Booknotes: Fractured Freedoms

New Arrival:

• Fractured Freedoms: Reconstructing Central Louisiana by David T. Ballantyne (LSU Press, 2025).

When, in April 1862, Union army and naval forces captured New Orleans, not only Louisiana's largest city but the most populous city by far in the entire Confederacy, that stunning event opened the floodgates for carrying the war into the Lower Mississippi Valley. By May 1862, the state capital, Baton Rouge, fell to Union forces and control of much of Louisiana's transportation and economic infrastructure soon followed. This early-war period occupation of the heart of a Deep South state offered the Lincoln administration a golden opportunity to test its wartime reconstruction policies.

Rather than attempting a comprehensive examination of reconstruction in Louisiana during the Civil War years and beyond, David Ballantyne's Fractured Freedoms: Reconstructing Central Louisiana employs a more localized approach to the topic. Its focus is on 1860s through 1890s Rapides Parish, which was located smack dab in the center of the state, had a large land area, and had a majority black population. The location of the parish seat, Alexandria, on the right bank of the Red River (and a relatively short distance from the Red's confluence with the Mississippi) meant that the small city was heavily visited by the war's kaleidoscope of effects.

From the description: "Using the region as a case study, Ballantyne reveals what is, in part, a rural Reconstruction success story, emphasizing the resilience of Black politics and the persistence of significant divisions among white residents that allowed the Republican Party to gain and maintain power there. It was only with the collapse of state-level Republican power in 1877 that Democratic forces in the parish were able to dismantle local Republican political control and gradually constrict Black freedoms."

Review - "More Important Than Good Generals: Junior Officers in the Army of the Tennessee" by Jonathan Engel

[More Important Than Good Generals: Junior Officers in the Army of the Tennessee by Jonathan Engel (Kent State University Press, 2025). Paperback, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:x,224/303. ISBN:978-1-60635-489-6. $39.95]

The title of this study is derived from a well-known quote from William T. Sherman, a general never at a loss for words, who commented the following about his Army of the Tennessee: "We have good corporals and good sergeants and some good lieutenants and captains, and those are far more important than good generals." Though the rank and file of the Confederate Army of Tennessee might beg to differ, and the sentiment is easier to swallow when your own army was consistently blessed with good to great leadership at the army, corps, division, and brigade levels, but it's a point well taken. If one agrees that the regiment formed the foundation of the Civil War army, then it certainly follows that regimental officers—captains and lieutenants that led companies and the colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors who commanded the regiment—formed the bedrock of an army's leadership and administration. As Jonathan Engel, author of More Important Than Good Generals: Junior Officers in the Army of the Tennessee, points out in his introductory remarks, his examination of the duties, motivations, and experiences of junior officers in the North's most consistently successful army addresses a neglected middle ground in Civil War personnel studies, a research space that remains far less developed than the vast scholarship devoted to both the general officers at the top levels of army organization (mostly through the avenue of biography) and the common soldiers at the bottom.

In addition to providing a useful synopsis of the current state of the Civil War officer and soldier literature (and where his own study resides within it), Engel's introduction also explains the challenges involved in his sampling process. First, he had to decide which units to include (as many batteries and regiments were attached to the Army of the Tennessee for only a brief interval) and take into account when and for what amount of time the unit actually served with the army. Simply who might count as an officer was its own source of difficulty, particularly in the context of how long an individual would have needed to serve in that capacity before his perspective could be considered relevant to the study. The impracticalities involved in formulating strict rules on these matters are core reasons behind the author abandoning the quest for producing a truly scientific sample. Nevertheless, while this choice precludes much in the way of quantitative analysis, the sheer size of the officer sample obtained in the end (481 individuals) leaves little reason to doubt the possibility of drawing meaningful interpretation from it. A particularly harrowing stat is that one in five of the sampled officers died during his service (with uncounted others suffering wounds of varying severity). That only 12% of those deaths were due to disease speaks to the great perils involved in leading from the front as well as the presumed advantages that officers possessed for maintaining overall well-being (although some in the sample complained about the quality of medical services in the same way that private soldiers commonly did).

The study explores the full gamut of day-to-day regimental officer duties that were distinguished from those carried out by general officers above them and the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers below them. One of the most interesting parts of the discussion looks at the breadth and scale of administrative matters that fell under the responsibilities of these officers. The anxiety that these duties could produce was clearly apparent in one officer telling his wife to make sure the new house they were purchasing was put in her name as he was going to scared of owning anything of great value for years after the war ended for fear the government would seize it to hold him accountable for monies held against him through some old service audit or lost paperwork.

In evaluating the writings of these officers, Engel joins leading historians Gary Gallagher, James McPherson, and others in finding strong evidence to support that notion that ideology was a strong motivational force. The junior officers of the Army of the Tennessee regularly cited the sacred cause of Union and defense of the American political process that both sections abided by before 1860 as primary reasons behind joining the army. He also finds that, far from being disillusioned by the war's constant parade of death and destruction, these officers only strengthened in resolve as the war progressed and, in the author's words, emerged from the conflict "with their moral and political worldview intact" (pg. 4). As it was with common soldiers, faith and family were consistent sustaining forces for junior officers. The letters that form the basis of Engel's study also express strong political engagement from the start, and that characteristic was maintained throughout the war. A clear majority were in accord with federal laws drafted in support of conscription, confiscation, and hard war.

The only period of time when Engel could detect a noticeable breach in the army's aura of self-confidence and certainty in achieving ultimate victory was during the latter part of 1862 and early months of 1863 (the time that corresponded with the joint failures of the 1862 Chickasaw Bayou and Mississippi Central operations and the stalemate months of the Vicksburg Campaign that extended into the following year). At this time, officer writings frequently questioned the Army of the Tennessee's leadership, peaked in their anger and frustration directed toward home front opposition (in particular, the Midwest Copperhead movement), and believed the nation's political elites were truly bungling the war effort. In Engel's estimation, this was a "uniquely despondent period" for these officers.

Of course, with the Army of the Tennessee operating across vast swaths of the middle and deep South, its officers and men were regularly exposed to southern slavery. It's clear that very few of the army's junior officers could be considered abolitionists by the prewar definition, but, as the war progressed, opposition to slavery was more frequently and more explicitly expressed in their letters. Reinforcing the findings of other researchers of Union soldiers, the correspondence of these officers reveal that both emancipation and black enlistment became widely accepted as practical means toward strengthening the Union war effort and weakening Confederate resistance. Following sample letter writers over time, as the author does, also communicates noteworthy patterns of both softened attitudes among those previously ambivalent to, or even hostile toward, the black population and expressions of increased solicitude toward their welfare.

In the area of random stats and trivia that readers might be interested in, Engel found only three references in his sample of officers overseeing target practice. Much more surprising is that the author found no evidence of officer examination boards being set up on an official basis in the Army of the Tennessee. According to Engel, that is a unique omission.

How junior officers viewed the proper relationship between themselves and their men is also a topic of some discussion. Western Civil War armies such as the Army of the Tennessee are often portrayed as being less disciplined than their eastern theater counterparts when it comes to regulating soldier behavior, and the officers of Engel's sample indeed expressed widely differing views on the need for, and propriety of, tightly restraining their men's conduct in the field. A corollary to that attitude is that a number of officers in the sample actively strove to maintain an informal relationship between themselves and the rank and file soldiers that served under them.

One major section of the study that will undoubtedly appeal to a great many readers explores what these officers thought about their superiors. Unsurprisingly, their letters contained many comments about Grant and Sherman. Interestingly, positive approval of Grant's abilities did not begin to coalesce among the junior officer corps until the Vicksburg Campaign was in full swing in Spring 1863, and the same did not happen for Sherman until the 1864 Atlanta Campaign. These men saw that their top leaders shared earnestness and tenacity from early on, but it was a long process before conviction settled in that actual ability and performance matched those generally recognized qualities in both generals. Curiously, respect for later army commanders, James McPherson and O.O. Howard, arrived much faster, with the former's long association with the army (and close relationship with Grant and Sherman) undoubtedly aiding that process. The army's consistent record of victory, which continued under both generals, also undoubtedly meant that neither had to start from square one in the eyes of their men. Readers will also find numerous other insights and opinions on a number of brigade, division, and corps commanders. Generally speaking, as revealed in their writings, Army of the Tennessee junior officers valued bold aggression and dogged determination of purpose. In writing about their fellow regimental officers, the personal traits "they most associated with being a worthy leader included battlefield courage, good character, and respectful relationships with their subordinates" (pg. 112).

In addition to being a highly unique contribution to our knowledge and appreciation of those who fought in the armies of the Civil War, Jonathan Engel's officer study anticipates a number of fruitful avenues for further research. Readers of this book are reminded on more than one occasion that the content and analysis of this study applies to only one army, and an exceptional one at that, with the Army of the Tennessee being the Union's most consistent winner in the field. It would be wonderful to see this type of study applied to the other principal Union armies. A contrast between the western Army of the Tennessee and the eastern Army of the Potomac alone seems almost surely to be productive. It is easy to imagine a great many facets of Engel's study as applied to the much more star-crossed, politically interfered-with, and New England/Mid-Atlantic-flavored Army of the Potomac drawing very different conclusions. More Important Than Good Generals is a fresh and original study that all Civil War students should read.

Booknotes: Decisions of the Red River Campaign

New Arrival:

• Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Michael S. Lang (U Tenn Press, 2025).

This is only the second Trans-Mississippi theater entry in UT Press's highly prolific Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, which is fast approaching two-dozen volumes. The first, Ed Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns (2024), was one of the best in the series.

On the face of it, the 1864 Red River Campaign is a fascinating topic for critical decision analysis. Personality clashes within the Confederate high command in the theater hover heavily over the campaign, but its strategic and operational aspects ooze contingency in ways that still divide opinion. One chronicler of the Red River Campaign and its associated Camden Expedition, Michael Forsyth, even goes so far as to say that the Confederates bungled a golden opportunity to alter the course of the war. Michael Lang's Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation tackles a campaign that resulted in a clear Confederate victory that nevertheless left both sides dissatisfied with the result.

From the description: "By the time of the Red River Campaign, which occurred between March 10 and May 22, 1864, Federal victory in the American Civil War was nearly assured. This final Union offensive in the trans-Mississippi theater was launched to capture Shreveport, a strategic river port and Confederate military complex. The fall of Shreveport would split Confederate forces, allowing the Federals to encircle and destroy the Confederate Army in western Louisiana and southern Arkansas as well as open a gateway to an invasion of Texas. But the dense piney woods and swamps of Louisiana made for difficult maneuvering, and both sides made severe tactical mistakes, leading General William Tecumseh Sherman to declare the Red River Campaign “one damn blunder from beginning to end.”"

In support of the decision analysis are sixteen maps, an 11-stop driving tour, orders of battle, and strength tables. I've already started reading this so the review should appear sometime in the coming weeks.