Review - "Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles" by Hank Koopman

[Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles by Hank Koopman (Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series - University of Tennessee Press, 2025). Paperback, 15 maps, photographs, touring guide, orders of battle, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages:xiv,281. ISBN:978-1-62190-847-0. $24.95].

When the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, the brainchild of retired U.S. Army colonel Matt Spruill, began its official run with 2018's Decisions at Stones River^*, no one could have predicted how prolific it would become. With contributions from respected subject matter experts and avocational first-timers alike, the series, now approaching two dozen volumes, has in a very short time proved a resounding success. The latest volume, from series newcomer Hank Koopman, is Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles.

For those new to this series, it should be mentioned that these books do not examine Civil War campaigns and battles through the traditional narrative lens. Instead, analysis is through a series of "critical decisions," which are defined as those command choices that had profound consequences in their immediate aftermath and that meaningfully shaped the course of ensuing events. As outlined in previous reviews, analysis of each critical decision follows a structural format to which every volume closely adheres. Discussion progresses through five linked stages—Situation, Options, Decision, Result(s)/Impact, and Alternate Decision/Scenario. The first and typically lengthiest section, Situation describes the state of affairs at a crossroads moment in the campaign or battle. It provides readers with the background information necessary to recognize and evaluate the range of reasonable Options (most frequently two or three in number) available for addressing the situation. The historical Decision is then outlined very briefly before the Result(s)/Impact section recounts what happened and how those results shaped subsequent events. A degree of emphasis is placed on tracing lasting effects of critical decisions made earlier. Finally, an optional Alternate Decision/Scenario section delves into alternative history discussion based on choices not made.

In the series, critical decisions are categorized as being either strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, logistical, or personnel-related. One key message from the series as a whole is that the side that seizes the initiative and holds it longest will typically author the majority of critical decisions. That is certainly the case here for the Henry and Donelson Campaign's twenty-one critical decisions, with the Union side making thirteen decisions and the Confederates eight. Those totals breakdown further into ten operational and three tactical decisions for generals Henry Halleck, U.S. Grant, and their subordinates. On the Confederate side, there are three operational, three tactical, and two personnel-related decisions.

A chief takeaway from Koopman's analysis is the critical importance of unity of command and the firm wielding of it from above. Everyone recognizes how central those intertwined concepts are to successful military operations, but history is replete with examples of officers that failed to heed their lessons. Along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers in early 1862, federal forces used command unity to good effect throughout most of the campaign while the Confederates signally failed to achieve anything close to it. As Koopman keenly observes, Confederate general Albert Sidney Johnston, in his capacity as theater commander, made the two personnel-related decisions but, from faraway Bowling Green, left all of the critical operational decisions to a dysfunctional three-headed monster of his own creation in the form of generals John Floyd (the senior officer), Gideon Pillow, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, who together failed to carry out any semblance of united command and purpose.

If any one stage of the campaign could be considered the 'day of decision' it was February 15, that distinction reflected by all six of the volume's tactical-level critical decisions taking place on that day. Even though Grant gifted the Confederates with his greatest blunder of the campaign, his decision to leave his command headless and rudderless during a six-hour period that happened to coincide with the Confederate breakout attempt. Koopman's examination of those six decisions reveals a stark study in contrasts, with Grant's subordinate division commanders admirably filling the void while their Confederate counterparts, who started their assault without any concrete plan for extricating the army, operated at cross purposes. Though Pillow and his men earned just credit for hard fighting that dislocated the Union right and placed the absent Grant's entire command in some jeopardy, all of the critical decisions made by the Confederate high command at Donelson on that day (one each by Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner) proved calamitous to their small army and the overall Confederate position in the West. Grant, when he did finally arrive back on the field, is duly credited with calmly reasserting control of the situation and finishing the job of turning the tables on the haplessly indecisive Confederates, who incredibly decided to retreat back within their own lines rather than attempt to extricate themselves through the hard-won gap their morning attack had opened in the federal ring.

Though the avowed purpose of the series is not to provide a full narrative of events but rather to focus on key decision-making as a way "to progress from an understanding of 'what happened' to 'why events happened' as they did," Koopman arguably comes closer than most to providing readers with both. His Situation assessments are more developed than those typically presented by series authors, and his Result(s)/Impact discussions go much deeper than most in exploring tactical events and small-unit descriptive detail. In this volume, argumentation in regard to why each decision is determined to have been critical in nature is strong, and linkage and transition between decision analyses are exceptionally smooth. Like other volumes in the series, there is a collection of maps that help orient the reader as well as a driving tour guide (twelve stops in this case) tied to the critical decisions examined in the main text.

Hank Koopman's Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson is another fine entry in University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series. As to the future of the series as a whole, there have been some interesting developments of late. It has been recently revealed that the series is branching out from its prior focus on single campaigns and battles. For example, last year's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns examined multiple operations conducted at various times around a particular geographical point of strategic significance, and the upcoming Decisions on Western Waters will be a themed volume of a type not seen before. It will be worth keeping an eye out for more of those.

* - Spruill's Decisions at Gettysburg was first published in 2011, providing proof of concept, and it was later incorporated into the series as a formal installment with a 2019 second edition.

Booknotes: Interrupted Odyssey

New Arrival:

• Interrupted Odyssey: Ulysses S. Grant and the American Indians by Mary Stockwell (SIU Press, 2025).

A short while ago, I reviewed a well-argued overview analysis of Abraham Lincoln's various interactions with the tribes of North America (to read it, go here). Of course, the 16th president, mired in the Civil War, could not devote much in the way of personal attention (or political capital) to broader Indian affairs, and his assassination left unfulfilled his promise to more closely address relations between the tribes and the United States government once the war ended.

Direct successor Andrew Johnson had similarly pressing matters of national reconstruction to attend to, but his administration managed to negotiate major new treaties with those that sided with the Confederacy during the Civil War as well as with the Plains Indians, agreements with the latter aimed toward safeguarding westward movement and settlement. Those treaties signaled a major new emphasis on resettling tribes to reservations with a long-term goal of assimilating them. Of course, work in those areas was far from over when U.S. Grant, who was involved in that earlier process in his capacity of US Army general in chief, was sworn into office as the nation's 18th president in 1869. The merits of his two-term administration's Indian policy, long disputed in the literature, are the focus of Mary Stockwell's Interrupted Odyssey: Ulysses S. Grant and the American Indians.

Upon taking office, Grant quickly appointed Ely S. Parker, a trusted Seneca lawyer, engineer, and brevet brigadier general who earlier served on Grant's staff during the Civil War, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and they collaborated on developing the administration's "Peace Policy."

From the description: In Interrupted Odyssey, "Stockwell rejects the common claim in previous Grant scholarship that he handed the reservations over to Christian missionaries as part of his original policy. In part because Grant’s plan ended political patronage, Congress overturned his policy by disallowing Army officers from serving in civil posts, abandoning the treaty system, and making the new Board of Indian Commissioners the supervisors of the Indian service. Only after Congress banned Army officers from the Indian service did Grant place missionaries in charge of the reservations, and only after the board falsely accused Parker of fraud before Congress did Grant lose faith in his original policy."

Many other elements of the Peace Policy did not go as planned. More: "Stockwell explores in depth the ousting of Parker, revealing the deep-seated prejudices that fueled opposition to him, and details Grant’s stunned disappointment when the Modoc murdered his peace commissioners and several tribes—the Comanche, Kiowa, Cheyenne, and Sioux—rose up against his plans for them."

Such failures aside, it's probably safe to say that Grant's Indian policies are viewed more positively overall by today's historians, and Stockwell has clearly joined this group of modern revisionists. In the author's view "Grant set his country firmly toward making Indians full participants in the national experience. In setting Grant’s contributions against the wider story of the American Indians, Stockwell’s bold, thoughtful reappraisal reverses the general dismissal of Grant’s approach to the Indians as a complete failure and highlights the courage of his policies during a time of great prejudice."