Showing posts with label Reviews - Naval. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Reviews - Naval. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 8, 2026

Review - "Ironclad Ambush: Confederates Strike Lincoln's Mississippi River Blockade at the Head of Passes, October 12, 1861" by Neil Chatelain

[Ironclad Ambush: Confederates Strike Lincoln's Mississippi River Blockade at the Head of Passes, October 12, 1861 by Neil P. Chatelain (Savas Beatie, 2026). Hardcover, 12 maps, photos, illustrations, footnotes, appendix, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xviii,209/255. ISBN:978-1-61121-795-7. $32.95]

As Civil War naval historian Neil Chatelain revealed in his excellent 2020 study Defending the Arteries of Rebellion: Confederate Naval Operations in the Mississippi River Valley, 1861-1865, Union victory and Confederate defeat along the length of the Mississippi River could not be fully explained through simple recitation of the wide disparities in financial, industrial, and military resources available to each side. Of course, those differences, as stark as they were, defined the conflict in many ways, but it is also true that fairly prodigious amounts of Confederate funding and material were thrown into defending both ends of the great river valley. Unfortunately for the region's defenders, a lack of unified direction, competition between government and civilian authorities, interservice rivalries, and general dispersal of effort critically hindered the creation of an effective naval counter to the rapidly expanding and increasingly aggressive U.S. Navy.

Nevertheless, some noteworthy tactical victories were achieved by those scratch Confederate naval forces, one of which occurred quite early in the war at the Head of Passes on October 12, 1861. A number of brief overviews of the battle can be found in the literature (arguably the best being the relevant section of Chester Hearn's broader study The Capture of New Orleans, 1862 (1995), but Chatelain's new book Ironclad Ambush: Confederates Strike Lincoln's Mississippi River Blockade at the Head of Passes, October 12, 1861 is the first full-length account.

The October 12 battle occurred at a time when blockading Union naval forces were rapidly gathering at the mouth of the Mississippi River as well as other key points of Gulf shipping ingress and egress. Even at this early stage of that process, enforcement had reached the point that Union forces felt confident enough to ascend the river and work toward constructing a fortified land battery below the Head of Passes. It was under this developing situation that the battle was fought, and Chatelain's study deals with matters associated with the establishment and tightening of the blockade during this period at length. Pertinent to that discussion is a detailed review of the types and capabilities of the ships involved as well as the uneven quality of their captains.

Arrayed against the growing Union threat was a hastily marshaled "mosquito fleet" led by Confederate naval captain George Hollins that consisted of a number of converted steamers with fire raft support, but what boosted Confederate confidence most was the availability and promise of the newly completed ironclad ram Manassas. Contradictory contemporary claims and assorted mysteries still impact modern appraisal of the vessel. They include what the ironclad really looked like, and design features as simple as whether it had one or two smokestacks (although Chatelain is confident in his answer to that latter question). Throughout his many attempts at cutting through the haze of conflicting accounts on a variety of matters, Chatelain judiciously weighs each side of a particular contested issue (explaining his thought process in the main text) and offers his own interpretation based on the best available evidence. A number of fresh insights emerge from this thorough review of the original source material, among them are some consensus-challenging suggestions surrounding the timing, place, and circumstances of Manassas's incorporation into the C.S. Navy. Every major secondary source claims that Manassas, a civilian-financed and owned privateer, was forcibly seized by Confederate authorities for their own use, but Chatelain cites primary source evidence strongly supportive of the possibility that Manassas's civilian captain, John Stevenson, first offered his powerful ram's services to the government.

The best writers of Civil War land campaign and battle narrative are able to convey a vivid mental picture and deep understanding of battlefield landscape and topography to their readers, and Chatelain is able to do much the same for the geology and hydrology of the Mississippi River's mouth. Knowledge and awareness of the shifting sand bars, scouring forces, "mud humps," and other noteworthy (and militarily significant) physical features of the river mouth geography are essential to reader understanding of the fleet action that occurred there, and the author provides that background information in full. Chatelain's detailed description and analysis of the river's five main passes (Southwest, South, Southeast, Northeast, and Pass รก l'Outre) that branch off the aptly named Head of Passes like the fingers of a glove demonstrate why blockading the mouth of the Mississippi was difficult while at the same time in some ways simpler than one might realize. With those matters in mind, it's clear to see why both sides so closely coveted control of the inland Head of Passes.

The battle itself, which lasted only a few early-morning hours and apparently resulted in no casualties on either side, is recounted thoroughly and well. Map support is strong, with a series tracing ship movements and positions of both sides during each phase of the battle and its immediate aftermath. This is easily the most detailed account of the battle to date, unlikely to be surpassed unless a significant body of new source material emerges. After Manassas successfully, but not fatally, rammed the powerful steam sloop U.S.S. Richmond, the Union flotilla fled from the Head of Passes. Three ships (including the Richmond) ran aground below Southwest Pass and struggled mightily to refloat themselves. Under long-range harassing fire from the tug C.S.S. Ivy and fearing return of Manassas, which unbeknownst to them withdrew upriver after partially dislodging its ram and losing an engine during its strike on Richmond, some officers panicked and miscommunication even led to premature vessel abandonment.

In addition to exploring the battle itself in all its intricacies, Chatelain persuasively conveys to readers a solid sense of both its meaning and depth of its shadow. Head of Passes was the war's first fleet action as well as its first use of an ironclad in combat. As the author explains, the battle did not spark the ensuing flurry of ironclad building in general nor did it prompt the construction of ram fleets on the Mississippi (both initiatives were already well in swing by the time of the battle), but the limited success of Manassas offered encouraging proof of concept. October 12 was a very bad day for the U.S. Navy, and its handling of the engagement was shaky from top to bottom. After allowing themselves to be surprised, the Union vessels retreated in unseemly haste and, as mentioned before, orders to abandon grounded vessels were unnecessarily issued on more than one occasion. However, Chatelain makes an interesting point that the embarrassing U.S. defeat very well might have had a silver lining of major proportions. The command shakeup after the battle, which included reassignment of area commander Capt. William McKean and the sidelining or outright cashiering of his most underperforming subordinate ship captains, brought to the West Gulf Blockading Squadron daring new leadership that performed their duties phenomenally well during the devastatingly effective New Orleans campaign of the following spring. The author's suggestion that that decisive outcome might have been seriously in doubt had the October 12 battle not gone so poorly and the original leadership remained in place is an intriguing counterfactual to consider.

Recent years have been good ones for filling in gaps in the Civil War naval warfare and blockade literature, and Neil Chatelain's Ironclad Ambush represents yet another fresh and original contribution to those areas of study. In addition to providing the first truly comprehensive history of the Head of Passes naval battle, Chatelain's book adds essential context to our knowledge and understanding of the early-war blockade of the Mississippi River mouth. Highly recommended.

Monday, July 6, 2026

Review - "This Great Contest Afloat: The Civil War on the Seas, Coastline, Rivers, and Oceans" by Neil Chatelain

[This Great Contest Afloat: The Civil War on the Seas, Coastline, Rivers, and Oceans by Neil P. Chatelain (Savas Beatie, 2026). Softcover, maps, photos, illustrations, appendix section, reading list. Pages main/total:xxv,147/192. ISBN:978-1-61121-777-3. $16.95]

Adequately summarizing the Civil War naval component's enormous impact on Union victory and Confederate defeat requires not only the ability to skillfully condense a highly multifarious area of study but also the mastering of a vast and constantly expanding literature. In producing his latest book This Great Contest Afloat: The Civil War on the Seas, Coastline, Rivers, and Oceans, it is readily apparent that Neil Chatelain, himself a major recent contributor to Civil War naval history studies, was able to meet those steep challenges. The pleasing result far surpasses what one might consider to be merely adequate.

Given that the clashes between opposing field armies were the Civil War's primary driving force, the land-oriented convention of dividing the conflict into three major theaters of operation remains valid. Complicating this traditional arrangement of lines on a map is the complex geography and nature of the naval war, and Chatelain convincingly conceptualizes that aspect of the war as unfolding along four naval theaters: the blockade, the littoral zone ("beaches, estuaries, deltas, bays, and harbors"), the rivers, and the oceans. Within the volume's discussion of each, chapters unfold in phases consisting of one or more years. In this way, each theater, with its men, machines, strategies, tactics, and clashes both large and small, gets its proper due. Where these four naval theaters were interconnected is also discussed.

Of course, a grand overview narrative of this kind limits the amount of operational detail that can be conveyed, but Chatelain still manages to present a remarkably comprehensive account of naval actions ranging from individual ship engagements to squadron-level battles. Beyond that, on both the domestic and international stages, the naval war is explored in its economic and diplomatic contexts. While a chapter specifically devoted to the common sailors of both sides would have been welcome (and it is understood that not every sub-topic can be covered), brief excerpts from firsthand accounts are sprinkled about, and the impact of individual officers, both well-known and obscure, are highlighted throughout.

Progressive Union domination of southern rivers and coastlines as well as the inexorable tightening of the blockade are well outlined, with due emphasis placed on the importance of army-navy combined operations, and all phases of Confederate naval resistance, along with countermeasures such as mine warfare, are discussed in turn. While the Confederates achieved noteworthy successes in evading the blockade over almost the entire duration of the war, continually expanding Union naval enforcement combined with the loss of major ports and their rail connections to the Confederate interior were strong limiting factors. In only one of the four theaters were the Confederates able to seize real momentum. In the oceanic theater the Confederates employed commerce raiding, an asymmetrical military and economic strategy that damaged the United States global merchant fleet (the second largest in the world at the time) to such an extent that much of the shipping was driven into foreign flagging and the merchant marine industry itself forced into a course of long-term decline.

Chatelain's text is not just a reorganized regurgitation of oft-repeated history. It also references fresh work and suggests future paths of study. For example, in addition to incorporating key points from his own specialized research in Confederate naval mismanagement of their early-war Mississippi River Valley defenses as well as the economic war centered on safeguarding or intercepting U.S. gold shipments passing through the Panamanian isthmus, Chatelain calls attention to other recent work such as Michael Bonner and Peter McCord's reexamination of the blockade's overall effectiveness. As was the case with prior series installments, readers have to go to the main Emerging Civil War website to find the volume's footnotes and bibliography (available in pdf format here).

Strong synergy between main text and supporting visual aids (among the latter abundant photographs, period drawings, and original maps) has been a major force behind the appeal and popularity of the ECW series of books, and this one excels in that category. Another common series feature is an appendix section populated with an eclectic mix of supplemental topics and discussion. In this volume's collection, Chatelain surveys the Civil War contributions of black sailors and offers some top-down organizational notes as well as commentary on sites associated with the naval war that are worth visiting today.

A compact yet comprehensive survey study encompassing both big picture strategy and naval activities of all scales and types, Neil Chatelain's This Great Contest Afloat: The Civil War on the Seas, Coastline, Rivers, and Oceans is a great option for those seeking an updated introductory-level Civil War naval history.

Friday, June 5, 2026

Review - "Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles" by Michael Becker

[Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles by Michael D. Becker (University of Tennessee Press, 2026). Softcover, 10 maps, photos, illustrations, driving tour, orders of battle, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xv,142/290. ISBN:979-8-89527-045-5. $24.95]

Naturally enough, the major land campaigns and battles fought in the eastern and western theaters have been the primary focus of University of Tennessee Press's prolific Campaign Decisions in America's Civil War series. However, there has been some shift in direction over the past year and a half or so, with the subject matter of two volumes [Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns (2024) and Decisions of the Red River Campaign (2025)] finally crossing into the Trans-Mississippi theater of operations. Naval orientation is also on the rise, another welcome development. As was the case with Edward Cotham's Galveston book, Michael Becker's Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles centers naval and combined operations in its analysis while also departing significantly from the established structural format of addressing only a single, sharply defined campaign. Indeed, Becker's book covers a series of interconnected land and naval operations played out over an extended period of time (1861-64), the unifying theme of which was the bitterly contested strategic struggle for control over the mighty Mississippi River and its major tributaries. Both Cotham and Becker's contributions demonstrate that the format of the series can be adaptable without losing the core elements of its character and identity.

Many readers of this review will already be familiar with the series and its structure, at the center of which is the concept of the "critical decision." For those new to the series, critical decisions, as distinct from mere important decisions, not only have major consequences in their own right but possess the key added feature of substantially shaping those decisions and events that follow it over the course of the rest of the campaign and beyond. For each critical decision, identification and analysis unfolds in the following sequence: Situation, Options, Decision, and Result(s)/Impact. Situation describes a particular state of politico-military affairs (categorized as strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, personnel related, or logistical in nature) at a moment pivotal enough to prompt a critical decision. That decision framework provides readers with the background context necessary to recognize and evaluate the Options (two or more in number) available to the decision-maker. The historical Decision selected from those options by a critical decision-maker is then briefly described. The ensuing Result(s)/Impact section recounts what happened and outlines the ways in which the decision's outcome shaped the historical events that followed. An Alternative Decision/Scenario section is optional for contributors (some go deep into alternate history conjecture while others omit it altogether). In this case, Becker ventures into that territory selectively.

Each of the six categories of critical decisions are represented at least twice in Becker's analysis. While operational and tactical decisions comprise the majority, their sources (both military and civilian leaders) and categorical diversity are emblematic of the range of key actors and factors involved with the initial conception, support, and conduct of Civil War military campaigns. The expansive time interval and geographical space involved with the events of this particular volume are uniquely broad, but the author is up to the challenge when it comes to connecting the decisions in coherent fashion.

The twenty-seven critical decisions involved in securing control over the key waterways of the inland West are organized into four chapters by year: 1861 (9 decisions), 1862 (14), 1863 (2), and 1864 (2). That the great majority are concentrated in the first two years of the war really highlights the exemplary foresight, urgency, determination, and flexibility of Union planners, who built a vast squadron of river gunboats of various types from scratch and quickly put them to highly effective use without any prior experience in the areas of design and tactics from earlier wars. The great rapidity with which that process occurred denied their much more resource-strapped and disorganized Confederate opponents the breathing space needed to coordinate an effective response. The result was that squadron-scale Confederate naval resistance on the western rivers was effectively destroyed by mid-1862. In terms of assessing the campaign to control the western waterways, it might be argued that there were no more critical decisions to had after Vicksburg and Port Hudson were both secured by Union forces in July 1863, but the Red River Campaign of the following spring placed a large proportion of Mississippi River Squadron capital ships at great risk, making Becker's two 1864 decisions (both related to that campaign) worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, even if the entire Union naval contingent was lost it is difficult to imagine the Confederates gaining the capacity to seriously threaten Union control of Mississippi River navigation at that late stage of the war.

Becker's discussion demonstrates strong awareness and appreciation of recent contributions to the literature. His presentation and analysis of critical 1861-62 Confederate decision-making aligns closely with the mistakes and challenges so astutely identified and examined in Neil Chatelain's insightful 2020 study Defending the Arteries of Rebellion: Confederate Naval Operations in the Mississippi River Valley, 1861-1865. Among these were inefficient resource allocation, dispersal of effort through debilitating competition over scarce resources, strategic indecision, and lack of unified command. Becker usefully reminds us that, at one point, five different civilian and governmental entities had jurisdiction over fighting vessels in the region, and the single professional naval officer given the most authority, George Hollins, was relieved of command at the worst possible moment. As the author outlines in the book, all of those factors impacted critical decision-making in ways that directly contributed to epic disaster for the Confederate defense of the Upper and Lower Mississippi River Valley during the early war period. In similar vein, the critical decision involving staff officer Lewis B. Parsons's reorganization of theater transportation resources demonstrates keen appreciation of the recent literature's assessment of Union rail and river logistics.

Books of this type are always going to have a subjective element to them. Some readers will point toward possible omissions or differ with the author in identifying certain decisions as being truly critical. One of the latter might be the decision surrounding Union construction of a mortar boat flotilla for shore bombardment. While these vessels were deployed during a number of important ship vs. shore actions fought along the Mississippi River Valley, it would be difficult to maintain that they had a critical impact on any of them. In the area of possible omissions, Becker makes strong cases for designating a number of naval administration matters as critical decisions, but one might also suggest that promoting David Dixon Porter to command the new Mississippi River Squadron was a critical personnel related decision. Compatible personalities mattered a very great deal when any and all naval assistance provided to army operations had to be framed as an interservice request. The personal and professional harmony that existed between Porter's navy and Grant and Sherman's army was instrumental to Union victory on a multitude of occasions, not least of which during the very difficult Vicksburg Campaign. In terms of actual complaints, the Decision and Results/Impact sections of some situations draw significant elements from more than one Option choice, which is a practice not typical of the series. Given that that pops up most often in situations with option numbers as high as four and five, option consolidation would have been one way to address that occasional source of confusion.

A major feature of every book in the series is the driving tour appendix tied to the main text's critical decision analysis. This is achieved through a combination of additional support text from the author and focused excerpts from official reports and military communications. As one might imagine, Becker's task was an especially challenging one given the vast size of the Mississippi River Valley area of operations. Even with careful organization, the twelve tour stops between Cairo, Illinois and Bailey's Dam on the Red River in Louisiana take the user on a journey of 1,300 miles! The appendix section also contains vessel orders of battle for each of the major actions discussed in the text.

A novel variation on the typical subject matter of the Campaign Decisions in America's Civil War series, Michael Becker's Decisions on Western Waters successfully applies the critical decision analysis structure to one of the war's longest running and most geographically extensive military contests, effectively framing the opening of the Mississippi as a single campaign of critical significance. With available land campaigns of major status dwindling in number, it will be interesting to see what other unusual pathways the series might take.

Wednesday, May 13, 2026

Review - "William Watson and the Rob Roy: The Adventures of a Civil War Blockade Runner" by Walter Wilson

[William Watson and the Rob Roy: The Adventures of a Civil War Blockade Runner by Walter E. Wilson (McFarland, 2026). Softcover, maps, tables, photos, illustrations, appendix section, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:vi,157/250. ISBN:978-1-4766-9903-5. $39.95]

A British citizen but long-term resident of Louisiana, Scotland's William Bryant Watson joined many other foreign nationals in being caught up in the whirlwind of America's Civil War. Volunteering with the Third Louisiana infantry regiment, Sergeant Watson fought at Wilson's Creek and Pea Ridge, and in October of 1862 he was wounded at Second Corinth. Returning home to recover, Watson eventually decided to switch gears and engage in the potentially lucrative pursuit of blockade running out of Texas. His vessel, the schooner Rob Roy, became perhaps the best remembered of that class to ply the trade, mostly due to Watson's event-filled 1892 memoir The Adventures Of A Blockade Runner; Or, Trade In Time Of War. A critical reexamination of that published account, Walter Wilson's William Watson and the Rob Roy: The Adventures of a Civil War Blockade Runner assigns itself the difficult task of correcting mistakes, filling in gaps and omissions, and addressing the various half-truths and embellishments that together seriously challenge the truthfulness of Watson's story. In the end, Wilson's research finds that much of Watson's memoir is backed by historical sources.

As Wilson confirms, Watson's blockade-running adventure had a rocky start. At first the Rob Roy was confiscated by Confederate authorities for government use. This caused a minor international incident due to Watson's foreign citizenship. After that matter was resolved and the Rob Roy was finally loaded with cotton bales to run the blockade, the schooner sank in its berth from gross negligence in cargo stowage. Eventually, the schooner was raised and completed its first voyage without incident. It speaks to the sheer vastness of the Gulf Coast and the difficulties involved with maintaining a tight blockade of even a limited number of ports, that a slow sailing vessel such as the Rob Roy was able to achieve a measure of success. This is especially notable given its relatively late start (near the end of 1863) in the high risk-high reward business of illicit trade, well after the U.S. Navy's blockade enforcement was in full swing. Watson increased his chances of avoiding capture by taking an indirect route to Havana, first stopping at Tampico, Mexico and then hugging the coast all the way to the Yucatan Peninsula's eastern extent before sailing directly to Cuba (the journey from the Tampico waypoint to Havana taking perhaps just over two weeks). For his second voyage to Havana, he changed the route to avoid predictability.

As Watson explains, feelings of considerable relief upon safely reaching a blockade-running harbor with a full cargo did not last long. Wilson confirms that such places were rife with unscrupulous speculators and corrupt brokers. In reading about Watson's two stopovers in Havana, one gets a sense of both the scale of profits involved as well as the complex behind-the-scenes activities attendant to finding crews, acquiring and financing return cargoes, and (related to the last point) negotiating new ownership shares. The number of shady characters swarming each arriving ship was legion, and it took considerable knowledge and interpersonal skills to determine who was worthy of trust. Politicking was also involved, with brokers, captains, and shipowners ingratiating themselves with local military commanders in ways that smoothed the permit process as well as hampered competitors or (in the case of Watson) those with whom they had business quarrels. Watson's encounters with other schooner owners, expanded upon by Wilson's research, also strongly suggests that the use of small, sail-powered vessels played a significant part in the international blockade running trade in the Gulf throughout the war.

In addition to shedding considerable light on a largely unsung and underappreciated aspect of Civil War blockade running, Watson's memoir also provides useful information about the tactics he employed to escape detection and capture. The most modern of contemporary steamships employed in blockade running relied on sleek hulls, long and low profiles, and sheer speed, but Watson developed effective strategies of his own that were tailored to both the strengths and limitations of schooners. In their case, it was best to move cautiously and methodically. Watson avoided unfurling sails during daylight hours, and moved at night as much as possible. When a blockader was sighted on the horizon during the day, it was best not to run. Instead, small boats were immediately launched to turn the schooner bow-on to the approaching steamer, making the runner's small profile difficult to discern among the waves. When approaching the destination, the shallow draft of the schooner was a strength, allowing it safe passage through channels that the much larger blockading steamships could not closely cover.

Among his wide-ranging efforts, Wilson performs yeoman work in attempting to uncover the full names of the litany of figures in Watson's account who were identified only by a single initial (ex. Mr. L). In the most difficult cases, Wilson provides readers with a number of possible candidates while offering his own opinion as to the most likely one. Wilson's research uncovers in-depth information on a great many of the historically obscure characters that figure large and small in Watson's story. The author's work also follows other individuals involved in captaining schooners, the most colorful of these being Capt. Dave McClusky. In addition to exploring the social and business networks and relationships that shaped Watson's experiences, those parts of the book collectively expand our understanding of the wider trade. One of the most important aspects of Wilson's analysis is his close reexamination of Watson's shaky, and occasionally non-existent, grasp of the where and when. Utilizing a variety of sources, Wilson imposes upon Watson's memoir an authoritative timeline of dates and events backed by solid evidence that serve to either confirm, question, or completely debunk Watson's claims. Much of the author's research in Gulf blockade runners, their cargoes, and the timing of their voyages is helpfully compiled in tabular format for current and future use.

Some of the volume's strongest historical detective work goes into investigating Watson's series of alleged voyages involving the Rob Roy, Phoenix/Pelican, and Jeanette that have no existing records or outside corroborating sources. The author calls these parts of Watson's story his "phantom voyages." As thoroughly documented and discussed among three chapters, there is no direct or even indirect evidence that Watson, as he claimed, completed a second return run into Galveston with Rob Roy, later sold his share in the schooner, and continued blockade running with steamships. By Wilson's best determination from the available sources, none of the steamship claims are supported by actual evidence. Instead of divesting himself of his ownership share in Rob Roy, the truth seems to be that Watson made a final voyage aboard it in early 1865, during which the schooner was forced onto a beach in Florida and burned to prevent its capture. After the war, Watson returned to his native land and, by all appearances, led a life of successful business pursuits.

In addition to constituting a significant addition to the Civil War blockade literature (in particular, the lesser-examined Texas, Mexico, and Cuba trading triangle in the Gulf), Walter Wilson's William Watson and the Rob Roy demonstrably affirms that Watson's celebrated yet controversial memoir does indeed possess considerable value as a historical document, if used with an abundance of caution. Indispensable to that necessity is pairing Watson's book with Wilson's impressive new critical evaluation.

Monday, January 5, 2026

Review - "The Devil’s Own Purgatory: The United States Mississippi River Squadron in the Civil War" by Robert Gudmestad

[The Devil’s Own Purgatory: The United States Mississippi River Squadron in the Civil War by Robert Gudmestad (Louisiana State University Press, 2025). Hardcover, maps, photos, appendix section, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xiii,212/305. ISBN:978-0-8071-8491-2. $50]

The strategies, leaders, common sailors, ships, and operations associated with the Civil War period U.S. Navy's Mississippi River Squadron (the famed "Brown Water Navy") have been documented and studied in numerous book-length overviews, biographical treatments, and microhistories. Fine modern works from the likes of Gary Joiner, Barbara Tomblin, and Myron Smith have preceded this one, but what makes Robert Gudmestad's The Devil’s Own Purgatory: The United States Mississippi River Squadron in the Civil War exceptional is its development of fresh interpretive themes drawn from, among other sources, extensive use of newly created datasets as well as its unprecedented levels of quantitative integration (including GIS mapping) into the volume's textual description and analysis.

In a compact narrative remarkable for the breadth and amount of focused depth achieved in just over two-hundred pages of main text, Gudmestad explores the Mississippi River Squadron's origins as the army-controlled Western Gunboat Flotilla and documents the full range of its wartime activities, which included squadron-scale engagements, ship vs. ship and ship vs. shore encounters, escort duties, counterguerrilla operations, area control patrolling, and interdiction of both illicit trade and Confederate use of western waterways for their own supply, transport, and logistical uses. An exhaustive presentation of the squadron's Civil War record is beyond the book's scope, but strong summaries of the more significant battles and campaigns (among them Forts Henry and Donelson, early-1862 White River operations, the Battle of Arkansas Post, the 1862-63 Vicksburg Campaign, and 1864's Red River Campaign and Johnsonville debacles) are provided as are brief accounts of a myriad of smaller-scale actions. Shipboard life (including discipline and punishment) is also vividly described and the squadron's central role in military emancipation highlighted at some length.

A key component of the research behind the book is the impressive sailor database compiled from official muster rolls by the author and his team. Their combined efforts produced detailed information on 14,754 sailors. With the likelihood that another 1-2,000 individuals went unexamined, the author estimates that up to 17,000 men served in the squadron. In both text and tabular formats, a detailed demographic profile of Brown Water Navy recruits emerges from that source. Differences between Union sailors and army soldiers are noteworthy. Western sailors were far less likely than Union Army volunteers to be farmers, more likely to be immigrants, and both younger and slightly shorter than their foot soldier counterparts. While there were also demographic differences between the navy's deep water and inland waterway sailors, Gudmestad contends that both groups shared a general lack of ideological enlistment motivation. Though William Marvel has recently argued in convincing fashion that economic considerations drove early Union Army enlistment in previously underappreciated ways, most scholarship highlights saving the Union as the army volunteer's primary motivation (with some enlistees also expressing earnest desire to free the slaves). By contrast, it is the author's conclusion here (though one wishes Gudemestad had developed the argument at greater length in the book) that the evidence best supports the claim that economic reasons, including the prospects of prize money, were what generally motivated western sailors.

Gudmestad's manuscript research, fresh analysis of the relevant primary and secondary literature, and new quantitative measures (the last including GIS mapping of riverine irregular warfare events), together leads him to interpret the Mississippi River Squadron's war as passing through four distinct, yet partially overlapping, phases. Overall, it is a useful construct for tracking the evolution of the squadron's assigned roles and range of activities. During Phase One (July 1861-June 1862), the Western Gunboat Flotilla, primarily manned by former bluewater sailors and transfers from the army, directly confronted Confederate vessels, squadrons, and river forts both alone and in conjunction with the army. Phase Two (ending in April 1863), which further perfected army-navy combined operations and essentially marked the complete destruction of organized Confederate naval opposition, was still characterized by attacks on river forts, but the escalation of irregular attacks against Union rear area shipping during that time transformed the main duties of the squadron to supply line protection and escort duties. During Phase Three (May 1863 to April 1864), the naval counterguerrilla war deepened and intensified, with the navy going on the determined offensive against both guerrilla attackers and their presumed civilian supporters (the targeting of the latter leading to much in the way of unjustified acts of plunder and property destruction). Finally, Phase Four, which encompassed the final twelve months of the war, witnessed a steep drop in squadron efficiency and an accompanying rise in Confederate success in ambushing and destroying squadron vessels.

After the harsh reality of sailor life on a closely confined western gunboat set in, it became increasingly difficult to maintain minimum crew strength. Individualistic northern recruits chafed at naval discipline, which was much stricter than that of the army. That, combined with the many personal discomforts and extreme health hazards involved in the shipboard environment (the squadron routinely operated in the most mosquito-infested areas of the Deep South) deterred new recruits and helped produce a persistent manpower gulf. Gudmestad convincingly argues that black recruitment (willing, half-willing, and unwilling) critically addressed that widened gap that emerged during the second and third phases of the squadron's war. His research reveals that blacks and white immigrants enlisted in nearly equal numbers during the second phase, and black men comprised more than one-third of new recruits during the third phase. Military emancipation facilitated much of that Phase Three influx. The Union Army's role in military emancipation across the length and breadth of the lower Mississippi River Valley has been featured in a number of recent studies. By comparison, the western navy's part in the process has been less appreciated in the literature, and Gudmestad's coverage of the topic represents a significant effort toward addressing that imbalance.

A variety of elements involved in Phase Four make it worthy of special attention. Much has been written about the negative impact late-war recruits had on Union Army of the Potomac combat efficiency (although more recent scholarship has strongly contested many of those earlier conclusions), but far less attention has been paid to how much expiring enlistments affected naval operations over the same period. Gudmestad argues that, compared with 1864 Union Army regiments, Mississippi River Squadron vessels experienced far more critically low reenlistment rates. He attributes much of that to discipline requirements, low onboard quality of life (exemplified by the sailor quote serving as the book's title), and, as also mentioned above, lack of ideological commitment. Other contributors to plunging operational efficiency were very heavy desertion rates (perhaps the highest among all Union military formations) and high personnel turnover from disease and disability. There was also extensive turnover in top leadership, with more than a third of squadron vessels having new commanders for the war's final twelve months. In comparison to the two prior phases, the final phase witnessed a sharp plunge in black enlistment (only 8%), a change likely stemming from native-born and immigrant whites taking advantage of highly lucrative late-war enlistment bounties. The result of all of this was a very noticeable drop in overall leadership aggressiveness, far fewer shore expeditions, and a sharp rise in the incidence and success rates of anti-ship attacks from experienced and highly mobile Confederate guerrilla and raiding forces (a prime example of notable Confederate success against qualitatively declining opposition being the Johnsonville, Tennessee disaster of November 1864). However, as Gudemestad also explains, none of those drawbacks, significant as they were, prevented the squadron from carrying out its primary tasks and finishing out the war wearing the crown of victory.

A deftly composed combination of sound synthesis and groundbreaking original research, Robert Gudmestad's The Devil’s Own Purgatory: The United States Mississippi River Squadron in the Civil War presents a fresh portrait and reassessment of the Brown Water Navy's war. Elements of this study will enhance and challenge the existing knowledge and perceptions of even the best-read students of the subject matter. The extensive datasets created by Gudmestad's team will also be profoundly useful tools for future researchers. Highly recommended.

Wednesday, November 12, 2025

Review - "Rockets, Tanks and Submarines: The Ingenuity of Civil War Texans" by Edward Cotham

[Rockets, Tanks and Submarines: The Ingenuity of Civil War Texans by Edward T. Cotham, Jr. (State House Press, 2025). Softcover, photos, drawings, maps, illustrations, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:ix,236/304. ISBN:978-1-64967-027-4. $39.95]

It was patently obvious to every contemporary observer that the Civil War North and loyal Border States together possessed financial, industrial, logistical, and technological resources that the agriculture-based economy of the Confederate South could not hope to match. In attempting to put that vast disparity into stark perspective, it has often been repeated in the sources that New York state alone had more manufacturing firms than the entire South. The only question was whether Union military and civilian leaders and planners would prove able to fully mobilize and manage those resources and integrate them efficiently into a war-winning strategy. There were ups and downs in the process along the way, but it would be difficult to argue that the overall effort was not a stupendous success. It has even been argued, the chief proponent being Thomas Army, that engineering, and with it its major components of education, management, personnel, and technology, was the decisive factor in the Union triumph. Somewhat lost, or at least underappreciated, in all that discussion were the many military advancements and innovations produced by Confederate inventors, designers, and engineers, many of whom hailed from Texas. Their many attempts to offset Union land and naval superiority with advanced weapons and force-multiplying technologies are the focus of Edward Cotham's fascinating new study Rockets, Tanks and Submarines: The Ingenuity of Civil War Texans.

Cotham's study is not the first book to detail the wartime history behind the men and activities of the Singer Secret Service Corps, a highly active group of inventors and financiers led by Edgar Singer and organized at Port Lavaca, Texas in 1863. Best known for their development and production of effective torpedo technologies, Singer agents spread their mine warfare ideas and expertise for deployment to both inland waterway invasion routes and strategic points located along the Confederate coastline from Texas to Virginia. Published in 2015, Mark Ragan's Confederate Saboteurs: Building the Hunley and Other Secret Weapons of the Civil War represented a pioneering investigation into the wide-ranging impact the Singer group had on not only land-based and underwater torpedo/mine warfare during the Civil War but also submarines (including the famed CSS Hunley) and torpedo boats. Fully crediting Ragan's groundbreaking research, Cotham's own book both revisits and expands upon that earlier work. Numerous productive Texan men of ideas both inside and outside the Singer group are profiled in the text. Among the most prominent figures are the aforementioned Edgar Singer, Robert Creuzbaur "The Captain Nemo of Texas," Benjamin Whitney, Charles Williams (designer of the Triton submarine plan and a horological torpedo), and Williams collaborator Ebenezer Allen.

Among the innovative secret weapons developed for the Confederate war effort, the Singer torpedo of various designs and triggering mechanisms proved most effective. Relatively cheap deterrents that packed a powerful punch that could sink a capital ship in a single blow, Singer weapons were a horror to Union naval vessels cruising inland waterways or those attempting to breach southern harbor defenses. Army officers and men also came to fear their subterra tactical deployment along strategic roadways, railroad tracks, and land-facing fortifications. As Cotham and others before him have pointed out, though, the Achilles heal of employing torpedoes for coastal defense was their highly uncertain shelf life in the face of strong tidal forces and both saltwater corrosion and sea life encrustation disabling triggering mechanisms. To remain reliably effective, torpedo fields that protected harbors would have to be regularly replaced, a requirement that was perhaps beyond the capacity of local resources.

In addition to torpedo weapons themselves, their means of conveyance to the enemy in the form of submarines and semi-submersible torpedo boats are major objects of Cotham's research. The successful sinking of USS Housatonic by the submersible CSS Hunley and the damaging of the ironclad USS New Ironsides by the torpedo boat David are only part of a wider discussion of the debates within Confederate military, government, and civilian circles over the usefulness and potential of such weapon classes. The leadership of the C.S. Navy is often portrayed as being more open than most when it came to approving new and untested technologies, but Cotham's study shows that getting that approval was more often than not a tough struggle, which was understandable given the competition for limited resources within Confederate military procurement. Nevertheless, the potential merits behind a number of unbuilt designs, such as the aforementioned Triton, and design elements are interesting to contemplate. Assisting in visualizing what weapons described in the book looked like (or might have looked like had they been built) are a multitude of detailed technical drawings and conceptual illustrations.

Though it does not do so extensively, Cotham's study does engage in current debates among Civil War historians over whether expensive, time-consuming, and resource-intensive ironclad squadrons were the Confederacy's best option for port and harbor defense, the other option between reliance on fixed defenses composed of interlocking land batteries, mine fields, and obstructions. While he does not lean decisively in either direction, the author adds torpedo boats to the discussion as an alternative to capital ship ironclads. Smaller in size, and presumably far cheaper and quicker to produce, it is assumed that torpedo boats could have been put into operation in fairly large numbers using the same amount of resources spent on constructing and maintaining ironclad squadrons, with more than a little money and materials left over to use toward other war effort priorities. It's a tantalizing thought to consider, but Cotham also recognizes that the David's attack on New Ironsides was the only proof of concept that we have to go on. While torpedo boat projects were planned at several locations across the Confederacy, Cotham and others note that wild rumor, scant documentation, and mystery all dog any modern investigation of those programs. As an example, in his own discussion of the completed or nearly completed Texas torpedo boat's ultimate fate at the time of the Trans-Mississippi Department's surrender, Cotham's examination of the available evidence was not able to produce much more clarity than what Ragan published on the topic a decade ago. Even more mysterious are claims of a functioning Houston submarine, the existence of which Cotham could find no compelling supporting evidence.

Perhaps the least successful of the Texas weapons discussed in the book that were actually built and tested was the attempt to form a rocket battery. Designed by German-born ordnance officer George Schroeder, and overseen by Swiss-born engineer Julius Kellersberger, the Schroeder rocket system was rushed into production and failed spectacularly during a high-profile test firing. Suffering from the age-old problem associated with military rockets, namely the impossibility of reliably controlling the flight path to target, the battery project was scrapped entirely and remaining rockets disposed of.

For those potential readers wondering about what machine Cotham's mention of "tanks" in the title could possibly be referring to, the answer is mobile railroad artillery. At several points in the book, Cotham credits district commander Major General John B. Magruder for backing promising innovations, and the general brought to the Galveston front his prior rail gun experience from the Virginia Peninsula. At Galveston, Magruder expanded the concept into development of an interconnected system of reinforced casemates linked to each other by tracks that would be used to move a rail gun back and forth between threatened points. While that is certainly an original, and rather commendable, weapon system for Civil War island defense, associating it with a tank is still a pretty generous analogy (even if the turreted rail gun sought after by Magruder had been actually built)!

Popular conceptions of Texas's contributions to the Civil War often involve images of hard-charging cavalry and shock troop infantry on the battlefield, but Edward Cotham's Rockets, Tanks and Submarines effectively reminds us that a small group of enterprising Texas citizens also produced technological innovations that did not lead to victory but nevertheless had an outsized impact on the course of the war. Additionally, several of those developments served as windows into the future conduct of warfare worldwide. Recommended.

Tuesday, September 2, 2025

Review - "American Civil War Amphibious Tactics" by Ron Field

[American Civil War Amphibious Tactics (Elite, 262) by Ron Field, illustrated by Steve Noon (Osprey Publishing, 2025). Softcover, photos, illustrations, original color art, notes, select bibliography, index. Pp. 64. ISBN:978-1-4728-6316-4. $21]

Everyone can agree with the proposition that U.S. Army-Navy combined operations conducted along both the southern coastline and the continent's strategic inland waterways contributed mightily to Union victory during the Civil War. That significance makes the topic highly appropriate for inclusion in Osprey Publishing's Elite series, which traces "(t)he history of military forces, artifacts, personalities and techniques of warfare." All of those elements are prominently displayed in Ron Field's American Civil War Amphibious Tactics.

Of course, Civil War amphibious operations collectively constitute a very broad topic that can only be selectively addressed in a 64-page study. Field, a frequent Osprey contributor, nevertheless offers readers of all backgrounds a consistently interesting short narrative that touches upon a number of important campaigns and smaller operations. Along the way, Field's writing identifies a number of key military and civilian figures involved as well as specialized equipment and methodologies employed during troop landings on beaches and riverbanks. Given the vast disparity between the war's opposing sides when it came to their respective amphibious capabilities, it's understandable that the topic is addressed entirely from the Union perspective within this limited space, but it is nevertheless the case that Confederate-led combined operations efforts, which did achieve some noteworthy successes during the war, merit at least some recognition.

Amphibious operations summarized in the text include a selection of early-war events in eastern North Carolina between initial Union success at Hatteras Inlet in August 1861 and the fall of New Bern in March 1862. Smaller inland incursions that followed Union occupation of most of North Carolina's coastline are additionally described, those 1862-64 events serving as lenses through which to discuss the presence and actions of lesser-known specialized units such as the First New York Marine Artillery and the Naval Battalion of the 13th New York Heavy Artillery. Though most of the book focuses on coastal operations, the volume also touches upon the Mississippi Marine Brigade's raiding and counter-guerrilla activities in the Mississippi River Valley from 1862-64. Once it became clear that remaining heavily fortified cities and harbors in North and South Carolina could not be captured by direct naval attack alone (that recognition following the dismal failure of the grand ironclad assault on Charleston Harbor in April 1863), a Fleet Brigade of sailors and marines was formed to support shore attacks. Participation in the failed boat assault against Fort Sumter on September 8, 1863 and the campaign against Fort Fisher (December 1864-January 1865) are recounted in the book as examples of that formation's activities.

The above narrative takes pains to direct attention (within the main text as well as in photos and their captions) toward the experiences and signal achievements of numerous officers and men who might otherwise have received little exposure in the literature. It is also worthy of note that the text is accompanied by copious embedded source notes, that very welcome feature being a new, or at least relatively recent, development among Osprey titles (at least in this reviewer's admittedly limited sampling). Steve Noon's color artwork consists of vivid depictions of amphibious warfare action scenes and combat imagery as well as uniform and equipment details.

A selection of essential ships, weaponry, and equipment are featured in the book. The contributions of Norman Wiard designs, which include a multi-use 12-lb. boat howitzer that could be flexibly attached to a launch and a shallow-draft double-ender troop transport vessel (likely modeled after existing ferry boat designs) specially created for amphibious operations, are prominently displayed at many different places in the book. Methods for getting fighting men from their transports to the shore (obviously a key step in all amphibious warfare endeavors) are also described, one being the stringing together of a long line of troop-loaded surfboats behind a swift-moving steamship, the angular momentum created upon casting off the tow line helping carry the small boats to the target beach at speed.

This volume, a fine addition to Osprey Publishing's Elite series, provides readers of all backgrounds a strong introductory-level window into Union amphibious landing and support operations during the Civil War.

Wednesday, August 13, 2025

Review - "From Ironclads to Admiral: John Lorimer Worden and Naval Leadership" by Quarstein & Worden

[From Ironclads to Admiral: John Lorimer Worden and Naval Leadership by John V. Quarstein & Robert L. Worden (Naval Institute Press, 2025). Hardcover, 4 maps, photos, illustrations, appendix section, endnotes, source essay, index. Pages main/total:xv,207/293. ISBN:978-1-68247-444-0. $34.95]

John L. Worden will always be remembered foremost for being the commander of USS Monitor during the famous 1862 Battle of Hampton Roads. His ship versus ship duel with the CSS Virginia proved to be one of naval history's defining engagements of the transition period between the age of wood and sail to a new age of iron and steam, the latter quickly leading to the all big-gun castles of steel that came to represent modern naval power and influence well into the twentieth century. However, while Worden's name has been forever etched into remembrance of that dramatic historical event, his distinguished naval career before, during, and well after the Civil War has, until now, never been properly documented and recognized within the pages of a full-length biography. Ably filling that gap are John Quarstein, former director of the Virginia War Museum and emeritus director of the USS Monitor Center, and Robert Worden, retired from a career with the Library of Congress and a collateral descendant of John L. Worden. These prolific researchers and authors have combined their backgrounds and knowledge to produce From Ironclads to Admiral: John Lorimer Worden and Naval Leadership, a publishing 'first' that provides a very fine comprehensive portrait of its subject's private life and long professional career both ashore and afloat.

It appears that details about the early life of John Worden (surname rhyming with 'burden,' the original spelling being Werden) are pretty sparse. Family connections, those of the Graham family of New York in particular, are cited by the authors as a possible main source of inspiration behind young Worden's decision to embark upon a naval career. At the time, officer development was an entirely hands-on shipboard process, and the book, by tracing Worden's early experiences aboard several vessels, provides readers with a fine introduction into nineteenth-century US Navy midshipmen training.

A major theme of the book is Worden's evolution into becoming a well-regarded scientific officer through multiple stints at the US Naval Observatory in Washington, DC. There, Worden documented meticulous astronomical and meteorological observations and honed his high order mathematical skills through recording calculations based on those observations, particularly the former. It was during his first Observatory assignment that Worden was married, an apparently happy union with Olivia Toffey that produced a family and survived numerous extended absences. Other duties that Worden became closely associated with were the inventorying, testing, and rating of the Navy's modern navigational and scientific instruments.

As the book reveals, lifelong precarious health proved to be a major theme shaping Worden's story. At the same time, though, that laundry list of ailments affecting him over the duration of his professional career did not not keep him from logging an equally long list of noteworthy achievements. When and where these health problems occurred (or recurred) are recorded at length in the appendix section.

The naval component of the 1846-48 war between the United States and Mexico is largely an afterthought in the popular literature of that conflict, at least when compared with the extensive range of published studies of the major land campaigns fought in both northern and central Mexico. Addressing that gap, this biography provides a number of insights into Mexican War naval operations along the Pacific Coast. Worden's first wartime assignment was with a supply ship, but he nevertheless had firsthand experiences with the navy's blockading and seizing of Mexican ports as well as with shore operations supporting small coastal garrisons defending against Mexican attacks. In between the Mexican War and the outbreak of the Civil War, Worden returned to the Naval Observatory and was also posted to the career-enhancing Brooklyn Naval Yard.

The study does not delve much into Worden's political views beyond noting that he was a life-long Democrat. During the secession crisis, his War Democrat credentials were without doubt unimpeachable, as he was entrusted by Navy Secretary Gideon Welles with carrying confidential dispatches to Fort Pickens, the standoff at Pensacola, Florida being one of the national emergency's most delicate political situations and potential military flashpoint. Events, including the firing on Fort Sumter, overtook Worden on the return journey, though, and he was arrested by Confederate authorities and held prisoner for nearly six months. According to the authors, that made Worden the first northern POW of the Civil War.

With a single paragraph devoted to the subject, it remains unclear exactly how the Ironclad Board's selection process led to Worden being assigned captain of the Monitor. Whether it was a case of Worden being in the right place at the right time (his recent release from long confinement by the Confederates was well publicized, and he was readily available awaiting assignment) or his reputation as a scientific officer (though his background was not in naval or steam engineering) was looked upon as a strong prerequisite for managing an experimental vessel, the board judged him the "right sort of officer to put in command of her" (pg. 80).

Given the already exhaustive nature of the literature related to the Battle of Hampton Roads, the book addresses the Monitor's construction, its nearly fatal journey to Hampton Roads, and its celebrated duel with the Virginia in a single, relatively brief chapter that captures the essentials. The main takeaway is the demonstration of Worden's leadership qualities throughout the process between trial runs and his serious wounding in action. Those traits are listed by the Foreword writer as high-order "courage, perseverance, decision-making, and tactical and technical proficiency" (pg. xii). Along with his wielding a sage balance between imposing discipline and granting leniency that made him popular among subordinate officers and crewmen alike, Worden's excellence in those aforementioned areas is exhibited throughout the book. The nature of Worden's wounds incurred during the fight with the Virginia, which included severe ocular trauma, and his road to recovery are well described in the text.

As the authors explain, Worden's wounds and hard-earned experiences led him to submit numerous official-channel suggestions for improvements to the navy's present and future turreted ironclad designs. Some of Worden's recommendations, such as an improved pilothouse arrangement, were approved, but it was nevertheless the case that intraservice decision-making conflicts and the nature of construction contracts still left every ironclad class with serious design flaws.

Recovering his eyesight enough to return to active service, Worden was assigned to command the USS Montauk, a Passaic-class monitor. While destruction of the CSS Rattlesnake, formerly the cruiser Nashville, was noteworthy, his most significant action was his testing of Montauk's ability to reduce Fort McAllister in Georgia. The clear failure to force the fort's surrender convinced Worden that monitors, having only two guns per turret (both slow-firing), did not possess the weight and rapidity of fire necessary to suppress or destroy extensive enemy fortifications. The failure of his superiors to heed his reports, along with a heavy dose of rivalry with the army as to who would capture Charleston, resulted in an intense battering of the ironclad squadron assembled at Charleston Harbor in April 1863, an attack in which Worden also participated. Finally compelled to realize that ironclads alone could not force the issue, from then on army-navy combined operations were the rule for confronting enemy harbors and their protective ring of forts and entrenched batteries.

After Charleston, Worden's failing health landed him back at the Brooklyn Navy Yard for more rounds of overseeing new monitor designs and construction. Non-ironclad construction also proceeded, and Worden's experience with ships like the Idaho illustrate the many enduring problems and challenges involved with steam-sail combo warship designs. He also returned to sea with the North Pacific Squadron.

In another career highlight, Worden served as the seventh superintendent of the US Naval Academy at Annapolis. The authors acknowledge divisions among historians in regard to Worden's traditional versus progressive legacy at the head of that venerable institution, and they adopt a judicious approach to that debate as well as in assessing Worden's actions and attitudes toward the admittance of non-white cadets and the apparently intractable problem of cadet hazing rituals. Worden's last great service to the country was in commanding the European Squadron during a period of time in the Mediterranean Sea that, given the great distance from Washington and intermittent communications, required both decisive decision-making and delicate diplomatic awareness.

In examining the entire breadth of John L. Worden's nearly fifty-three years of service in the US Navy, From Ironclads to Admiral goes well beyond the famous duel at Hampton Roads to provide readers with the first full assessment of that distinguished officer's many other contributions to Union ironclad development and naval superiority during the Civil War. Authors Quarstein and Worden also record their subject's significant impact on scientific advancement, protecting United States national interests overseas, and officer education. The attachment of Worden's name to numerous memorials, including a coastal fort, the parade ground at the Naval Academy, and four US Navy ships, attests to how well John L. Worden was admired and remembered by previous generations, and this fine biography reminds the present and future reader why such honors were so richly deserved.

Sunday, December 1, 2024

Review - "'Digging All Night and Fighting All Day': The Civil War Siege of Spanish Fort and the Mobile Campaign, 1865" by Paul Brueske

["Digging All Night and Fighting All Day": The Civil War Siege of Spanish Fort and the Mobile Campaign, 1865 by Paul Brueske (Savas Beatie, 2024). Hardcover, 6 maps, photos, illustrations, footnotes, appendix section, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xxiv,243/331. ISBN:978-1-61121-710-0. $32.95]

By the summer of 1864, northern military planners and political leaders had been advocating a combined operation to seize Mobile, one of the South's largest cities and the western theater's most significant remaining blockade-running haven in the Gulf, for nearly two years. Everyone recognized Mobile's strategic importance, but organizing a campaign against it always got derailed by other priorities. When finally underway, Mobile's reduction proceeded in two major phases: (1) the August 1864 sea and land assault that wrested control of Mobile Bay from Confederate naval forces and captured the masonry forts guarding the bay's entrance, and (2) the March-April 1865 operation that drove the Confederates from their eastern shore fortifications and forced the evacuation of the city. One can argue that each of these stages was sufficiently spaced apart from the other to be considered a separate campaign, and no existing scholarship integrates the two into a single study devoting equal detail and attention to the events of 1864 and 1865.

In terms of modern book-length treatments currently available, readers wanting to learn about the August 1864 Battle of Mobile Bay commonly consult Chester Hearn's Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign: The Last Great Battles of the Civil War (1993), its content overwhelmingly weighted toward the 1864 campaign, or Jack Friend's West Wind, Flood Tide: The Battle of Mobile Bay (2004). Preceded only by Sean Michael O'Brien's scantily detailed Mobile, 1865: Last Stand of the Confederacy (2001) and even briefer works from John Waugh and Russell Blount, Paul Brueske's The Last Siege: The Mobile Campaign, Alabama 1865 (2018) provided readers with the first truly satisfactory book-length overview of the land campaign against Mobile. Even then, though, only limited space could be devoted to the campaign's two main actions, the siege of Spanish Fort and the storming of Fort Blakeley. In his new book, "Digging All Night and Fighting All Day": The Civil War Siege of Spanish Fort and the Mobile Campaign, 1865, Brueske is able to offer his full attention to the strongly contested fight over the east bay's southernmost guardian.

Some contend that the results of the 1864 Mobile Bay campaign effectively neutered the city of Mobile's strategic significance, rendering a massive spring campaign against it unnecessary, but Brueske effectively argues that proponents of that view unduly benefit from the advantages of hindsight. In addition to its value as a logistics and communications hub that effectively blocked Union forces from gaining river access into the Alabama interior, Mobile's defenses also housed in early 1865 one of the western theater's few remaining Confederate troop concentrations of any great consequence. The Confederate Army of Tennessee was never again able to conduct army-scale operations after its devastating defeat at Nashville in December 1864, but it was nevertheless the case that powerful sub-units, though reduced in manpower strength, retained combat effectiveness. Some were dispatched east to North Carolina and others south to Mobile. The handful of veteran brigades sent to Mobile formed the backbone of its defense in 1865, and Brueske makes a strong case for the city's enduring military significance during this waning period of the war.

Brueske's deeply researched operational and tactical-level narrative devotes equal attention to the military actions and strategic concerns of both sides. Union land forces during the 1865 Mobile Campaign were led by Major General Edward S. Canby, and strong elements of two army corps (Thirteenth and Sixteenth) were directed against Spanish Fort upon completion of a brief west bay diversion. Canby's men outnumbered the Confederate defenders of Spanish Fort, initially a mixture of garrison troops and Army of Tennessee veterans under Brigadier General Randall Gibson, by roughly eight to one. Many expected Canby to launch an immediate assault, but he elected instead to reduce the fort by siege approaches. After nearly two weeks of progress, Colonel James Geddes's brigade was able to traverse a covered route around and behind the Confederate left that was previously thought impassable to organized forces. His thinning defenses finally unhinged by Geddes's bold action, Gibson withdrew the garrison overnight, escaping under the enemy's noses using a previously built plank causeway to march north to safety. There was little time for Gibson and his men to celebrate their close call, however, as the subsequent storming of Fort Blakeley left too few men overall to attempt a final combined defense of Mobile. The city's remaining garrison, including Gibson's command, withdrew upriver to Meridian, Mississippi and surrendered soon after.

Events of the two-week siege are meticulously recounted in the text and their details visually well represented in the accompanying cartography. All of the elements of offensive and defensive siegecraft honed by both sides during the war were displayed by the Spanish Fort combatants, including controversial use by the Confederates of subterra shells. Brueske credits the veteran presence of Gibson and the stubborn fortitude of his men for dragging out the operation as long as possible. Gibson's Confederates were able to make expert use of the preexisting earthworks and slowed enemy progress through well-timed sorties and effective sharpshooting. The besiegers were initially stymied through lavish expenditures of rifle and artillery ammunition along with naval support fire, but dwindling powder, bullet, and shell stocks eventually forced the Confederates to adopt drastic cutbacks. With Rebel guns increasingly silent in response, Union superiority in manpower and firepower gradually gained ascendancy. After two weeks, the garrison was forced to either surrender or withdraw. As Brueske details in the book, the latter operation was astoundingly successful.

The siege was noteworthy for the Confederate Navy arguably having a greater impact than its more typically dominant Union counterpart. Before ammunition ran short, the heavy guns of the Confederate naval squadron, in particular its pair of partially completed ironclads, was able to successfully hinder the Union advance by providing enfilade fire down the line. Rear areas also came under heavy fire, disrupting Union command and control. Additionally, Confederate vessels were able to ferry men, guns, and supplies into the fort (and out, as necessary) relatively unhindered. On the Union side, Admiral Henry Thatcher struggled to get his ships within range close enough to materially affect events. The east bay's network of distant shoals, water obstructions, and well-placed torpedoes hindered Thatcher's approach toward Spanish Fort and its supporting batteries, and the admiral's insufficient precautions against floating mines contributed to the shallow water sinking of two monitors and a tinclad.

Though respected by his peers, Canby was widely known to be an abundantly cautious general, and many critics (including U.S. Grant then and later) condemned his methodical approach to reducing the east bay forts as not keeping requisite pace with military events developing elsewhere. Nothing in Brueske's study is about significantly elevating Canby's modest historical stature among Union Civil War army commanders, but he does persuasively lead readers to approach Canby by fairly assessing the general's actions within the context of what was known and expected at the time. Canby initially had to overcome challenging weather limitations (ones that his critics consistently overlook), but he also got the job done with relatively low casualties. We can never know for certain whether an all-out assault to open the campaign would have resulted in fewer overall casualties than those accumulated over the two-week siege, but one can certainly take the position that the probability of suffering high casualties against the small but well led, strongly situated, and highly motivated band of Confederate defenders backed by plentiful artillery made an immediate attack not worth the risks involved. At this stage of the war, no apology was needed for employing a methodical approach that minimized casualties.

A very useful compilation of supplemental material is assembled in the volume's extensive appendix section. Found within are detailed army and navy orders of battle for both sides, lists of casualties and naval vessels lost, POW numbers, and an inventory of captured stores. Another appendix traces the postwar journey of the siege's most famous cannon, the Lady Slocomb. Preservation information is also provided as is a brief but interesting look at the history of the old Spanish Fort, its colonial period origins (Spanish versus British) still in dispute.

In addition to providing the Civil War literature with the first full-length account of the siege of Spanish Fort, the strategic arguments presented in Paul Brueske's "Digging All Night and Fighting All Day" (combined with the author's earlier work on the campaign) offer powerful counterpoints to those that maintain that the late timing and slow pacing of the 1865 Mobile Campaign essentially erased its strategic utility within the overall plan to end the war that spring. Highly recommended.

Thursday, November 14, 2024

Review - "Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations" by Edward Cotham

[Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations by Edward T. Cotham, Jr. (University of Tennessee Press, 2024). Softcover, maps, photos, illustrations, appendix, orders of battle, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages:xiii,170. ISBN:978-1-62190-913-2. $24.95]

It's easy to see why Galveston, Texas was considered a strategic point of interest for both sides during the Civil War. Galveston was Texas's most populous city, its most important commercial center, and it possessed the state's finest deep water port. Its rail connection with the interior also made it a prime base for a Union campaign to seize Houston. The occupation of both places would make Union forces masters of the heart of Texas and its limited modern transportation network. Initially determined to be indefensible with the meager resources available at the time, Galveston was reluctantly abandoned by its Confederate Army defenders. It was quickly occupied in turn by a small Union garrison supported by a naval squadron that easily outgunned anything the Confederates could muster against it. Before the Union foothold on Texas soil could be exploited, however, the port city was recaptured during a dramatic and improbably successful New Year's Day 1863 land and sea assault. Compounding the US Navy's embarrassment, just ten days later the Confederate commerce raider CSS Alabama lured out to sea and sank the Galveston blockader USS Hatteras. City and island remained in Confederate hands for the duration of the war.

The hits to US naval pride only continued. Approximately sixty miles up the coast, another Confederate naval attack surprised and defeated a US blockading force at Sabine Pass in 1862, and on September 8 of the following year a tiny earthwork battery turned back a massive combined operation that outnumbered the defenders roughly 100 to 1. In the fall of 1863, a two-pronged grand campaign, which consisted of a large overland expedition through western Louisiana and a substantial amphibious landing at the mouth of the Rio Grande that was accompanied by a follow-up movement up the coast, also failed (through a variety of reasons) to knock Texas out of the war. The decision-making involved in all of these events, many of which had military and political repercussions felt far and wide, is examined in Edward Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations.

Fast approaching two-dozen volumes, University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series possesses a unique analytical framework that has proven its value over time. Rather than repeat background material that has already been covered numerous times here on this site, please refer to previous CWBA reviews (such as this one here) for the series definition of a "critical decision" and brief explanation of the flow and structure of the steps involved in the decision analysis.

With published expertise [see Battle on the Bay: The Civil War Struggle for Galveston (1998) and Sabine Pass: The Confederacy's Thermopylae (2004), both gold standard histories of their topics] and over thirty years of ongoing research at his disposal, Cotham is the ideal author for this particular series installment. Calling upon that unique body of knowledge and using it to identify key moments of contingency, Cotham's approach to critical decision selection along with his situational summaries, option formulations, result(s)/impact discussions, and visions of alternate scenarios all display levels of nuance that a less robustly informed contributor tasked with the matter at hand would find very difficult to match. At first glance, it might appear unlikely that one could come up with this high a number of critical decisions (21) for a series of mostly small-scale events that unfolded in the war's tertiary theater (and this reviewer still struggled with one or two), but Cotham's keenly developed arguments and analysis consistently remove most lingering doubts.

The typical book in the series addresses a campaign and/or battle fought between major eastern or western theater field armies, making tactical-level critical decision analysis a common feature. However, Cotham notes that in his own area of study it was faraway decisions that most often and most deeply impacted the course of events. Also, an unusually high number (for the series as a whole) of his volume's critical decisions are personnel related. As Cotham amply demonstrates, leadership selection alone went a long way toward explaining why the underdog Confederates were so successful and how it was that Union forces failed in such disastrous fashion. President Davis's selection of John B. Magruder, that general's reputation under a dark cloud from allegations related to underperformance during the Seven Days, matched man and moment with results few could have foreseen, and the officers Magruder chose as his own principal subordinates no less so. On the other side, US naval hero David Glasgow Farragut, commander of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, made leadership appointments on the Texas coast that he would come to bitterly regret. As Cotham outlines, key officers at Galveston and Sabine Pass served their faraway superior poorly, delivering some of the few black marks against Farragut's otherwise sterling Civil War record.

Magruder proved to be a particularly interesting case to examine. So many Confederate generals thrust into unenviable coastal command situations similar to what Magruder faced wallowed in pessimistic passivity when tasked with pitting their own meager manpower and resources against Union combined operations having the overpowering capability of concentrating superior land and naval forces at nearly any point of their choosing. Magruder broke the mold, confidently seizing the initiative and making his own luck with boldness, creative planning, and decisive leadership. During this shining moment of his Civil War career, all of his decisions struck gold. Like Robert E. Lee did at Chancellorsville, Magruder employed against a dangerously superior enemy at Galveston a complicated battle plan with a lot of moving parts. Such high-risk plans often produced disaster, but, as Cotham effectively reminds us, it could also be an important factor in achieving success against long odds. Unfortunately for the rest of Magruder's Civil War career, his signal success along the Texas coast in 1863 did little to restore his profile as general worthy of being entrusted with coveted commands on major fronts.

Much like historian Donald Frazier has recently done in his Texas and Louisiana series of military history books, Cotham insightfully outlines significant connections (through decisions made and their results) between events in the Trans-Missisippi theater and future plans for the war on the other side of the river. Most notable among them are those involved in delaying the targeting of the key Gulf blockade-running port of Mobile, Alabama.

A mixture of modern maps and others borrowed from the atlas to the O.R. accompany Cotham's text. In the other series titles, the featured tour appendix is designed to be closely tied to the critical decisions presented before it. With his own subject matter more geographically dispersed than the others and with so many of its critical decisions produced from great distances, Cotham elected instead to include a walking tour of Galveston Civil War sites and some brief recommendations for hardy souls willing to take the 133-mile roundabout drive to Sabine Pass.

Joining the top rank of the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War collection of titles, Edward Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns, in addition to its atypical features recited above, carries some notable series firsts. The author points out that his book is the first to have a major focus on ship vs. ship and ship vs. shore movements and encounters, and one can also add that it is the first Trans-Missisippi theater volume in the series. Another one, an 1864 Red River Campaign book, is soon to follow, with hopefully even more in the works.

Monday, October 28, 2024

Snapshot from the Collection: "A Man And His Boat: The Civil War Career And Correspondence of Lieutenant Jonathan H. Carter, CSN"

One of the opportunities that these unpredictable gaps between new releases is affording me is the chance to finally get to some far too long neglected titles from the collection. Intrigued at the prospect of what it might have to say about Confederate Trans-Mississippi naval construction and operations, I purchased A Man And His Boat: The Civil War Career And Correspondence of Lieutenant Jonathan H. Carter, CSN (Center for Louisiana Studies, 1996), a now long out of print title edited by Katherine Brash Jeter, probably ten years ago or more. It has sat on the shelf frowning at me ever since, still in its original shrinkwrap. Last week, I finally read it.

Much of what is known about the Shreveport, Louisiana-built and based Confederate ironclad CSS Missouri comes from the official wartime correspondence of the man principally involved in managing its construction (and who later, through default, became its captain), Lt. Jonathan H. Carter. The volume's lengthy preface consists of an edited version of Jeter's 1987 Louisiana History journal article that explores the life and career of Carter, who was an 1846 Annapolis graduate. As one readily recognizes while reading the rest of the book, the research that went into that article relied very heavily upon Carter's (1863-67) correspondence, the edited collection of which follows the Preface and is reproduced in full.

Numerous documents in this compilation, perhaps most of them, are simple two-line administrative notes and personnel requests/orders. The names and dates are valuable to researchers, but on the whole probably of limited interest to general readers. There are many other letters, though, that exemplify the range of challenges faced by every Confederate ironclad construction project, among them shortages of skilled labor, raw and manufactured materials, and modern armaments. Additionally, army-navy disputes hampered (even blocked) timely efforts to build, arm, and man the vessel. Carter's frustration is palpable. He repeatedly points toward lack of cooperation with, and false promises from, the army, which seems to have greatly doubted the ironclad's value. Thus, it was no surprise that the vessel was designed for more but was fitted out with only three cannon (one of those being an antiquated 32-pounder), leaked badly from its green timber construction and insufficient caulking, was slower than promised, and had a glaring vulnerability in that the top of its single paddle wheel (center rear) was completely unprotected at the top. Building and maintaining crew strength proved to be a consistent thorn in Carter's side. Judging from the frequency with which the topic was raised in Carter's letters, when the army did release small groups of enlisted men for transfer to the Missouri's crew complement, many if not most seemed to have promptly deserted.

There are no detailed drawings of the Missouri provided, just two photos of a detailed scale model. The ironclad was described at the time as being vaguely similar in appearance to the CSS Tennessee, but to me it looks more like the child of a union between that vessel and a Pook turtle. That much of the center wheel was exposed is a really striking feature of the model. There's a contemporary watercolor painting that shows the wheel as having been, if not armor-protected, at the very least fully covered, but a close inspection of the vessel by a Union officer in June 1865 confirms that over 8 feet of the wheel was entirely unprotected.

Going by Carter's correspondence, it doesn't appear that the ironclad fired a shot in anger. Through still struggling with crew shortages, the Missouri was, at least in Carter's judgment, fully operational by the time of the 1864 Red River Campaign. However, low water kept it out of action. As we know, those same river conditions hampered Carter's Union naval opponents, too, though it was General Banks's defeat at Mansfield and subsequent retreat that conclusively removed the Union threat to the Missouri's Shreveport base. With no real opportunities to make a difference on either the Red or Mississippi Rivers, the Missouri was basically put into use as a floating battery until its surrender in June 1865, the last Confederate ironclad to lower its flag. In the end, the story of the Missouri provides little in the way of strong challenges to those critics who have argued that the Confederate ironclad fleet was an expensive resource drain that failed to produce enough noteworthy achievements to come even close to matching its exorbitant cost to the Confederate war economy.

Carter had wider responsibilities that those directly attached to the Missouri (for example, he was involved in off and on discussions, debates, and plans in regard to the prospects of building torpedo boats, and even an ironclad, in Texas), and his correspondence has additional value there. Jeter's extensive footnotes, especially those identifying and discussing lesser-known persons mentioned in the letters, are also helpful to other historians. A Man And His Boat has much to recommend it. It explores obscure subject matter such as Confederate naval activities in the Trans-Mississippi, and its central topic, the CSS Missouri, is one of the least known vessels in the Confederate ironclad fleet.