaca and did not make any kind of effort to employ Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry division forward, are compellingly drawn and supported, even after taking into account the cascading effects of another cavalry general's dilatory absence (to an extent, Kilpatrick had to fill in for Theophilus Garrard's late-arriving division). Generally speaking, McPherson and Sherman were both guilty of not positioning the available cavalry to the best effect, with the former taking his cues from the latter. In Powell's final estimation of what most went wrong on the Union side, Sherman erred greatly in not providing his and Grant's beloved protege with enough troops to ensure the assigned task could be completed and the unexpected dealt with, and orders for Joseph Hooker's Twentieth Corps to join McPherson were a day late.

On the other side of the equation, it has been alleged that Joe Johnston was surprised by the presence of McPherson's army at Snake Creek Gap and even that the Confederate commander was unconscionably unaware of the gap's existence. Powell forcibly demolishes any support for the latter claim, but he does justifiably contend that Johnston was indeed unduly surprised by Union passage through Snake Creek Gap and that the blame for it must go to both Joseph Wheeler and Johnston himself for failing to occupy the gap. As Powell keenly observes, Wheeler heavily overcommitted his forces to the Dalton front and Johnston, who devoted his mental energies to the defenses of Dalton and Rome while also personally directing some of his army's cavalry affairs, was similarly neglectful in his duty toward the security of the Snake Creek Gap approach to Resaca.

As he always does, Powell combines operational and tactical narrative seamlessly, his style of presentation and detail-levels more than satisfactory in both areas. Of course, the amount of micro-tactical discussion in this hybrid study can't match that found in a standalone battle tome, but there is more than enough of it selectively reserved for the most momentous events. The Snake Creek Gap, Resaca, and Lay's Ferry sequence receives the most consistently detailed treatment, which is important as the Battle of Resaca has never really received the full attention that it deserves, the previously standard history being Philip Secrist's slim volume². Along the way reminding us that Resaca produced more than 8,000 casualties, Powell's intricate account restores its status as a major battle of considerable import. Indeed, the amount of fine detail lavished upon Resaca in the book bodes well for hopes that future volumes in Powell's series will provide the same reader rewards when it comes to other big clashes similarly awaiting their own turn amid the current sharp upsurge in Atlanta Campaign battle history publishing.

Powell interrupts his discussion of the final stages of the Resaca fighting with a concise yet highly revealing summary of Sherman's logistical preparations for the campaign. In that chapter, Powell effectively explains the pathway through which those talented logistical planners and managers (with immense resources at their disposal) made possible the army group's ability to cut loose from the railroad and achieve wide sweeping maneuvers across rugged, barren geography in ways that its opponent could not match. However, that is not to say that Union superiority in wide maneuver left Johnston bereft of opportunities of his own. It is common enough for critics to point out Johnston's repeated failure to use his central position astride the railroad to mass local superiority against some portion of Sherman's host, which tended to advance on a broad front leaving its river-crossing spearheads vulnerable on occasion to getting caught mid-stream. In addressing this particular phase of the campaign, Powell certainly agrees with eminent Army of Tennessee historian Thomas Connelly that the overly defensive Confederate commander missed a golden opportunity to maul McPherson's vanguard near Calhoun.

Powell's handles the "Cassville Affair" in a pair of late chapters. Powell agrees with Robert Jenkins (as previously mentioned, the author of a book fully dedicated to the topic) that Johnston's version of events, as recorded after the war, was faulty and misleading. Powell is also entirely in accord with the most important aspect of the mystery, the fact (grossly underemphasized in nearly all accounts) that, even if John Bell Hood's corps was not distracted by encroaching Union cavalry and attacked as planned from its flanking position on the Confederate right, there was no substantial Union force present there to damage or destroy. In the informed judgment of both writers, Sherman failed to take the offered bait on that sector of the battlefield, and that stroke of fortune essentially rendered the morning phase of the day's controversies immaterial (beyond it being a source of mutual friction within Hood and Johnston's previously harmonious relationship).

The book's 19 maps are a solid number, with only a few gaps in expected coverage. You won't find the kind of all-pervasive, regimental-level map detail found in the most diehard volumes entirely dedicated to single battles, but that quality is present on a selective basis in Powell's book. Generally speaking, the map content matches the scale and level of detail presented in the accompanying text.

Though President Davis himself, who repeatedly urged Johnston to take the offensive (and, once he did, would be reinforced), possessed an unrealistic perspective on the capabilities of the western Confederacy's principal field army, Johnston proved equally incapable of coming up with a viable alternative strategy for the campaign. As Powell's account of the first weeks in May clearly shows, that did not change as the campaign progressed through its earliest stages. Erroneously maintaining that his army was outnumbered two to one, Johnston completely ceded the initiative to Sherman, believing his only two options were to either take up a strong defensive position (and hope Sherman would attack it head on) or wait for Sherman to commit a gross blunder that could then be exploited by a devastating counterstroke. It was a strategy entirely dependent upon best wishes. As Powell and others have pointed out, the overall disparity in numbers was never as grave as Johnston liked to proclaim, and at one point Sherman held only a roughly 9:8 edge in manpower. Simply hoping that his opponent would pull a Burnside at Fredericksburg was no plan at all, and, as the opening weeks of the campaign clearly demonstrated, Johnston was not audacious enough or flexible enough to take advantage of openings given him nor was he informed as well as he should have been about either the landscape around him or the positions of the opposing chess pieces on it³. Johnston and cavalry chief Wheeler were also no Lee and Stuart when it came to obtaining and processing intelligence. Johnston ultimately electing to retreat whenever and wherever confronted with a difficult operational dilemma would form a running pattern of command behavior first established during the period covered in this book. It was a self-defeating pattern set by Johnston that failed to pay its supposed attritional dividends, further emboldened his Union opponents, demoralized his own army, and eroded already shaky confidence in his leadership.

In The Atlanta Campaign - Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864, David Powell's ambitious pentalogy has gotten off to a rousing and fully satisfying start. On to Volume 2!

Additional Notes:
1 - Students of the Atlanta Campaign are fortunate that the quality matches the quantity of these battle studies. In chronological order of release (with links to CWBA reviews posted at the time):
• The Day Dixie Died: The Battle of Atlanta (2010) by Gary Ecelbarger.
• Kennesaw Mountain: Sherman, Johnston, and the Atlanta Campaign (2013) by Earl Hess.
• The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood's First Sortie, July 20, 1864 (2014) by Robert Jenkins.
• To the Gates of Atlanta: From Kennesaw Mountain to Peach Tree Creek, 1-19 July 1864 (2015) by Jenkins.
• The Battle of Ezra Church and the Struggle for Atlanta (2015) by Hess.
• Slaughter at the Chapel: The Battle of Ezra Church, 1864 (2016) by Ecelbarger.
• The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood's First Effort to Save Atlanta (2017) by Hess.
• July 22: The Civil War Battle of Atlanta (2023) by Hess.
• The Cassville Affairs: Johnston, Hood, and the Failed Confederate Strategy in the Atlanta Campaign, 19 May 1864 (2024) by Jenkins.
2 - Philip Secrist's The Battle of Resaca: Atlanta Campaign, 1864 was originally published in 1998 and reissued in paperback in 2010 (see the site review of the latter edition). The book offers a fine summary of the fighting on May 14 and 15 as well as an interesting discussion of battlefield archaeology at the site.
3 - Indeed, numerous critics condemn Johnston for his apparent lack of knowledge about the terrain and road networks between Dalton and Atlanta beyond a very narrow corridor encompassing both sides of the Western & Atlantic Railroad. It is a point well taken, although, as Powell suggests, it might be a bit overblown.

Review - "The Cavalry of the Army of the Ohio: A Civil War History" by Dennis Belcher

[The Cavalry of the Army of the Ohio: A Civil War History by Dennis W. Belcher (McFarland, 2024). Softcover, maps, photos, illustrations, OB charts and tables, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:viii,326/389. ISBN:978-1-4766-9232-6. $49.95]

It is generally agreed upon that Union cavalry forces navigated the early Civil War period in an unfavorable position. By traditional understanding, during the first two years of the war federal mounted forces suffered from strategic neglect and widespread inferiority in organization, leadership, quality of horseflesh, and even numbers. However, by dint of great supporting effort both behind the lines and at the fighting front, blue troopers, gradually equipped with superior firepower, an organized remount system, and benefiting from the emergence of a strong stable of experienced and gifted leaders, finally achieved rough parity with their foes by the war's midpoint. With Confederate cavalry worn down by steady attrition in all phases and a failing national war effort overall, the pendulum swung even further during the latter stages of the conflict, and by the end of the war Union cavalry, east and west, reigned supreme. Of course, that arc of progression is an oversimplification, but according to prolific western theater cavalry historian Dennis Belcher it largely holds true for the Union Army of the Ohio's mounted arm, which was composed of units from Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and even Pennsylvania.

Belcher's The Cavalry of the Army of the Ohio: A Civil War History represents the first comprehensive treatment of the topic. Given the lack of continuity involved, after all the Army of the Ohio had two distinct lives (1861-62 and 1863-64) and arguably a third iteration, researching the subject and attempting to organize and write a cohesive history of it was a difficult task. As explained by the author, the process was rendered even more challenging by the existence of numerous wide gaps in the available source material.

At its heart, the book is a remarkably thorough organizational and operational history of mounted forces attached directly to the Army of the Ohio (and to a lesser extent the military department as a whole). The sheer breadth of military actions described in the volume, from tiny company-sized skirmishes all the way up to major battles. will impress novice and expert readers alike. Those discussions are not allowed to exist in a vacuum either, as the context of each confrontation, large or small, is typically explored at suitable depth. Documenting the progress of larger campaigns and battles from a cavalry-centric perspective also gives coverage of even the most well-trodden ground a fresh sheen. As was the case with Belcher's sister study of the Army of the Cumberland's cavalry, the narrative is richly supplemented with orders of battle, strength and casualty tables, maps, and illustrations. Inserted into the text at regular intervals, the detailed cavalry order of battle charts in particular are essential aids in piecing together which units were present at a given location and moment in time. Fighting events deemed too small to merit their own discussion in the main text are helpfully compiled into reference tables placed nearby.

As quickly becomes apparent while reading Belcher's narrative, mounted forces attached to the army and department of the Ohio during the early war period generally operated in a dispersed fashion, defensive rather than offensive in stance and reactive rather than proactive in movement. Most regiments were relegated to either rear-area security (guarding important railroad communications against up and coming Confederate raiders such as John Hunt Morgan and Nathan Bedford Forrest) or fulfilling traditional scouting and screening duties at the front. The earliest-formed regiments spent their time primarily in Kentucky and Tennessee, major points of involvement being Wildcat Mountain, Mill Springs, the Army of the Ohio's march on Nashville and to Shiloh, and the "Siege" of Corinth. In addition to those larger and more well-documented events, a host of smaller and more obscure engagements and skirmishes are described in the text. As Belcher relates, results in the field were generally mixed during the balance of 1861 and first half of 1862, but important structural improvements were in the offing.

The book traces the origins of offensive capability in the cavalry to post-Corinth movements of the Army of the Ohio and subsequent developments that led to the belated concentration of mounted regiments into multiple brigades. Critics of the measured pace of Army of the Ohio commander Don Carlos Buell's advance across northern Alabama toward Chattanooga often seem to underappreciate the logistical limitations involved. Incessant Confederate raids against Buell's lines of supply and communication proved to be a major problem. Indeed, Belcher explains that the lack of cavalry, in both numbers and organization, to oppose those rear-area raids played a major part in delaying his march (including a critical two-week halt). Buell repeatedly asked his superiors for more cavalry, but, as Washington responded, there were none to be had from elsewhere. New units would have to be recruited. By the time additional brigades (which would be able to finally go on the offensive against rear area threats to the railroads) could be employed, it was already too late to secure control of the Gateway to the South. Stop-gap measures such as creating mixed-arms brigades (with cavalry providing the mobility and infantry the firepower) and rushing newly raised cavalry regiments into the field without adequate arms and training had predictably mixed, and frequently atrocious, results. As Belcher clearly outlines in the book, 1862 would very much be a critical catch-up year for the mounted forces of the Army of the Ohio.

The book's in-depth coverage of Union mounted operations during the 1862 Kentucky Campaign notes both lingering problems in the cavalry arm and hope for the future. In the end, Belcher credits Buell's newly formed cavalry division with playing a major part in repelling the Confederate advance. Contributions included the capture of an entire Confederate cavalry regiment by McCook's Brigade, a screening of Buell's movements successful enough to keep his Confederate counterpart from correctly divining his intentions, and other noteworthy events. In the lead-up to Perryville and during the climactic battle itself, Gay's Brigade displayed a mixed record, fighting well at the front line but proving negligent in relaying critical intelligence information to the infantry it was supporting. To the south on Lebanon Road, McCook's Brigade led the advance of Crittenden's Corps but was unable to penetrate the enemy screen. On the whole, things were getting better, but further improvements were still necessary. As emerged during the Buell court of inquiry, the cavalry's chain of command was still a confused and internally miscommunicated mess. Nevertheless, as the Army of the Ohio was dissolved with Buell's dismissal and its cavalry folded into the new Army of the Cumberland led by William Rosecrans, the roots of the strong performances of federal cavalry brigades during the Stones River Campaign had their foundation in incremental improvements made over the previous summer and fall.

While the Army of the Ohio was not formally reborn until 1863, the balance of 1862 witnessed a number of operations by Department of the Ohio cavalry, most notably (and as detailed in the book) Carter's Raid into East Tennessee and the Union response to Morgan's Christmas Raid. With the dissolution of the Army of the Ohio, it was left to scattered cavalry units back in Kentucky to guard Rosecrans's rear and combat a new series of Confederate raids into Kentucky and East Tennessee. According to Belcher, sources suggest that at least five provisional brigades were organized during this time and the efficiency displayed by those involved in opposing Morgan's Great Raid of June-July 1863 proved that some strong measure of parity with Confederate cavalry in the West had finally been accomplished. Coincidentally or not, this is the exact same moment in time that the eastern theater Union cavalry proclaimed that it had achieved the same qualitative and moral edge against J.E.B. Stuart's celebrated troopers.

When the new Army of the Ohio finally advanced into East Tennessee in August 1863 and captured Knoxville against little opposition, it was primarily through the cavalry-heavy Twenty-Third Corps. After capturing the city, the cavalry spread out over a large area of occupation, frequently coming into contact with the enemy. In addition to detailing the most important aspect of the mounted arm's contributions to the successful campaign, Belcher provides comprehensive lists of a great many minor actions. By any estimate, the dispersed cavalry of Burnside's army did the lion's share of the fighting in occupied East Tennessee that fall and early winter. During the Confederate attempt to recapture Knoxville, the cavalry also had a large impact on the flow of events. Among other episodes, Belcher details their key role in winning the "race to Campbell's Station" and Colonel William Sanders's stiff rear guard delaying action before Knoxville that cost him his life.

An argument could be made that the Army of the Ohio cavalry's prodigious, but largely behind-the-scenes, labors in East Tennessee rank highest among its many contributions to the Union war effort. In recounting at length numerous engagements of which the cavalry fought front and center, including an abundance of obscure small actions that even many informed students of the Civil War in this region will likely not readily recognize or know only in passing, Belcher builds a strong case that the cavalry of the Army of Ohio performed its best and most valuable service during a highly active six-month period beginning in September 1863. During that time, the cavalry operated at corps strength (nearly 9,000 troopers with even more units added as time went on) over a large geographical area, constantly battling and skirmishing with the enemy under some of the war's most challenging environmental and logistical conditions (so much so that obtaining sufficient remounts was a widespread and persistent problem).

In January 1864, the Army of the Ohio received yet another new commander, General John Schofield, and for the upcoming Atlanta Campaign he would have the controversial George Stoneman as his cavalry chief. When readers think of the role of the Army of the Ohio's cavalry during the Civil War, it is likely that this campaign most often comes to mind. Unfortunately, by a combination of factors (including Sherman's widely documented inability to get the best out of his army group's large mounted forces), the ways in which the campaign unfolded did not display the cavalry's improved performance and stature at their finest. According to Belcher, much of that was due to what happened during General Samuel Sturgis's short tenure as Army of the Ohio cavalry chief, during which longstanding issues went unresolved and there was massive turnover in divisional and brigade leadership. As revealed in the book, the general "disarray" in the cavalry's organization, leadership, and condition extended through the early months of 1864 (when lack of remounts continued to plague the army). All of that left the mounted forces directly attached to the Army of the Ohio poorly prepared for the upcoming rigors of the four-month Atlanta Campaign. While the more disastrous deep raids conducted beyond Atlanta garner much of the attention and largely reflect poorly on the decision-making and priorities of the higher echelons of command (including Sherman, but Stoneman in particular), Belcher convincingly maintains that the veteran regiments continued to operate at a high level, most notably during the earlier stages of the campaign.

Upon the successful conclusion of the Atlanta Campaign, the cavalry's association with the Army of the Ohio ended, but Belcher's narrative continues to follow the noteworthy services of the old regiments through the balance of the war (much of the focus being on the Nashville Campaign). As demonstrated throughout the book, the evolution of the cavalry attached to the Army of the Ohio largely paralleled wider trends and developments across the western theater, the end stage of which was embodied in James Wilson's celebrated lightning campaign through the heart of the Deep South during the waning moments of the war.

The author of a major biography of Union major general David Stanley, an organizational history of the Army of the Cumberland's mounted arm, a unit study of the Chicago Board of Trade battery, and a trio of deep studies detailing cavalry operations during the Stones River, Chickamauga, and Nashville campaigns, Dennis Belcher has quickly become one of the leading authorities on Civil War cavalry in the western theater. Admirably weathering the prodigious challenge of taking an inherently fragmented topic and instilling a coherent order of progression to its history, The Cavalry of the Army of the Ohio only enhances Belcher's growing reputation. Highly recommended.

Booknotes: Yankees in the Hill City

New Arrival:

• Yankees in the Hill City: The Union Prisoner of War Camp in Lynchburg, Virginia, 1862-1865 by Clifton W. Potter, Jr. (McFarland, 2024).

When it comes to Civil War Virginia, the Richmond-area military hospitals and POW facilities naturally dominate the discussion of those topics, but Lynchburg, with its railroad connections and relative isolation from advancing Union armies and cavalry raiders (at least until the latter stages of the war) also proved an ideal location. Indeed, the city was one of the Confederacy's primary hospital centers.

From the description: "With three railroads and a canal passing through the city, Lynchburg, Virginia, was a major hospital center during the Civil War, far from the remote battlefields. A transit camp where Union soldiers remained before being paroled or transferred to another prison opened in June 1862 at the Fair Ground, just outside the city limits. Upon arrival, the sick and wounded were assigned to one of the 32 hospitals regardless of the uniform they wore."

Clifton Potter's Yankees in the Hill City: The Union Prisoner of War Camp in Lynchburg, Virginia, 1862-1865 is a "complete history of this Union POW camp in Lynchburg: the context of its founding, its operations, and its fate after the war." Like other military detention facilities throughout the South, the number of prisoners at Lynchburg quickly exceeded both expectations and capacity, and by June 1862 the prisoner population had already expanded six-fold. At mid-summer there were 5,000 men held there. According to Potter's research, the administrator of the camp, Col. George Gibbs, was exceptionally proficient with making the most of his limited resources. Potter estimates that the death rate there was "roughly 1.56 percent" under Gibbs's watch (pg. 7), a pretty impressive figure that included wounded individuals.

More from the description: "Union POWs who died were buried in the City Cemetery by the local funeral service, which also carefully recorded their personal data. Local ministers daily performed burial services for all soldiers, regardless of their race or the color of their uniforms, and all their expenses were paid by the Confederate government."

The first appendix consists of a register of Union POW deaths at Lynchburg between 1862 and 1865. Record data includes name, unit, date and location of death, detailed burial plot info, and cemetery number. Chapter Five of the book covers the 1864 campaign and battle of Lynchburg, and a corresponding appendix lists Union casualties suffered during those events from May to June 1864. In a cool little detail of the kind I've never encountered before, every source listed in the bibliography has attached commentary discussing its content and significance.

The final chapter covers the camp's post-war history and current state of historical memory attached to it.

Booknotes: Lincoln's Rise to Eloquence

New Arrival:

• Lincoln's Rise to Eloquence: How He Gained the Presidential Nomination by D. Leigh Henson (Univ of Ill Pr, 2024).

Combining disciplined self-education, ambitious drive, and natural intelligence, Abraham Lincoln was one of those gifted men able to successfully rise above presumed limitations of humble beginnings. His public oratory, seamlessly alternating between being folksy in popular appeal and striking in formal political and legal expression, was an essential tool in Lincoln's political arsenal. What was behind its development is the focus of D. Leigh Henson's Lincoln's Rise to Eloquence: How He Gained the Presidential Nomination.

Presented in two parts, the first addressing Lincoln's early Whig career and use of language to "gain distinction in Congress" and the second his 1850s rhetorical duels against both Stephen Douglas and slavery, Henson's study "examines Lincoln’s pre-presidential development as a rhetorician, the purposes and methods behind his speeches and writings, and how the works contributed to his political rise."

As outlined by numerous Lincoln experts, Lincoln's rhetorical power was rooted in multiple sources. More from the description: "Lincoln’s close study of the rhetorical process drew on sources that ranged from classical writings to foundational American documents to the speeches of Daniel Webster. As Henson shows, Lincoln applied his learning to combine arguments on historical, legal, and moral grounds with appeals to emotion and his own carefully curated credibility."

When it comes to analyzing the structure of Lincoln's rhetoric, other works of recent vintage—such as those from David Hirsch and Dan Van Haften that have deconstructed Lincoln's words and speeches using principles of science and math (specifically geometry)—come to mind. Henson "also explores Lincoln’s use of the elements of structural design to craft coherent arguments that, whatever their varying purposes, used direct and plain language to reach diverse audiences--and laid the groundwork for his rise to the White House."

Lincoln’s Rise to Eloquence "follows Lincoln from his early career through the years-long clashes with Stephen A. Douglas to trace the future president’s evolution as a communicator and politician."