Showing posts with label Reviews - Campaigns and Battles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Reviews - Campaigns and Battles. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 8, 2026

Review - "Ironclad Ambush: Confederates Strike Lincoln's Mississippi River Blockade at the Head of Passes, October 12, 1861" by Neil Chatelain

[Ironclad Ambush: Confederates Strike Lincoln's Mississippi River Blockade at the Head of Passes, October 12, 1861 by Neil P. Chatelain (Savas Beatie, 2026). Hardcover, 12 maps, photos, illustrations, footnotes, appendix, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xviii,209/255. ISBN:978-1-61121-795-7. $32.95]

As Civil War naval historian Neil Chatelain revealed in his excellent 2020 study Defending the Arteries of Rebellion: Confederate Naval Operations in the Mississippi River Valley, 1861-1865, Union victory and Confederate defeat along the length of the Mississippi River could not be fully explained through simple recitation of the wide disparities in financial, industrial, and military resources available to each side. Of course, those differences, as stark as they were, defined the conflict in many ways, but it is also true that fairly prodigious amounts of Confederate funding and material were thrown into defending both ends of the great river valley. Unfortunately for the region's defenders, a lack of unified direction, competition between government and civilian authorities, interservice rivalries, and general dispersal of effort critically hindered the creation of an effective naval counter to the rapidly expanding and increasingly aggressive U.S. Navy.

Nevertheless, some noteworthy tactical victories were achieved by those scratch Confederate naval forces, one of which occurred quite early in the war at the Head of Passes on October 12, 1861. A number of brief overviews of the battle can be found in the literature (arguably the best being the relevant section of Chester Hearn's broader study The Capture of New Orleans, 1862 (1995), but Chatelain's new book Ironclad Ambush: Confederates Strike Lincoln's Mississippi River Blockade at the Head of Passes, October 12, 1861 is the first full-length account.

The October 12 battle occurred at a time when blockading Union naval forces were rapidly gathering at the mouth of the Mississippi River as well as other key points of Gulf shipping ingress and egress. Even at this early stage of that process, enforcement had reached the point that Union forces felt confident enough to ascend the river and work toward constructing a fortified land battery below the Head of Passes. It was under this developing situation that the battle was fought, and Chatelain's study deals with matters associated with the establishment and tightening of the blockade during this period at length. Pertinent to that discussion is a detailed review of the types and capabilities of the ships involved as well as the uneven quality of their captains.

Arrayed against the growing Union threat was a hastily marshaled "mosquito fleet" led by Confederate naval captain George Hollins that consisted of a number of converted steamers with fire raft support, but what boosted Confederate confidence most was the availability and promise of the newly completed ironclad ram Manassas. Contradictory contemporary claims and assorted mysteries still impact modern appraisal of the vessel. They include what the ironclad really looked like, and design features as simple as whether it had one or two smokestacks (although Chatelain is confident in his answer to that latter question). Throughout his many attempts at cutting through the haze of conflicting accounts on a variety of matters, Chatelain judiciously weighs each side of a particular contested issue (explaining his thought process in the main text) and offers his own interpretation based on the best available evidence. A number of fresh insights emerge from this thorough review of the original source material, among them are some consensus-challenging suggestions surrounding the timing, place, and circumstances of Manassas's incorporation into the C.S. Navy. Every major secondary source claims that Manassas, a civilian-financed and owned privateer, was forcibly seized by Confederate authorities for their own use, but Chatelain cites primary source evidence strongly supportive of the possibility that Manassas's civilian captain, John Stevenson, first offered his powerful ram's services to the government.

The best writers of Civil War land campaign and battle narrative are able to convey a vivid mental picture and deep understanding of battlefield landscape and topography to their readers, and Chatelain is able to do much the same for the geology and hydrology of the Mississippi River's mouth. Knowledge and awareness of the shifting sand bars, scouring forces, "mud humps," and other noteworthy (and militarily significant) physical features of the river mouth geography are essential to reader understanding of the fleet action that occurred there, and the author provides that background information in full. Chatelain's detailed description and analysis of the river's five main passes (Southwest, South, Southeast, Northeast, and Pass รก l'Outre) that branch off the aptly named Head of Passes like the fingers of a glove demonstrate why blockading the mouth of the Mississippi was difficult while at the same time in some ways simpler than one might realize. With those matters in mind, it's clear to see why both sides so closely coveted control of the inland Head of Passes.

The battle itself, which lasted only a few early-morning hours and apparently resulted in no casualties on either side, is recounted thoroughly and well. Map support is strong, with a series tracing ship movements and positions of both sides during each phase of the battle and its immediate aftermath. This is easily the most detailed account of the battle to date, unlikely to be surpassed unless a significant body of new source material emerges. After Manassas successfully, but not fatally, rammed the powerful steam sloop U.S.S. Richmond, the Union flotilla fled from the Head of Passes. Three ships (including the Richmond) ran aground below Southwest Pass and struggled mightily to refloat themselves. Under long-range harassing fire from the tug C.S.S. Ivy and fearing return of Manassas, which unbeknownst to them withdrew upriver after partially dislodging its ram and losing an engine during its strike on Richmond, some officers panicked and miscommunication even led to premature vessel abandonment.

In addition to exploring the battle itself in all its intricacies, Chatelain persuasively conveys to readers a solid sense of both its meaning and depth of its shadow. Head of Passes was the war's first fleet action as well as its first use of an ironclad in combat. As the author explains, the battle did not spark the ensuing flurry of ironclad building in general nor did it prompt the construction of ram fleets on the Mississippi (both initiatives were already well in swing by the time of the battle), but the limited success of Manassas offered encouraging proof of concept. October 12 was a very bad day for the U.S. Navy, and its handling of the engagement was shaky from top to bottom. After allowing themselves to be surprised, the Union vessels retreated in unseemly haste and, as mentioned before, orders to abandon grounded vessels were unnecessarily issued on more than one occasion. However, Chatelain makes an interesting point that the embarrassing U.S. defeat very well might have had a silver lining of major proportions. The command shakeup after the battle, which included reassignment of area commander Capt. William McKean and the sidelining or outright cashiering of his most underperforming subordinate ship captains, brought to the West Gulf Blockading Squadron daring new leadership that performed their duties phenomenally well during the devastatingly effective New Orleans campaign of the following spring. The author's suggestion that that decisive outcome might have been seriously in doubt had the October 12 battle not gone so poorly and the original leadership remained in place is an intriguing counterfactual to consider.

Recent years have been good ones for filling in gaps in the Civil War naval warfare and blockade literature, and Neil Chatelain's Ironclad Ambush represents yet another fresh and original contribution to those areas of study. In addition to providing the first truly comprehensive history of the Head of Passes naval battle, Chatelain's book adds essential context to our knowledge and understanding of the early-war blockade of the Mississippi River mouth. Highly recommended.

Thursday, August 27, 2026

Review - "Forward to Richmond: The Virginia Campaign of 1862" by Brian Burton

[Forward to Richmond: The Virginia Campaign of 1862 by Brian K. Burton (University of Nebraska Press, 2026). Hardcover, 17 maps, illustrations, endnotes, bibliographic essay, index. Pages main/total:xiv,259/335. ISBN:978-1-4962-2971-7. $39.95]

Brian Burton's Forward to Richmond: The Virginia Campaign of 1862 is the twelfth installment in University of Nebraska Press's Great Campaigns of the Civil War series, which is now just over a quarter-century old. The purpose of each volume is not to revisit a major Civil War campaign in exhaustive operational and tactical detail but rather to offer new and experienced readers alike a relatively concise synthesis of the modern scholarly treatment of the campaign in its military, political, social, and international contexts. Burton's contribution to the series fulfills all those requirements in robust fashion.

Existing single-volume histories of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, of which Stephen Sears's To the Gates of Richmond (1992) remains the standard, typically treat decisions and events outside the coastal plain as ancillary. That rather insular perspective of the campaign has been considerably altered (for the better) of late. To be fair, every good examination of the campaign has acknowledged important ties with concurrent operations in the Shenandoah Valley, but it is only recently that historians have stressed to this degree a portrait of the fighting in Virginia during that time as a single integrated, theater-wide campaign. This broader understanding is exemplified in Ethan Rafuse's excellent recent book From the Mountains to the Bay: The War in Virginia, January-May 1862 (2023), the follow-up volume of which is currently scheduled for release later this year. Strongly influenced by that earlier work, Burton's interpretation of the Virginia campaign for this series is very much in that vein. His narrative discusses relevant military operations across the breadth of the state: from the Shenandoah Valley (bordered by the Alleghenies to the west and the Blue Ridge mountains to the east) to the central corridor between Washington and Richmond (the Piedmont) to the fingers of coastal plain flanked by navigable rivers and jutting into Chesapeake Bay (the Tidewater). These geographically separated operations are presented as linked events with intertwining military and political impacts that the author lucidly explains.

After President Abraham Lincoln stripped George B. McClellan of his general-in-chief duties in March 1862, assuming them himself with the assistance of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, management of the Union war effort in Virginia was left entirely in the hands of civilian novices. Burton joins many other writers and historians in judging the level of micromanagement that came out of the White House and War Department during this time as often inefficient and frequently detrimental. Burton would probably agree with Donald Stoker, who greatly admires Lincoln's strategic vision in the broadest sense but sees Lincoln's hands-on management of the events covered in this book (situated between McClellan's demotion and the appointment of Henry Halleck as general-in-chief) as a low point. Confronted with a steep learning curve, the president also failed to appreciate how much conditions and logistical constraints limited the speed and range of operations. On the other side, the Confederates had the opportunity for creating unity of command under a military man after President Jefferson Davis brought in Robert E. Lee as his chief military advisor, but the top-level advisory position was not seamlessly integrated into the formal chain of command. This led to avoidable situations such as when a bewildered Richard Ewell and his wandering division received directions from three different superior officers (Joe Johnston, Stonewall Jackson, and Lee).

Most historians deem Lincoln's decision in May 1862 to launch a large-scale Valley offensive aimed at trapping Jackson's seemingly exposed command as a serious mistake that diverted forces poised to tip the balance in the fight over Richmond, the theater's primary strategic point. Burton acknowledges the strengths behind that argument, but he also is highly sympathetic toward the wisdom of a Valley offensive. As that argument goes, a reasonable opportunity to trap and destroy an enemy force of 17,000, which would have been a major event at any point in the war, was hard to pass up, and, if successful, would have only cost the Union forces time that they could have afforded. In the end, the degree to which one might be persuaded depends on how much one believes a Valley offensive capable of strategic results against Jackson and to what degree its timing was critical in denying reinforcements to McClellan's forces on the Peninsula.

Burton's examination of the modern literature's current understanding of the campaign includes critical engagement with its analyses and conclusions. Upon his narrative's arrival at key moments of contingency, Burton does a fine job of identifying and exploring the options available to each side along with the advantages and challenges that factored into each (inserting his own informed commentary in a non-heavy handed manner). Much like the process central to University of Tennessee Press's Campaign Decisions in America's Civil War series, Burton's emphasis is primarily placed on understanding why particular decisions were made instead of judging them in the end as wholly good or bad.

Generally speaking, Burton sees the Confederate forces as developing two main advantages over their Union foes during this time: operational speed and secrecy. Most recent scholarship has treated Stonewall Jackson's legendary command secrecy even more harshly than before. Burton acknowledges the faults inherent in that command trait, but he also sees a not inconsiderable associated benefit to Jackson keeping even his own principal subordinates in the dark and Johnston keeping his army strategy close to the vest. In going to those extremes, it significantly lessened the chance that Confederate plans and movements could be leaked to the enemy either intentionally or unintentionally. In terms of speed, everyone is aware of Jackson's effective exploitation of unencumbered mobility in the Valley, and Lee achieved two great moments of potentially decisive concentration (first at Gaines's Mill and second at Glendale) during the Seven Days. Burton ranks among those who believe Glendale to have been a great missed opportunity to significantly cripple, if not destroy, McClellan's retreating army. In the author's view, the failure to achieve greater results from Lee's massing of forces against vulnerable parts of McClellan's army was less about employing overly complicated plans and more about astoundingly poor staff work (for which Lee bears much responsibility) and bad performances from inexperienced and/or incompetent subordinate commanders.

What the Confederates couldn't match, in the opinion of many (including Burton), were clear Union superiorities in artillery firepower and military engineering. Most sources praise Union logistical capabilities during the campaign, but the author finds room for criticism in how both sides handled logistics during this still learning stage of the war. Burton is largely impressed with how most Union corps and division leaders performed during their first big tests in a major campaign. The defects he sees in McClellan's conduct are of the traditionally cited sort, among them major flaws in the gathering and interpretation of military intelligence (especially when it came to enemy numbers), general underappreciation of the political impact of military decisions, and absenting himself from the fighting front during key battles.

While the primary focus of the study is on the campaign's military aspects, considerable attention is paid to social, political, and diplomatic consequences. Widespread and sustained soldier-civilian interactions across the theater during the period examined in the text hastened hardening attitudes all around, and there was mutual recognition that both sides were in clear earnest. Unlike some observers, Burton does not see Union military failure across the board as necessarily signaling the failure of conciliation policy, but radical factions were nevertheless able to win a war of perception, successfully linking personal military failure (McClellan was the army's chief proponent of conciliation) with policy failure in ways that paved the way for hard war and emancipation. More briefly explored are the ways in which the campaign shaped foreign relations between the North American combatants and the forces of public opinion and political leaders in Britain and France. Burton also makes it a point to discuss the impact of environmental conditions on both the health of the combatants and on operations. Of course, bad weather affects both sides, but, given that timing is everything when it comes to their effects, the author argues that, on balance, weather events tended to favor the Confederates most often during this period.

In a comprehensive narrative synthesis that begins with initial campaign planning debates and ends with Confederate victory in the Seven Days offensive, Brian Burton's Forward to Richmond: The Virginia Campaign of 1862 deserves to be regarded as a strong candidate for consideration as the best single-volume treatment of the expansive military contest in the eastern theater over the first half of that year, one that further recognizes the campaign's status as one of the war's most significant social and political inflection points.

Friday, July 24, 2026

Review - "Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville: A Battlefield Guide" by Brian K. Burton

[Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville: A Battlefield Guide by Brian K. Burton (University of Nebraska Press, 2026). Softcover, maps, appendix section, source list. Pages:xii,150. ISBN:978-1-4962-3620-3. $29.95]

Brian Burton's Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville: A Battlefield Guide is the eighth volume in University of Nebraska Press's This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil War Battlefields series. The installment preceding this one was published twelve years ago, so getting a new series title after such a long hiatus is a welcome development.

Having already contributed a Peninsula and Seven Days guide, Burton is no stranger to the series. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville are obviously big enough battles to warrant standalone treatment, but, given the amount of shared geography, it makes sense to combine them into a single volume (the Luvaas and Nelson War College series guide did the same). There are eleven tour stops for Fredericksburg and thirteen for Chancellorsville, and the author estimates that getting the most out of each would require a full day. However, especially if one is well prepared and willing to pare down the tour to a sub-set of author-recommended stops, the dual tour can be completed in one busy day.

The guide follows the standardized format adopted by the series, which unfolds in five parts: Directions, Orientation, What Happened, Analysis, and Vignette. Directions are easy to follow and precise to the nearest tenth of a mile, ending with instructions as to where the visitor should initially face. Orientation takes that initial facing further. Rather than sticking to compass directions that might cause confusion (although those are sometimes added), these guidebooks instead employ an eight-point 360° system of directional orientation (straight ahead, right front, right, right rear, etc) that points the visitor toward key battlefield landmarks and terrain involved with the more in-depth discussion that's to follow.

Within each stop's self-explanatory What Happened section, Burton masters the challenging task of providing streamlined big picture descriptions of events as well as, where appropriate, small-unit tactical-level details, all without the reader feeling the treatment oversimplified. A strong assist to all that comes from the book's excellent set of maps, which pinpoint each stop (and lettered sub-stop) and depict both unit movements and key terrain features. The Analysis section that follows it judiciously weighs leadership decision-making and its results, often introducing plausible elements of contingency. Both of these sections benefit from insights gleaned from engagement with the best of the relevant secondary literature, those military history works identified and/or discussed in the Further Reading and source list parts of the book. Optional to each stop is a Vignette tie-in that adds a very brief human interest story based on a firsthand account.

In the appendix section, readers will find regimental-level orders of battle as well as a primer on Civil War army organization, tactics, and weapons for those newer to the subject.

The closest competitors (for lack of a better word) to the This Hallowed Ground books are the classic U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles. They are very different from each other when it comes to style and presentation, and prospective readers are certainly encouraged to try both. Everyone has their own preferences (for example, the War College guides are packed with extensive passages from official military reports and firsthand accounts), but an argument can be made that the Nebraska series is the superior option of the two when it comes to maximizing limited time on the battlefield. Useful for both active touring and armchair reading, this new installment is another shining example of what the series does so well.

Friday, July 17, 2026

Review - "A Summer of Battles - The Final Weeks of the Civil War's 1864 Atlanta Campaign, Volume 2: Jonesboro, Lovejoy's Station and the Capture of Atlanta" by David Allison

[A Summer of Battles - The Final Weeks of the Civil War's 1864 Atlanta Campaign, Volume 2: Jonesboro, Lovejoy's Station and the Capture of Atlanta by David Allison (Author, 2025). Paperback, 3 maps, photos, endnotes, appendix section, index. Pages main/total:vi,242/438. ISBN:9798273780811. $19]

David Allison's A Summer of Battles - The Final Weeks of the Civil War's 1864 Atlanta Campaign, Volume 1 concluded with the outermost maneuver elements of William T. Sherman's sweeping "Grand Movement" establishing a strong bridgehead south of Atlanta on the east bank of the Flint River. There, advance units from the three corps of O.O. Howard's Army of the Tennessee were poised to launch a final lunge toward Jonesboro and the Macon & Western Railroad that passed through the depot town on its way north to Atlanta. Allison's A Summer of Battles - The Final Weeks of the Civil War's 1864 Atlanta Campaign, Volume 2: Jonesboro, Lovejoy's Station and the Capture of Atlanta continues the narrative through the closing stages of the campaign. [Note: Before going further please visit (or revisit) the site review of Volume 1 [here], paying close attention to its general observations in regard to the book's research, writing, and presentation. Those also apply to this second volume, and not all parts of that discussion will be repeated].

From his Atlanta headquarters, Confederate Army of Tennessee commander John Bell Hood charged his ranking subordinate, William J. Hardee, with driving back the federal advance, and he placed two corps (Hardee's own, temporarily commanded by Patrick Cleburne, and that of S.D. Lee) at Hardee's disposal. Aimed at crushing the Union bridgehead before it could be strongly fortified, the launch time of Hardee's attack west of Jonesboro on August 31, 1864 ended up being considerably delayed until mid-afternoon, when the rearmost contingent of Lee's rushed reinforcements from Atlanta finally arrived on the battlefield. That critical breathing space allowed Howard's troops along the east bank of the Flint River to fully establish an entrenched line of defense backed by well-positioned artillery support. Those circumstances alone dimmed Confederate chances for success considerably, but Allison also convincingly finds poor command and control at the highest levels (a common failing in the Army of Tennessee's battles) to be a major factor behind the Confederate repulse on the 31st. Cleburne/Hardee's Corps, which scattered the Union cavalry in its front during its initial assault, ended up derailing its own attacking momentum. Instead of regrouping after initial success and wheeling into the southern flank of the Union line, the corps dispersed its effort by allowing one division to fruitlessly chase the defeated Union cavalry across the river. The division returned, but the opportunity to strike the Union flank with a concentrated blow had already passed. To the north, S.D. Lee's Corps attacked frontally in two strong lines. The veteran Union defenders on Lee's front were unlikely to be overrun by such a direct attack, but Allison also points out that the lack of coordination between Lee's two battle lines badly disorganized and disrupted the assaulting formations. Both Confederate corps were rather easily repulsed by the Union defenders across their respective fronts.

Declining Confederate fighting morale likely also played a role in the failure of their attacks. High-ranking officers on both sides claimed that the Confederates at Jonesboro lacked their usual attacking spirit, and those claims support the conclusion of Gary Ecelbarger that the lopsided results of the earlier battle at Ezra Church heavily impacted Confederate offensive morale at Jonesboro. In their respective Ezra Church battles studies, both Ecelbarger and Earl Hess convincingly mark that battle as the last point during the campaign in which the Confederates were still capable of endangering Union movements through offensive action, and Allison's account of Jonesboro provides no dissuading evidence.

Whatever kind of Confederate victory that was possible at Jonesboro on the 31st would surely have done little to prevent the evacuation of Atlanta. To the north, three Union corps were able to strike the Macon & Western Railroad between East Point and Jonesboro against little to no opposition, in the process establishing practically unassailable blocking positions and tearing up the tracks. In describing this dramatic turn of events, the author contrasts Sherman's hyperactive presence at the front, where he was able to quickly respond to events as they happened, to Hood's static and detached command direction from Atlanta, where he was cut off from accurate information about what was going on to the south.

After the first day of fighting ended at Jonesboro, Lee's Corps was ordered to return to Atlanta, leaving Hardee isolated with only his own corps to continue to hold Jonesboro and protect the army's supply and munitions trains. Now having to also cover the northern approaches to Jonesboro, Hardee deployed his corps in a single, thin L-shaped line, the shorter east-west leg of which extended as far as was possible across the Macon tracks. Allison recounts the fighting on September 1 in great micro-tactical detail. The attack and defense of key sectors of the battlefield, particularly at the 'angle' formed by the elbow in Hardee's L-shaped line and along the far right of the Confederate position astride the railroad, are explored at a depth not found elsewhere. A great multitude of insightful firsthand accounts from both sides pepper the text, and there is even an entire chapter devoted to the assault of a single regiment (the 17th New York). The Fourteenth Corps's attack at the angle, which placed the defenders there under a murderous crossfire, unhinged the Confederate line, although local counterattacks stemmed the breakthrough and restored enough stability until nighttime cover allowed Hardee to safely withdraw his men and trains. Alleged Fourth Corps tardiness in coming up on the Fourteenth Corps's left was blamed by some for Hardee's escape, but the Confederates are also credited for having the foresight to extend their far right flank just enough that it could not be effectively turned by arriving Fourth Corps units until after nightfall. Rough terrain east of the railroad also played a role in hindering rapid Union deployment along that section of the battlefield. In Allison's studied view, Sherman's ill-considered decision to not rush David Stanley's Fourth Corps and John Schofield's Twenty-Third Corps/Army of the Ohio forward at all possible speed earlier in the day, but rather have them continue to wreck rails as they progressed south (only belatedly ordering them to make haste in the afternoon), was primarily responsible for Hardee surviving the September 1 fighting with his corps largely intact.

Regardless of where the credit or blame lies surrounding Hardee's escape, the overall Confederate situation was still far from secure. The success of Sherman's Grand Movement forced the evacuation of Atlanta, which was then occupied by Henry Slocum's Twentieth Corps on September 2. The book follows the course of Slocum's reconnaissance probes that secured Atlanta's surrender, also addressing competing claims in regard to which unit could best lay claim to being the first to enter the city. The biggest remaining question was whether Sherman's army group could finish the job and destroy Hood's scattered forces before they could reunite and cause further mischief. One corps needed to be left at Jonesboro to guard the rear, but Sherman had five corps concentrated for further operations.

As Allison explains, Sherman did little more than test Hardee's fortified defenses north of Lovejoy's Station late on the 2nd. He also directed Schofield to pass around the Confederate right to block the road that Hood would presumably use to reunite his army. However, once he received certain confirmation late in the day that Slocum's men occupied Atlanta, Sherman seemingly lost all remaining desire for continuing the offensive. To Sherman, the big prize of the campaign (Atlanta itself) was already won and any further attacks against entrenched defenders would only result in needless casualties. A.P. Stewart's and Lee's strung out corps were allowed to join Hardee without interference, and the Army of the Tennessee was back together at Lovejoy's late on the 3rd. The merits of Sherman's decision to not go for the killing blow but instead withdraw his armies back to Atlanta for rest and recuperation would be hotly debated ever since.

Jonesboro casualties for both days of the battle are examined separately in the appendix section, which offers extensive breakdowns of losses as well as numerous individual stories of pain and suffering. The last, and most thought-provoking, appendix revisits contemporary finger-pointing and later ink and print warfare surrounding who should be assigned principal blame for Hardee escaping destruction at Jonesboro. The bulk of the text reviews the opinions and writings of the key generals involved in the controversy. In it, Sherman's point of view takes a bit of a battering, and Stanley (so often framed by his contemporaries, especially Sherman, as the battle's scapegoat) emerges from the fray with a strong defense of his conduct. Addressing Sherman's alleged missed opportunity after Jonesboro to defeat Hood's temporarily scattered army in detail, analysis is mostly limited to Army of the Ohio commander John Schofield's pointed critique. The author himself does not adopt a hardened stance toward any single target, nor does he involve commentary from modern historians in the examination of these issues, mostly leaving readers to weigh these matters for themselves.

The state of the book's map coverage is similar to what it was in the previous volume. There is a good situation map of the area between Atlanta and Jonesboro, and a pair of fine maps show the August 31 and September 1 fighting at Jonesboro. The Jonesboro battle maps depict the action at brigade scale. While that doesn't match the regimental-level tactical detail presented in the text, it does at least give the reader a general understanding of the battlefield terrain and relative positions of the formations involved.

In providing a fine, in-depth account of the long-neglected Battle of Jonesboro as well as the follow-on confrontation at Lovejoy's Station, this volume is the first of its kind. More coverage is on the way. Two highly anticipated standalone studies of Jonesboro (one from Earl Hess another from Scott Patchan) are presumably still in the works, and these closing events of the Atlanta Campaign will of course also be examined in due time by David Powell's ongoing series (the third volume of which will be published later this year), so it will be interesting to read and compare everyone's findings when the time comes. In the meantime, it is recommended that every serious student of the 1864 Atlanta Campaign pick up a copy of this groundbreaking two-volume set from David Allison, which is available in hardcover and paperback editions (both very attractively priced).

Friday, June 5, 2026

Review - "Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles" by Michael Becker

[Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles by Michael D. Becker (University of Tennessee Press, 2026). Softcover, 10 maps, photos, illustrations, driving tour, orders of battle, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xv,142/290. ISBN:979-8-89527-045-5. $24.95]

Naturally enough, the major land campaigns and battles fought in the eastern and western theaters have been the primary focus of University of Tennessee Press's prolific Campaign Decisions in America's Civil War series. However, there has been some shift in direction over the past year and a half or so, with the subject matter of two volumes [Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns (2024) and Decisions of the Red River Campaign (2025)] finally crossing into the Trans-Mississippi theater of operations. Naval orientation is also on the rise, another welcome development. As was the case with Edward Cotham's Galveston book, Michael Becker's Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles centers naval and combined operations in its analysis while also departing significantly from the established structural format of addressing only a single, sharply defined campaign. Indeed, Becker's book covers a series of interconnected land and naval operations played out over an extended period of time (1861-64), the unifying theme of which was the bitterly contested strategic struggle for control over the mighty Mississippi River and its major tributaries. Both Cotham and Becker's contributions demonstrate that the format of the series can be adaptable without losing the core elements of its character and identity.

Many readers of this review will already be familiar with the series and its structure, at the center of which is the concept of the "critical decision." For those new to the series, critical decisions, as distinct from mere important decisions, not only have major consequences in their own right but possess the key added feature of substantially shaping those decisions and events that follow it over the course of the rest of the campaign and beyond. For each critical decision, identification and analysis unfolds in the following sequence: Situation, Options, Decision, and Result(s)/Impact. Situation describes a particular state of politico-military affairs (categorized as strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, personnel related, or logistical in nature) at a moment pivotal enough to prompt a critical decision. That decision framework provides readers with the background context necessary to recognize and evaluate the Options (two or more in number) available to the decision-maker. The historical Decision selected from those options by a critical decision-maker is then briefly described. The ensuing Result(s)/Impact section recounts what happened and outlines the ways in which the decision's outcome shaped the historical events that followed. An Alternative Decision/Scenario section is optional for contributors (some go deep into alternate history conjecture while others omit it altogether). In this case, Becker ventures into that territory selectively.

Each of the six categories of critical decisions are represented at least twice in Becker's analysis. While operational and tactical decisions comprise the majority, their sources (both military and civilian leaders) and categorical diversity are emblematic of the range of key actors and factors involved with the initial conception, support, and conduct of Civil War military campaigns. The expansive time interval and geographical space involved with the events of this particular volume are uniquely broad, but the author is up to the challenge when it comes to connecting the decisions in coherent fashion.

The twenty-seven critical decisions involved in securing control over the key waterways of the inland West are organized into four chapters by year: 1861 (9 decisions), 1862 (14), 1863 (2), and 1864 (2). That the great majority are concentrated in the first two years of the war really highlights the exemplary foresight, urgency, determination, and flexibility of Union planners, who built a vast squadron of river gunboats of various types from scratch and quickly put them to highly effective use without any prior experience in the areas of design and tactics from earlier wars. The great rapidity with which that process occurred denied their much more resource-strapped and disorganized Confederate opponents the breathing space needed to coordinate an effective response. The result was that squadron-scale Confederate naval resistance on the western rivers was effectively destroyed by mid-1862. In terms of assessing the campaign to control the western waterways, it might be argued that there were no more critical decisions to had after Vicksburg and Port Hudson were both secured by Union forces in July 1863, but the Red River Campaign of the following spring placed a large proportion of Mississippi River Squadron capital ships at great risk, making Becker's two 1864 decisions (both related to that campaign) worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, even if the entire Union naval contingent was lost it is difficult to imagine the Confederates gaining the capacity to seriously threaten Union control of Mississippi River navigation at that late stage of the war.

Becker's discussion demonstrates strong awareness and appreciation of recent contributions to the literature. His presentation and analysis of critical 1861-62 Confederate decision-making aligns closely with the mistakes and challenges so astutely identified and examined in Neil Chatelain's insightful 2020 study Defending the Arteries of Rebellion: Confederate Naval Operations in the Mississippi River Valley, 1861-1865. Among these were inefficient resource allocation, dispersal of effort through debilitating competition over scarce resources, strategic indecision, and lack of unified command. Becker usefully reminds us that, at one point, five different civilian and governmental entities had jurisdiction over fighting vessels in the region, and the single professional naval officer given the most authority, George Hollins, was relieved of command at the worst possible moment. As the author outlines in the book, all of those factors impacted critical decision-making in ways that directly contributed to epic disaster for the Confederate defense of the Upper and Lower Mississippi River Valley during the early war period. In similar vein, the critical decision involving staff officer Lewis B. Parsons's reorganization of theater transportation resources demonstrates keen appreciation of the recent literature's assessment of Union rail and river logistics.

Books of this type are always going to have a subjective element to them. Some readers will point toward possible omissions or differ with the author in identifying certain decisions as being truly critical. One of the latter might be the decision surrounding Union construction of a mortar boat flotilla for shore bombardment. While these vessels were deployed during a number of important ship vs. shore actions fought along the Mississippi River Valley, it would be difficult to maintain that they had a critical impact on any of them. In the area of possible omissions, Becker makes strong cases for designating a number of naval administration matters as critical decisions, but one might also suggest that promoting David Dixon Porter to command the new Mississippi River Squadron was a critical personnel related decision. Compatible personalities mattered a very great deal when any and all naval assistance provided to army operations had to be framed as an interservice request. The personal and professional harmony that existed between Porter's navy and Grant and Sherman's army was instrumental to Union victory on a multitude of occasions, not least of which during the very difficult Vicksburg Campaign. In terms of actual complaints, the Decision and Results/Impact sections of some situations draw significant elements from more than one Option choice, which is a practice not typical of the series. Given that that pops up most often in situations with option numbers as high as four and five, option consolidation would have been one way to address that occasional source of confusion.

A major feature of every book in the series is the driving tour appendix tied to the main text's critical decision analysis. This is achieved through a combination of additional support text from the author and focused excerpts from official reports and military communications. As one might imagine, Becker's task was an especially challenging one given the vast size of the Mississippi River Valley area of operations. Even with careful organization, the twelve tour stops between Cairo, Illinois and Bailey's Dam on the Red River in Louisiana take the user on a journey of 1,300 miles! The appendix section also contains vessel orders of battle for each of the major actions discussed in the text.

A novel variation on the typical subject matter of the Campaign Decisions in America's Civil War series, Michael Becker's Decisions on Western Waters successfully applies the critical decision analysis structure to one of the war's longest running and most geographically extensive military contests, effectively framing the opening of the Mississippi as a single campaign of critical significance. With available land campaigns of major status dwindling in number, it will be interesting to see what other unusual pathways the series might take.

Thursday, May 7, 2026

Review - "Stonewall Jackson’s Winter Operations: The Raids Against the C&O Canal and the Bath-Romney Campaign, December 1861 to February 1862" by Timothy Snyder

[Stonewall Jackson’s Winter Operations: The Raids Against the C&O Canal and the Bath-Romney Campaign, December 1861 to February 1862 by Timothy R. Snyder (Savas Beatie, 2026). Hardcover, 6 maps, photos, illustrations, footnotes, appendix section, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xxii,253/315. ISBN:978-1-61121-771-1. $32.95]

While he had justly earned his immortalizing nickname months earlier for his stalwart actions on Henry House Hill during the First Manassas battle, the Thomas J. Jackson of the winter of 1861-62 was not yet the "Stonewall" Jackson of legend. Though his lackluster performance during the Seven Days, a far more significant episode wedged between his Shenandoah Valley Campaign masterpiece and his daring drive into the Union rear that set up the smashing Confederate victory at Second Manassas, has inspired heaps of modern criticism, Jackson's operations along the Virginia-Maryland border from December 1861 to February 1862 clearly represent another Civil War career low point. Analysis of Jackson's flaws in personality, judgment, and command style that were exposed during that early phase of his Civil War career is central to the narrative presented in Timothy Snyder's Stonewall Jackson’s Winter Operations: The Raids Against the C&O Canal and the Bath-Romney Campaign, December 1861 to February 1862.

The reader will not progress very far into the book's introduction before realizing that the author does not rank among Jackson's modern devotees. While it is true that previous generations of writers too often downplayed the worst moments of Stonewall Jackson's Civil War career (of which this campaign was one), with some arguably blind to Jackson's faults, the more recent literature probably deserves more credit from the author for being reasonably well balanced in nature, with admirers, detractors, and those in between together presenting a suitably nuanced overall assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Jackson's Civil War generalship.

Detailed in the book are Jackson's December raids along the Upper Potomac and his follow-on military operations against the Union-occupied towns of Bath and Romney. The goal was to inflict lasting damage to two strategically significant regional transportation networks, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal linking Washington, D.C. and Cumberland, Maryland. In addition to supporting the movement of troops and supplies, much of the region's coal was transported along those routes for military and civilian purposes. By sweeping Union forces from those parts of Virginia that effectively shielded the railroad and canal (hopefully destroying them in the process), Jackson intended to establish long-term disruption to both routes. For Union forces, in addition to protecting those vital logistical arteries, occupation of Romney and Bath threatened Confederate-held Winchester and the rest of the Lower Shenandoah Valley, the defense of which were key parts of Jackson's Valley District command responsibilities.

The author of the 2011 study Trembling in the Balance: The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal during the Civil War, Snyder's established expertise on that subject serves him well in this volume. In addition to explaining why the C&O was such an important means of bulk transportation (especially for coal), the book details a series of Confederate winter raids—one against Dam Number 4 and three against Dam Number 5—none of which were able to inflict any lasting damage. As the author explains, the Confederate raids, which involved both infantry and cavalry forces, were ineffectual for a number of reasons. The Confederate raiders lacked blasting powder for breaching the dams and artillery fire was not used after it was determined that ammunition stockpiles were insufficient for that purpose. Instead, the dismantling process was to be achieved through hand-wielded tools, an iffy proposition under the best conditions let alone in icy winter waters against armed opposition. If that weren't bad enough, the well-positioned Union defenders across the water were both hypervigilant and highly mobile, able to quickly concentrate against as well as outrange their Confederate opponents with disruptive field artillery and rifle fire. Without the unrestricted freedom necessary to complete the laborious process of destroying the dams by hand, the Confederates were rather easily rebuffed at every turn. Description and analysis of these events, along with a properly framed appreciation of the canal's economic and military significance to the Union war effort, form one of the book's most important contributions.

Frustrated by the lack of success against the C&O but substantially reinforced by General W.W. Loring's small Army of the Northwest, Jackson was determined to clear Union forces from his district's western flank (hopefully eliminating the Union garrisons at Bath and Romney in the process) and destroy vital B&O infrastructure in the area. The problem was that achieving this would involve an arduous winter campaign in the Allegheny Mountains. As Snyder describes in the book, Jackson advanced on Bath from multiple directions, but the alert Union defenders were able to break contact and outrace his advance forces to the Potomac crossings. Finding further progress blocked at and around Hancock, Jackson bombarded the town, but the defenders there on the other side of river under fiery and aggressive Union commander Frederick Lander refused to surrender. Jackson next turned to Romney, but the defenders there retreated before his combined forces arrived, again denying the Confederates the possibility of capturing or destroying significant Union forces in the area. As was the case with the C&O, no long-term damage was inflicted upon B&O bridges and tracks during the brief Confederate occupation, and the campaign basically ended with Loring's men left behind to garrison Romney while Jackson's men returned to Winchester. The Confederates then fell into demoralizing internal squabbling that almost resulted in Jackson leaving the army altogether. In the end, Loring's isolated command was ordered to Winchester and Union forces rushed back into the ensuing void, reasserting control that would effectively last throughout the rest of the war.

At best, the benefits reaped from occupying Bath and Romney and in sweeping Union forces across the Potomac were minimal and temporary. Though it is difficult to fault Jackson too much for not being able to capture or destroy Union forces in the area given that they ran away at the Confederate approach, management of the campaign still left much to be desired. As the author explains, some of Jackson's missteps could be attributed to his high command inexperience, both in mountain operations during wintertime and in leading far more troops (approximately 8,500 officers and men, though fewer effectives) than he ever had before. Snyder also gives Jackson, who was without the services of his chief quartermaster John Harman, poor marks in logistical management of the campaign as evidenced by the extreme non-combat losses incurred during the campaign. By some estimates, these reductions in force numbered anywhere from one-quarter to one-third of the army's total strength, filling the military hospitals with sick and otherwise temporarily incapacitated soldiers. In analyzing those claims, Snyder justifiably contends that Jackson pushed too many of the men under his command beyond their physical limits, though one might also argue that other Confederate leaders during this time, notably those in charge of the concurrent Fort Donelson campaign over in Tennessee, contributed to military disaster by not being willing enough to test the limits of their men's endurance. At this stage of the war, Jackson also tended to overestimate the offensive capabilities of militia forces under his command. In relation to his militia and regular officers alike, he then compounded the situation by equating a lack of success (regardless of the cause or causes) with willful failure to perform their military duties. He also demanded blind obedience to the letter of his orders, rarely condoning independent initiative in reaction to changing circumstances. What couldn't be chalked up to inexperience were Jackson's extreme level of operational planning secrecy and his willingness to bypass the chain of command, both of which frustrated and infuriated principal subordinates such as Loring. These would be common complaints from those who served under Jackson (even the general's own staff members) throughout his remaining Civil War career.

Arguably Jackson's biggest mistake after securing Romney was in widely dividing his forces while in such close proximity to the enemy, who could easily rush in forces by rail to position superior forces against Confederate communications. By leaving Loring's command isolated in Romney and marching the rest to Winchester, Jackson was seemingly repeating Confederate president Jefferson Davis's disastrous national cordon defense strategy at the district level. Though the administration held on to that strategy for too long, leading to major military disasters in the West, the danger was immediately recognized on the Virginia frontier, with Jackson being directed through War Secretary Benjamin to withdraw Loring. Jackson considered (very wrongly, in Snyder's view) those orders to be improper "interference" in his own sphere of responsibility, that clash with his superiors prompting the general to submit his resignation. Snyder provides a detailed account of General Lander's ensuing offensive operation, one that would take advantage of the enemy dispersal and attempt to trap the Romney garrison. The fortunes of war would intervene, however, as Loring was already on the move. That and another of Lander's bouts with chronic illness (on top of the festering leg wound that would eventually kill him with sepsis) together allowed Loring to escape unmolested. Nevertheless, Union forces could take pride in how they performed during the winter operations covered in the book. Success or lack of success in any military campaign results from a combination of controllable and uncontrollable factors. One might argue that Snyder's narrative, by focusing so closely on the former, primarily in the context of Jackson's alleged failures and missteps, deflects reader attention from a full appreciation of the remarkably well-managed Union response to the Confederate canal raids and the Bath-Romney Campaign that followed them.

Inadequate map coverage was a clear drawback of the winter campaign's only other book-length account, Thomas Rankin's Stonewall Jackson's Romney Campaign, January 1-February 20, 1862 (1994). There is improvement on that score with Snyder's commissioned set, with its finely detailed maps of the Upper Potomac region and mountainous area of operations west of the Shenandoah, but, save for the skirmishing at Bath and the Confederate pursuit toward Hancock, troop movements associated with the canal raids and Bath-Romney campaign are not superimposed on any of the pictured road networks. It is also the case that map coverage ends completely just beyond the volume's midpoint, before the Confederate expedition to Romney begins.

Overall, this volume is a very fine raid and campaign history that measures up strongly as the most comprehensive account of Jackson's winter operations of 1861-62. At the same time, while the author provides a noteworthy service in shining a spotlight on the earliest manifestations of the generalship flaws that would most significantly color the remainder of Jackson's Civil War career, there does come a point when the volume and tone of the criticisms pass the threshold into becoming immoderate. In interpreting matters great and small in relation to Jackson's personality, command style, and decision-making during this period of the war, Jackson's behavior and actions are at nearly every turn presented in the least favorable light. But, as they say, opinions vary, and other readers and reviewers might see it differently. It is really only near the end of the book, with the final chapter having the tonally fitting title of "Stonewall Jackson Rebuked," that the author references the likelihood of positive benefits from Jackson's highly demanding leadership and command style. Most notable is the possibility, as suggested by veteran accounts, that Jackson's insistence that subordinates strictly follow his orders to the letter (regardless of intervening circumstances) and his pushing his men to the limits of endurance had the combined effect of steeling discipline in both the officer and enlisted ranks in ways that strongly prepared those volunteers, many of whom were still relatively green citizen-soldiers, for the rigors of hard marching and hard fighting necessary to achieving victory in the upcoming Valley Campaign and beyond. In the end, though, regardless of one's feelings about where the author's analysis of Jackson himself registers on the balance meter, it is undeniable that the book is a major contribution to the history of early-war military operations along the hotly contested Virginia-Maryland border.

Thursday, April 2, 2026

Review - "Desert Empire: The 1862 New Mexico Campaign" by Kelly-Fischer & Greenwalt

[Desert Empire: The 1862 New Mexico Campaign by Patrick Kelly-Fischer and Phillip S. Greenwalt (Savas Beatie, 2026). Softcover, 5 maps, photos, illustrations, integrated driving tour, appendix section, orders of battle, reading list. Pages main/total:xxviii,131/191. ISBN:978-1-61121-775-9. $16.95]

The Confederacy's early-war New Mexico Campaign is one of those Civil War operations that seems foolhardy in retrospect, seemingly destined for failure if not complete disaster. On the other hand, world military history is replete with examples of campaigns and wars won against longer odds. From the Confederate government's perspective in faraway Richmond, the invasion of New Mexico Territory via the upper Rio Grande River Valley was a self-contained, low-risk gamble that placed a slate of grand rewards on the table. If successful in New Mexico and the declared territory of Arizona, Confederate forces would be well positioned to threaten U.S. overland communications in the West. Critically, they would also gain a pathway to the Pacific and vie for control of vital mineral resources in the Rockies and Desert Southwest. Happily for Confederate planners, the expedition would involve only local troops, local resources, and captured munitions, placing minimal demands upon a central government already overwhelmed by the process of funding, clothing, supplying, and arming the main Confederate armies then gathering in the war's main theaters. Of course, Richmond's rather detached 'nothing ventured, nothing gained' attitude toward the risks and challenges involved in the operation offered little comfort to those whose lives and reputations would be at stake in carrying it out.

The existing literature associated with the New Mexico Campaign is well developed. In addition to classic campaign overviews from pioneering Civil War in the Southwest scholar Martin Hall and, more recently, Donald Frazier, the combined efforts of Don Alberts, John Taylor, and Thomas Edrington have produced an excellent Valverde book and two fine Glorieta battle studies. The well-coordinated, multi-front Union response that first derailed then completely defeated the Confederate expedition has been thoroughly explored by Flint Whitlock and Andrew Masich. Jerry Thompson has also compiled an exhaustive record and study of the New Mexico territorial volunteers and militia. A number of very useful edited primary source materials have been published, too. Combining a strong synthesis of the secondary literature with fresh revisitation of the O.R. documents associated with the campaign (the footnotes are available here), Patrick Kelly-Fischer and Phillip Greenwalt serve up a fine new overview history of the campaign with their book Desert Empire: The 1862 New Mexico Campaign, the latest volume in the Emerging Civil War series of military overviews.

Co-authors Kelly-Fischer and Greenwalt work successfully within the established format of the series. In addition to providing a sound summary of the strategic picture in the Desert Southwest at the outbreak of the war, their narrative offers well-rounded operational and tactical-level summaries of the military events that unfolded across what is today's Arizona and New Mexico. The campaign's primary battles at Valverde and Glorieta are both well described and contextualized, the account of the multi-day fight for control of Glorieta Pass being the centerpiece of the study. Five maps and a multitude of period and modern photographs, along with many other illustrations, supplement the text. A driving tour, its components placed at the tail end of select chapters, is also incorporated into the study.

Logistical considerations, and how well or how poorly each side met their challenges, are a major theme of the book. Headed by General Henry Hopkins Sibley, the Confederate "army" of some 3,000 men, all mounted, was supported by a logistical apparatus entirely inadequate for the requirements of a long campaign conducted over great distances. The Rio Grande could supply most of its water requirements, but food for the men and forage for the horses would be an almost entirely improvised affair, dependent on local sources (most of which would be unfriendly to their cause). On the other side, Union authorities managed their affairs remarkably well. Preparing for the arrival of Confederate forces in the region, they did a good job of spiriting away or hiding supplies previously stored along what would become the main path of invasion, largely denying them to the enemy. At the same time, resources and reinforcements were being concentrated in the northeast corner of the territory at Fort Union for the coming counteroffensive. Sibley's most direct opposition, the sizable Union garrison at Fort Craig led by Col. E.R.S. Canby, was able to husband supplies within the fort for an indefinite stay. However, the authors also note that Canby's own logistical situation, his command's Santa Fe Trail supply line cut off by Sibley's presence in the Union rear, was itself less than ideal. Far to the west, the famed "California Column"'s long advance from southern California to New Mexico across hundreds of miles of inhospitable desert, its own successful logistical support plan undoubtedly informed by the U.S. Army's antebellum experiences conducting desert operations, is recounted in a sparkling essay attached as an appendix. Another shorter appendix discusses the importance and role of Fort Union, as well as New Mexico volunteers at large, to the outcome of the campaign.

Union commanders, none of whom were experienced in managing large numbers of fighting men over vast distances, proved themselves well up to the task of blunting Sibley's offensive. Aggressive Col. John Slough, while suffering a tactical setback at Glorieta Pass, nevertheless blocked the Confederates from reaching Fort Union, and his subordinate officers are credited with destroying much of the Confederate supply and ammunition train during their surprise attack at Johnson's Ranch. While his forces based at Fort Craig could not halt the Confederate advance in its early stages and lost the battle at Valverde, Canby still successfully managed to keep the fort and its stockpiles out of Confederate hands and continued to be a thorn in Sibley's side for the duration of the campaign. The authors, citing Canby's own mounting logistical concerns, are only mildly critical of his unwillingness, or inability, to directly oppose Sibley's retreat during the latter stages of the campaign. How much of Canby's innate caution bled into overcaution and a great missed opportunity to destroy Sibley's crippled remaining forces is left to the reader to decide. Col. James Carleton's deft handling of the California Column is justly praised. Desert logistics and scarce water resources necessitated a journey conducted in stages and at a measured pace. Carleton's arrival on the scene, though it was too late to cut the retreating Confederates off before they reached safe haven, nevertheless completed the final link in Union forces fully re-securing New Mexico Territory and eliminating the Texas-based threat for the rest of the war.

By all accounts, including the one presented in this volume, Henry Sibley had no business being entrusted with an enterprise as complicated and difficult as an invasion of New Mexico Territory. His military judgment and leadership capacity severely compromised by chronic alcoholism, Sibley was ill for most of the campaign, leaving tactical direction to his principal subordinates. Even though those regimental officers—notably Col. Thomas Green, Lt. Col. William Scurry, and Majors Charles Pyron, Henry Raguet, and John Shropshire (the last two killed in action)—were able to produce impressive tactical successes at Valverde and Glorieta, the lack of firm overall direction and persistent logistical nightmares meant that Confederate forces were typically scattered as the campaign progressed and could not fully leverage their speed and maneuverability advantage in being fully mounted. The Confederate offensive effort also did not possess enough artillery firepower to threaten enhanced defenses such as those newly erected at Fort Craig and Fort Union. One interesting what-if to contemplate is if Slough had not disregarded orders to remain at Fort Union and instead drawn the Confederates deeper into the mountains, further isolating them and perhaps affording the California Column enough additional time to truly seal Sibley's fate.

Desert Empire skillfully delivers a comprehensive campaign history in a tight package capable of appealing to a wide range of readers. In all likelihood, the Confederate invasion of New Mexico Territory represents the Civil War's most extreme disparity between the scale of what was at stake (militarily, politically, and economically) and the numbers of fighting men involved on both sides, and Patrick Kelly-Fischer and Phillip Greenwalt's engaging new account of that unique campaign is highly recommended.

Thursday, March 5, 2026

Review - "They Fought Like Veterans: The Military History of the Civil War in the Indian Territory" by Michael Manning

[They Fought Like Veterans: The Military History of the Civil War in the Indian Territory by Michael J. Manning (Prairie Star Music & Pub, 2025). Hardcover, maps, photos, chapter notes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:564/586. ISBN:979-8-9997957-1-7. $49.95]

When addressing a reading audience interested in the lesser-known parts of the Civil War fought west of the Mississippi River, it is worthwhile to never lose an opportunity to sing the praises of Mary Jane Warde's award-winning When the Wolf Came: The Civil War and the Indian Territory (2013) and recommend it as the best single-volume treatment of its subject. Nevertheless, with her book's broad approach directing roughly equal focus and attention toward the conflict's political, social, and military aspects, Warde's campaign and battle coverage necessarily lacks the depth of detail that a more specialized study can offer. Providing just that is Michael Manning's They Fought Like Veterans: The Military History of the Civil War in the Indian Territory, which documents the area's collection of 1861-65 skirmishes, battles, and campaigns in a comprehensive fashion not found anywhere else in the literature. Readers might recall Manning's earlier exploration of this topic in two issues of Blue & Gray Magazine published in 2011 and 2015, the limitations of the periodical format in terms of available examination space being obvious. While some of that previously published material makes its way into this work, the new approach to the subject found in They Fought Like Veterans exhibits a marked overall increase in depth and breadth. Indeed, the volume's double-column narrative, numerous accompanying maps, and front/back matter together fill nearly six hundred 8.5"x11" pages.

While military events tower above all other topics of discussion in the book, there is ample social and political background history explaining the forces that drove the many internecine tribal conflicts that emerged in Indian Territory during the secession period and Civil War years. It has been well established in the literature that the bitterest internal divisions within the Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Creek/Muscogee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminole) of Indian Territory were rooted decades earlier in unresolved animosities that developed between pro-treaty and anti-treaty factions (i.e. those who adamantly opposed removal during the 1820s and 1830s and those who reluctantly adopted the path of pragmatic acceptance). Especially among the Cherokees and Creeks, those differences directly impacted the ways in which the various tribes responded to southern secession. Heavily lobbied by Confederate representatives wielding big promises of support, each tribe had to decided for itself whether to maintain treaty ties with the U.S. (which created widespread mistrust by evacuating all of its military posts in the territory) or forge new ones with the nascent Confederacy. All of that background is explored at some length in the book's first three chapters. At the opposite end of the volume, a final chapter summarizes the Reconstruction-era struggles experienced by all the tribes, regardless of wartime loyalties, who had to both rebuild after the war's mass destruction and negotiate new treaties with the restored United States.

In terms of presentation style, the text melds author narrative with extensive block quotes from O.R. reports and a host of other government documents and firsthand accounts. In addition to referencing those government sources, chapter notes and bibliography cite Oklahoma and Kansas manuscript collections, published primary sources of various types, newspaper articles, and the secondary literature. Often full-page in size, military maps number in the many dozens and feature tactical and operational-scale movements and unit positions superimposed upon modern topographical maps. The breadth of map coverage is atlas level in scope. This is a big deal due to map numbers and quality being persistent weaknesses across the Civil War in Indian Territory literature. In many cases, the maps created by Manning are notable improvements upon the best examples found in other publications or are the first of their kind. The most sparsely detailed ones are likely the consequence of inescapable source limitations. Photographs are similarly plentiful in number and feature both archival images and the author's own battlefield photography. On the less positive front, the finished manuscript does exhibit a number of drawbacks common to self-publishing, among them frequent name misspellings and inconsistent rank designations.

In addition to covering many smaller-scale skirmishes and raids, the book offers detailed accounts of all of the major military campaigns fought inside the borders of Indian Territory, among them the battles associated with Opothleyahola's flight to Kansas, the Union Army's First and Second Indian Expeditions, the Battle of Old Fort Wayne, First and Second Cabin Creek, the Battle of Honey Springs, and the 1864 Phillips Expedition and its Battle of Middle Boggy. With Indian Territory situated as a strategic buffer between Union Kansas and Confederate Texas as well as being in close proximity to the Missouri-Kansas border war and the fighting in NW Arkansas, Indians units and other forces stationed in the territory were heavily involved in major and minor campaigns conducted along the periphery. With emphasis on Indian unit participation, Manning also covers those campaigns—which include Pea Ridge, Cane Hill/Prairie Grove, the 1863 Union capture of Fort Smith, and the 1864 Camden Expedition—at appropriate depth.

Manning's comparison of Union and Confederate Indian regiments raised for service in the territory flatters the former far more than the latter. The three (First through Third) Indian Home Guard regiments raised for federal service were better armed, equipped, and clothed than their Confederate Indian counterparts, whose own military upkeep was routinely low priority, but factors behind their success went deeper than just material support. Confederate Indian units operating inside Indian Territory were frequently bolstered by Texas (and sometimes Arkansas) cavalry, but Manning's campaign accounts clearly show that the Indian Home Guard regiments consistently exhibited stronger unit cohesion, were better integrated in the order of battle, and enjoyed far stronger artillery support. On the Confederate side, too many Indian officers and men came and went as they pleased, leaving their forces chronically scattered and understrength when the critical moment of doing battle arose. Of course, some of that could be blamed on poor top leadership (ex. from generals Albert Pike and Douglas Cooper), but it does seem to be the case that the Union Indian regiments more successfully adapted their own martial cultures to what would have been to them alien structures of military organization and discipline.

In keeping with the July 17, 1863 Battle of Honey Springs being widely recognized as the most significant battle fought in Indian Territory during the war, the campaign and its aftermath are accorded extensive coverage. In describing the battle and explaining Confederate defeat, Manning addresses some of the same issues and concerns raised in William Lees's recently published archaeological study. Both authors note the imbalanced concentration of fighting in the center, but, while Lees suggests that Confederate commander Douglas Cooper's leadership deficiencies were primarily responsible for the Indian units on either flank not getting into the action in any meaningful way, Manning sees the problem as being with the poor fighting and leadership qualities of the Indian units themselves (much of the blame for that being due to unfulfilled promises and neglect from the Confederate government). Like Lees, Manning credits clear superiority in Union firepower and the possibility of poorly manufactured/weather ruined powder on the Confederate side as being major contributors to Union victory and Confederate defeat. Manning's analysis follows the established narrative of marking Honey Springs as a significant turning point in Confederate prospects for success in Indian Territory, but he also sees it as coinciding with downsized Union aims. After the demoralizing defeat, Confederate forces inside the territory assumed a largely defensive posture punctuated by occasional mounted raids against Union supply lines. On the other side, the Federals abandoned grandiose plans of using victories in Indian Territory as a springboard for launching offensives into North Texas. Instead, after the occupation of Fort Smith, Arkansas in September 1863 secured the eastern flank of Union occupation forces in Indian Territory, resettlement of tribal refugees to their formerly abandoned homes and maintaining supply and communications with key military posts such as Fort Gibson were prioritized.

Manning is not the only writer to characterize the guerrilla war in Indian Territory as being perhaps the most destructive produced during the war, rivaling the worse excesses in Missouri. The brunt of that mass-scale horse theft, crop losses, livestock rustling, and homestead destruction was concentrated in the northeastern corner of the territory, in the Cherokee and Creek domains. What isn't clearly documented is which bushwhacker-style guerrilla chieftains and bands operated in Indian Territory. Manning blames some of the chaos on Cherokee leader Stand Watie's raiding, but Watie and his men were not guerrillas. Perhaps the source material is too sparse to support such a project, but a truly full study of the guerrilla war in Indian Territory and its impact is sorely needed. What does seem clear is that the relative safety of the Choctaw and Chickasaw home fronts strongly contributed to those tribes maintaining consistent, and largely unified, popular support for the Confederate war effort up until the conflict's waning moments.

Throughout the book, Manning compares the quality of high command leadership demonstrated by both sides, mostly finding the administrative, planning, and fighting capacities of Union generals, particularly James G. Blunt and Samuel R. Curtis, far superior to the string of Confederate commanders that led combined white and Indian forces. The author maintains that Union commanders were generally better able to concentrate their forces at decisive moments, that contention supported by numerous examples of Confederate forces (even when possessing superior overall numbers in the territory) being caught scattered when forced to give battle. Manning is among those who hold General Blunt in high regard for his aggressiveness and military leadership. Unlike historian William Shea, a deep admirer and biographer of Curtis but who has also closely studied Blunt's career, Manning believes Blunt was destined for greater responsibilities (perhaps even departmental command) before his career was derailed (unfairly, in Manning's opinion) by the Baxter Springs debacle of October 1863. Manning's characterization of John Schofield as a petty schemer and intraservice squabbler will be familiar to most Trans-Mississippi Civil War readers but perhaps less so to those primarily acquainted with Schofield's later 1864-65 army command performances in Georgia and Tennessee.

Easily the most comprehensive military history and map study of the Civil War in Indian Territory, Michael Manning's They Fought Like Veterans successfully bridges a longstanding gap in the literature. Recommended.

Wednesday, February 11, 2026

Review - "A Summer of Battles - The Final Weeks of the Civil War's 1864 Atlanta Campaign, Volume 1: The Siege of Atlanta, Utoy Creek and The Grand Movement" by David Allison

[A Summer of Battles - The Final Weeks of the Civil War's 1864 Atlanta Campaign, Volume 1: The Siege of Atlanta, Utoy Creek and The Grand Movement by David Allison (Author, 2025). Softcover, maps, photos, illustrations, appendix section, endnotes, index. Pages main/total:xxx,300/455. ISBN:9798272419958. $25]

The collective output of 1864 Atlanta Campaign publishing over the past fifteen years or so has managed to achieve, in a remarkably short period of time, a stunning reversal of the rather profound neglect that persisted across preceding decades (the one shining light being Albert Castel's classic 1992 campaign history). Remarkably, just for the July fighting around Atlanta alone, six major studies—two each for the Peach Tree Creek, July 22, and Ezra Church battles—have been produced since 2010. Credited to Gary Ecelbarger, Earl Hess, and Robert Jenkins, all are excellent. What still remains the most overlooked phase of the long campaign, however, is its conclusion. Those events are finally addressed at length for the first time in a two-volume set (available in both hardcover and paperback) from David Allison titled A Summer of Battles - The Final Weeks of the Civil War's 1864 Atlanta Campaign. Encompassing the first thirty days of August 1864, Volume 1 begins with the pressing of Union siege lines forward against Atlanta's inner ring of defenses and ends with General William T. Sherman's army group seizing a bridgehead across Flint River and closing in on the critical Macon & Western Railroad town of Jonesboro.

Allison's detailed descriptive account of the week-long series of events leading up to and including the Battle of Utoy Creek solidly suggests an author possessing intimate knowledge of the ground and strong familiarity with the source material. The ways in which the battlefield terrain and road network west of Atlanta shaped the course and conduct of the fighting between the Union Fourteenth and Twenty-Third Corps and S.D. Lee's Confederate corps are clearly and meaningfully laid out. Variously presented at brigade and regimental scales, the tactical narrative incorporates a vast array of firsthand accounts that really bring to the fore the experiences of the common soldiers and lower-ranking officers that led them. At the higher command level of the discussion, the author also offers a lengthy assessment of the controversy that emerged over Fourteenth Corps commander John Palmer's rank dispute that did much to derail the entire operation. The effect Palmer's obstinate refusal to take orders from Army of the Ohio commander John Schofield (after being directed to do so by Sherman) had on Union opportunities for breakthrough success west of Atlanta remains open for debate, but Allison's analysis supports the view that Palmer's intransigence likely led to hundreds of unnecessary Union casualties. While his actions may have satisfied his sense of personal honor, Palmer's resignation in the middle of an active operation constitutes a major black mark against his otherwise sterling record as one of the Union Army's best-regarded citizen-generals. In the end, Allison's account of the Utoy Creek battle shows that John Bell Hood's Army of the Tennessee, though severely battered by the failed offensive actions of the previous month, remained well capable of defensively thwarting Sherman's methodical extension of the fighting front.

There are some notable flaws. In common with many other self-publishing projects of this scale, text and presentation have some rough edges that an outside editor might have helped smooth over, but the end result is not overly distracting.  A dearth of map coverage marred Allison's otherwise fine 2018 study of the rear area battle at Decatur [site review here]. With inclusion of a pair of good brigade-scale maps of the fighting at Utoy Creek, there is improvement in this volume. At a larger scale, Sherman's initial progress west of Atlanta is traced using maps borrowed from the atlas to the O.R., but they're usefulness is limited. Unfortunately, map coverage ends entirely with Utoy Creek, leaving the reader with only textual means of tracking the course of the Grand Movement and its final approach to Jonesboro.

A great strength behind Allison's narrative account of these operations is the sheer number of firsthand accounts the author managed to compile through his research. They are extensively integrated into every aspect of the study. Indeed, that class of source material deeply colors and enhances Allison's detailed renderings of the opposing siege lines, the mass bombardment of Atlanta, the large-scale maneuvering west and south of the city, and the battlefield events of the thirty-day period (August 1 to August 30) examined in the book. When the contending armies were on pause during the month, the earthworks constructed by both sides, as well as the sharpshooting and skirmish line raids and sweeps that each side participated in, strongly resembled what was going on far to the east around Petersburg. Personal interactions between Union and Confederate soldiers facing each other across no man's land, including widespread fraternization, is also covered extensively. The scale and intensity of the bombardment of Atlanta, and what it was like to experience it on both ends of the barrel, are also informatively revealed in the text. Many Union rifled batteries fired so many rounds that they wore out their tubes, necessitating replacement guns be sent down from northern factories. Confederate soldiers in the trenches around Atlanta and civilians remaining in the city itself undoubtedly suffered from the physical and psychological effects of the bombardment, but the rain of shells at the same time did not lessen their resolve. Bombardment alone could not break Confederate resistance, and there was no patience for regular siege approaches. That reality, along with the check at Utoy Creek and the failure of Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry raid to do much damage to enemy rail communications, finally convinced Sherman that a more radical approach was needed in order to lever Hood's army out of Atlanta. His answer was the "Grand Movement," a far more ambitious flanking strategy that ultimately proved successful.

For his Grand Movement, Sherman pulled Twentieth Corps back to a series of fortified Chattahoochee River bridgeheads and slid the rest of the army group west and south along a wide-arcing left wheel movement that would position it against, and eventually across, Hood's last remaining rail link below the city. Not displaying his usual brand of aggressiveness, Hood did not directly oppose the five-day march of Sherman's flanking forces, and the question naturally arises as to why he didn't attack while Sherman's army group was in motion. The normal explanation is that Hood, lacking full and timely intelligence (Wheeler's cavalry was off on a long-distance raid against Sherman's own communications), mistakenly assumed that the enemy movement was either the beginnings of a general retreat or, at worst, another raid against Atlanta's rail links. By the time Hood realized that the threat beyond his left was being conducted by Sherman's main body (six full corps), it was too late to intervene. Hood himself cited the many offensive hindrances stemming from the broken nature of the ground west of Atlanta and the enemy's ability (consistently demonstrated at all points prior) to instantly fortify as reasons for not attacking. The possibility that Hood's Army of Tennessee, after the failed attacks on July 20 at Peach Tree Creek, the July 22 Battle of Atlanta, and at Ezra Church on July 28 together produced frightening losses in officers and men, might have simply been spent as an offensive force is curiously not part of the discussion, which is a bit surprising given that both Ecelbarger and Hess make that argument in their excellent Ezra Church books. As Allison describes it, Sherman's movement was planned and executed so skillfully (with the Union corps pressing forward cautiously, refusing flanks and fortifying at every stop along the way) that openings for Hood to counterattack and derail it were hard to come by. However, as August 30 approached, Twenty-Third Corps, the original hub of the wheeling movement and then its entrenched rear guard, found itself separated from the other corps by three miles of ground. In the author's view, this moment, as fleeting as it may have been, was Hood's only real opportunity to strike back. Hood's inability or failure to contest the Grand Movement is addressed in the main text and at even more depth in an appendix, and further critical assessment of Hood's reaction to finding the enemy in force and across his communications will undoubtedly be furnished in Volume 2.

In presenting a wealth of descriptive military and human interest detail on some of the most neglected aspects of one of the war's most momentous campaigns, David Allison's A Summer of Battles - The Final Weeks of the Civil War's 1864 Atlanta Campaign, Volume 1 is well worthy of recommendation, certainly sparking more than enough interest to proceed onward to the second volume's coverage of the Battle of Jonesboro, Lovejoy's Station, and the fall of Atlanta.

Monday, February 2, 2026

Review - "Opening Manassas: The Iron Brigade, Stonewall Jackson, and the Battle on Brawner’s Farm, August 28, 1862" by Herdegen & Backus

[Opening Manassas: The Iron Brigade, Stonewall Jackson, and the Battle on Brawner’s Farm, August 28, 1862 by Lance J. Herdegen and Bill Backus (Savas Beatie, 2025). Hardcover, 8 maps, photos, footnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:x,264/286. ISBN:978-1-61121-761-2. $32.95]

While no one has yet attempted to surpass John Hennessy's 1993 masterpiece Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas, smaller pieces of the campaign and battle have received quality standalone treatment. Noteworthy works of that type include Robert K. Krick's Cedar Mountain battle study, Scott Patchan's examination of James Longstreet's August 30 mass assault that secured Confederate victory at Second Manassas, and a number of book-length accounts of the Fitz John Porter controversy. Another prominent title to add to the list is Lance Herdegen and Bill Backus's Opening Manassas: The Iron Brigade, Stonewall Jackson, and the Battle on Brawner’s Farm, August 28, 1862.

In addition to its fresh description and reappraisal of the much smaller-scale, but nevertheless bitterly contested, fighting that directly preceded (and did much to shape) the following two days of major fighting at Second Manassas, the book also adopts a novel dual-author format, one that is described by the publisher who suggested it as a "fog of war" style of approach. In it, widely acknowledged Iron Brigade expert Lance Herdegen handles the Union side, and Bill Backus unveils the action from the opposing perspective of Stonewall Jackson's wing of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The chain of events examined in the book unfolds through alternating Union and Confederate chapters. The one-sided viewpoint and focus of each chapter is further shaped by the writer's interpretation of how much was known about the other side's movements and intentions at the time. The transition between chapters is less than smooth at times, with narrative and chronological continuity to some extent sacrificed in service to emphasizing the friction of war.

Understanding what had to happen to place elements of two Confederate divisions of Jackson's wing and a portion of Union general Rufus King's First Division/Third Corps together on Brawner's Farm requires a pretty heavy amount of background and context, and the reader is past the volume's midpoint before the August 28 clash itself begins in earnest. Taking the long view, Herdegen traces the full length of the Iron Brigade's journey from its western origins to the bitter struggle in Brawner's field. The brigade's unusual headgear and uniform, struggles with adapting to army discipline under the leadership of John Gibbon, the physical trials of the summer campaign, and mounting frustration over a lack of battle experience are all matters discussed at some length. Covering the background for the Confederate side of things, Backus ably traces Lee's increasingly desperate attempts to come to grips with, and quickly crush, John Pope's Army of Virginia before it could combine forces with the Army of the Potomac. Ultimately, that involved the high-risk detachment of Stonewall Jackson's wing of the Army of Northern Virginia for a drive deep into the enemy rear to sow chaos and create opportunity for Pope's defeat or destruction. A striking theme that emerges from the fog of war approach is just how much in the dark both sides were as to enemy locations and intentions. Indeed, the extent of mutual confusion that persisted over the period examined in the book is pretty remarkable considering the relative proximity of the opposing forces involved, and misuse of cavalry as a contributing factor is a good point raised by Backus.

Backus's overall assessment of Jackson as a general aligns with those who rate him at his best when conducting sweeping operational maneuvers and weakest when managing affairs at the tactical level. In terms of problematic leadership traits, Backus cites Jackson's legendary operational secrecy and his frequent issuing of orders that bypassed the normal chain of command as key flaws. Both of these, especially the former, are on prime display during the August period examined in the book. Indeed, the author's analysis of Jackson's decision-making at each stage of the operation heavily emphasizes the degree to which Jackson courted disaster through his own unique command style. Though his many points of criticism raise valid concerns about Jackson's leadership style and judgment, their sheer number, especially after factoring in those involving negative repercussions that might have happened but didn't, arguably threatens to overshadow the greater significance of what Jackson and his men actually achieved during these stages of the campaign. In contrast, Backus heaps superlatives upon division commander Richard Ewell, though, unlike how the Jackson critiques are handled, it's made much less clear in the text where the reasoning is coming from. Jackson's gravest mistake, in the author's view, was his abandoning possession of Thoroughfare Gap, though Backus mitigates some of that criticism by conceding that Jackson's prioritization of his wing's concentration over assigning strong units to rear area security had merits of its own and by noting that other mountain passes were available for reestablishing communications had things truly gone south for the Confederates.

During the Civil War, infantry lines of battle arrayed against each other in the open and at short range rarely traded volleys for more than a brief period of time before one side or the other brought the proceedings to a head by either charging the enemy line or ending the exchange through withdrawal. As traditionally understood, Brawner's Farm was different, a face to face firefight lasting upwards of an hour and a half, resulting in horrendous casualties for those involved, and this volume's microhistory of the battle fully explores that atypical reality. As explained in the text, the Confederates struggled that day to harness their superior numbers, a large part of that being attributed to terrain difficulties, key leadership losses, and the battle taking place very late in the day. On the Union side, Gibbon's brigade has always garnered the lion's share of the attention for its determined and costly stand, but Herdegen also duly credits Abner Doubleday's brigade for filling in a dangerous gap in the Union line at a critical moment when the Confederates of Lawton's Brigade were finally able to launch a charge against it (which was repulsed with heavy losses all around). Support for Gibbon from the rest of the division could have been better managed, but that is typically blamed on the temporary leadership void caused by General King's untimely epileptic episode. It was what happened after the battle that caused the most controversy. The decision to march King's division away from the battlefield was, in Herdegen's opinion, a "mistake" that "played a large role in the defeat of Pope's Army of Virginia in the next two days" (pg. 263), but the reasoning behind that damning assessment is left undeveloped. One might argue that falling back was well within military prudence given how exposed King's battered division would have been on the morrow.

As the book recounts at length, officer losses on the 28th were exceptionally high, but the Confederate leadership casualties in particular (two division commanders along with a great multitude of field grade and company officers spread across four brigades) cast a long shadow. In assessing the aftermath of Brawner's Farm, this study persuasively contends that the process of  junior officer attrition in the Army of Northern Virginia was already reaching damaging levels well before the war's midpoint.

Brawner's Farm was far more than an outpost battle or mere prelude to the main event, and, like David Powell and others have recently done in altering our conception of which events should be considered integral parts of the Battle of Chickamauga, books like this one clearly demonstrate that Second Manassas should be viewed as a three-day, rather than the traditionally understood two-day, battle. In addition to providing a thorough history of the fighting at Brawner's Farm, Opening Manassas offers Civil War readers compelling historiographical points of interest in regard to ongoing debates surrounding Stonewall Jackson's generalship and the early development of the Iron Brigade's distinguished combat reputation.