Showing posts with label Authors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Authors. Show all posts

Friday, October 2, 2026

Author Q&A: Theodore Savas and "The Indispensable Man"

The site's long-running Q&A feature ends its rather long hiatus with the return of Theodore Savas. Ted wore his publisher's hat for our 2007 interview, but today we will be talking about his newest work on the authorial side of things: The Indispensable Man: George Washington Rains, the Confederate Powder Works, and the Civil War You Never Knew.

CWBA: Welcome back, Ted. It has often been said that no Confederate army lost a battle because of a lack of arms, powder, and shot. However, a wider reading uncovers a number of challenges to that long accepted claim. For example, antiquated arms were a key factor in the early-war Confederate defeat at Mill Springs and, accurately or not, bad powder was blamed for the mid-war loss to a much smaller Union force at Honey Springs. Also, in a general sense, defective shells and obsolete artillery dramatically impacted Confederate hitting power on a multitude of battlefields. What are your thoughts on the matter?

TS: This first question deserves a full reply, so here we go.

You’re right to challenge it, and so do I. That line is one of the most durable myths of the war. It survives and thrives because of what I call reverse-engineered thinking: the Confederacy fought for four years, none of the big-name battles were lost because of a lack of munitions, so it always had the means to fight a long war. It didn’t have the means to fight a war at all in 1861, and it lost a lot of engagements because of a lack of powder. Let me dig into this a bit more.

When George Rains sat down in a Richmond hotel room with Jefferson Davis and Josiah Gorgas on July 8, 1861, for what was essentially a final job interview in a meeting no one has ever written about, not a pound of military-grade powder was being made anywhere in the South. Davis put him in charge of locating, designing, and building a mammoth central government gunpowder mill from scratch to supply the entire war effort east of the Mississippi. We will come back to this later.

You noted Mill Springs. General Crittenden attacked in the rain on January 19, 1862, at the far eastern end of Johnston’s line three months before the Augusta Powder Works began production. We don’t have precise records of what the Confederates fighting there had at that time, and the powder they did have was probably subpar—wet and poorly made. The previous October, General Zollicoffer and some of his officers were complaining that they did not have two rounds of ammunition per man, and that artillery had arrived with empty shells.

After the Augusta Powder Works went into operation in April of 1862, no significant defeat east of the Mississippi River took place because of a lack of gunpowder. Before that, during the war’s first year, there are multiple examples of major defeats in several states directly related to a lack of powder. Rains and the Augusta mill, except for one small shipment, did not send powder to the Trans-Mississippi, but I have a significant amount of information about just how bad the powder was out there and the consequences.

Take Honey Springs. That was a quality problem, and the evidence is stronger than “accurately or not” suggests. That summer, Gen. William Steele complained that the powder he received from San Antonio “looks well when first opened, but attracts moisture to such an extent that exposure to damp weather converts it into a paste. The troops have no confidence in it.” Gen. Kirby Smith wrote about this in March 1864: Mexican powder made with nitrate of soda instead of nitrate of potash “caused our troops to be defeated on the Arkansas, and resulted in the loss of the greater portion of the Indian Territory.” None of that powder came from Augusta; it all came from Mexico by order of Richmond.

You’re right about “hitting power,” though that term has different applications. At Charleston in 1863, Beauregard complained that not more than one-fifth of the fuses he’d been sent “burst properly or with accuracy.” Rains watched the batteries engage the Union fleet and was alarmed by what he witnessed: “I regret to say that of the many shells I saw fired from our batteries at the enemy from the 10 inch Columbiad, but few fuzes took fire and hence the ammunition and projectiles were expended without effect.” But the problem was never Augusta powder, which was routinely tested. The lack of “hitting power” in my view came not only from bad fuses but from weak powder made in smaller state-run or quasi-private mills, especially in New Orleans. I mention this in more detail in a later answer below.

To summarize: once Augusta was running at full stride, from April 1862 and thereafter, the claim holds up reasonably well for quantity and quality east of the Mississippi. There was neither quantity nor much quality during the first year of the war anywhere, and this was true west of the river as well for essentially the entire war.

CWBA: There are a lot of senior Confederate/militia officers named Rains for Civil War readers to keep track of, including Gabriel Rains of the torpedo bureau, James E. Rains (killed leading his brigade at Stones River), James S. Rains (a Missouri State Guard brigadier primarily known for his alcoholism and military incompetence), and your Rains, George Washington Rains. For those not familiar with him, can you provide a short capsule bio?

TS: Even the newspapers couldn’t keep them straight. In July 1861, while George Rains was meeting Tennessee’s governor in Nashville, papers from Buffalo to Dallas were arguing over whether the “Gen. Rains” fighting in Missouri was the Major Rains who had been running an iron works in New York and had gone South. He wasn’t.

George Washington Rains was born in New Bern, North Carolina, in 1817, the younger brother of Gabriel of torpedo and landmine fame. Their father built fine furniture and cheap caskets, went broke, and moved the family to Alabama one step ahead of his creditors. George graduated from West Point first in chemistry and third in the class of 1842 (Longstreet, Rosecrans, D. H. Hill, and Abner Doubleday were classmates; Mansfield Lovell was his roommate).

He served as an engineer and artillery officer, taught chemistry at West Point, and had a remarkable Mexican War career as a spy, engineer, and combat staff officer for Gens. Winfield Scott and Gideon Pillow. In 1856, George married into one of the richest families in America (that’s a crazy story), resigned from the U.S. Army, and moved to upstate New York, where he helped manage and grow his father-in-law’s Washington Iron Works at Newburgh. He was a wealthy man by the time his home state of North Carolina seceded. He was also in communication with Richmond, which was trying to get him to join the Confederacy for a specific task. He left his wife and young daughter in June 1861 and traveled to Richmond, a move that permanently estranged him from his father-in-law; his marriage never fully recovered.

While designing and building the two-mile-long Augusta mill complex, he traveled to every state east of the Mississippi. He turned Tennessee’s lone blasting mill into a viable operation late in the year and helped design a second mill from scratch; without these, Albert Sidney Johnston could not have maintained any Western Theater line.

The Augusta mill was the only permanent industrial complex or construction project the Confederacy finished. Rains had a myriad of complex important duties, eventually commanded several arsenals, and during the war’s final weeks served as the Confederacy’s de facto chief of ordnance. He ended the war as a colonel but was probably promoted to brigadier during the final days.

He remained in Augusta, taught chemistry, served as dean of the Medical College of Georgia, and wrote several textbooks. He returned to Newburgh in 1894 after his father-in-law died, and died there himself in 1898.

CWBA: The Indispensable Man is clearly more than a Civil War biography that follows the standard format. How would you describe what kind of book it is?

TS: It is three books, threaded together under the primary rubric of biography.

First, it’s a full biography. George Rains led five very different lives: birth to West Point, a distinguished career in the Old Army, a prosperous stretch as an industrialist and family man in New York, four years as the Confederacy’s powdermaker, and three decades as a teacher and college dean in Augusta. His prewar years are covered in full because you can’t understand what he was able to achieve during the Civil War without understanding how he built his talent stack.

Second, it’s an industrial and logistics history. That might sound boring, but it’s edge-of-your-seat front-row coverage of a shadow war you have never known. You’ll learn more about powder than you probably want to, but you must be versed in this if you study the war at any serious level. Most historians have no idea how hard and complex powder was to make, and why pistols, small arms, field artillery, and coastal guns all needed different grains of powder. They aren’t interchangeable. Making it and distributing it to where it needed to go was a nightmare that never ended. That gap in knowledge has distorted what historians have written, and how they and we have read and understand the war. Please note that this is not a criticism. I didn’t know much about this either until I began studying it.

Third, and this is what surprised me most, The Indispensable Man is a history of the strategy of the war told through the lens of gunpowder. Rains and the Augusta Powder Works are inextricably linked to grand strategy, and not indirectly. I have the firsthand accounts to prove it.

There were eye-popping shortages everywhere, at every level, nearly all the time during the war’s first year. This was true even in Virginia, where the Confederates hoarded most of what they seized from the U.S. arsenals and forts.

All of this raises a hard question about the other side: what did the Lincoln administration know and when did it know it? Lincoln and everyone in any position of power knew the South had very little powder and could not replace what little it had. Major newspapers like the New York Times explained the complexities of making powder, why the Confederacy could not make it quickly, and it specifically warned Lincoln not to give Jefferson Davis what he needed most: the time to develop a central mill to reach a war footing.

Despite all this knowledge, the United States adopted a long-war strategy for a conflict that could have ended quickly regardless of who was tactically victorious in the field. Pulling triggers and yanking lanyards anywhere—even vigorously sustained skirmishing—would have drained the Confederacy within weeks. I know that statement raises eyebrows, but I cover this in depth with numbers and firsthand accounts. Everyone of consequence on both sides knew this. The Confederate War Department reports it produced for itself and for the Congress shocked everyone—and not in a good way. The math was undeniable. If Lincoln pressed them, the war was over. You have never heard or read this because it never made it into the books.

The footnotes are almost a fourth book. They are deep and explanatory, and I urge everyone to read them carefully. All my work is there.

CWBA: In your introduction, you recount your experience of one of any scholarly endeavor’s greatest frustrations: being flatly denied access to key manuscript material. Did that top official with the county museum you referenced offer a reason why you couldn’t examine the Rains papers they held?

TS: Not specifically, but I think he was embarrassed that I flew in from California and had to point out what was jammed into drawers on an upper floor and what they really were. He called them “some Confederate drawings.” I explained what they were, why they were important, that only a few had ever been seen, and that they were the Rosetta Stone of Confederate industry. He was English, not American, and he was more interested in geology and dinosaurs than he was in history. He was not a helpful man. It was maddening.

The good news is that the story didn’t end there. Years later the museum had a new curator, Gordon Blaker, who understood exactly what he had. Those drawings became the foundation of Never for Want of Powder (2007).

CWBA: What was it about Rains’s background and skill set that made him a strong fit to manage the Augusta Powder Works?

TS: No one else in the Confederacy combined what he brought to the table, and no one else could have performed that task. That is not hyperbole. He had broad and deep experience in chemistry, science in general, math, teaching, engineering, and military science, as well as combat experience and years spent managing a major industrial complex in New York, where he learned business, logistics, shipping, hiring, firing, management, production schedules, and a lot more. If he had never married into the Ramsdell family and run the Washington Iron Works, he could never have designed, built, and managed the Augusta Powder Works. New York was a dress rehearsal, but of course he didn’t know that at the time. Quite literally, no one else had that talent stack. No one. And Rains used all of it to achieve what he did.

CWBA: You mention that this is a book decades in the making. One of the stops along the way was the publication of Never for Want of Powder: The Confederate Powder Works in Augusta, Georgia (U. of S. Carolina Press, 2007) that you co-authored. Between then and now did you discover new sources that revised your understanding of what was presented in the 2007 study?

TS: Great question. Never for Want of Powder was a team effort led by Chip Bragg and blended several disciplines. My part was the Rains biographical chapters. The main subject was the works themselves: the architecture, the machinery, the process, and Charles Ross’s careful reconstruction of the production records. That research holds up, and I cite it often in my new book. What I found in the years following its publication changed my understanding of Rains and all that he did and why, and changed the book I thought I was writing into something quite different.

In 2010, I obtained a 30-page handwritten memorandum Rains wrote during the war’s final months. It had never been published or used in any manner. Unfortunately, like a lot of Rains items it ends mid-sentence, so it could have been 100 pages. I have no way of knowing. The candid memorandum walks through his entire service in personal and opinionated terms. It confirms his meeting with Davis and Gorgas and that he left Richmond for Nashville the same afternoon he got his orders. It explains all he did and why and offers chilling descriptions of how Albert Sidney Johnston was completely unprepared for combat of any kind for months on end during the fall and winter of 1861-62, and how worried Johnston, Rains, et al. were that Union forces would advance and force them to expend what little powder they had.

Second, the advent of digital research unlocked scores of sources and connected the dots. In January 2020, I started running keyword searches in the Official Records. If a document isn’t in the index, you’ll never find it, and the index is far from complete. Searching for “powder” and other keywords important to my study turned up letters, telegrams, and reports I’d never seen, from generals, governors, arsenal officers, citizens—you name it. I ended up compiling my own index of all 128 volumes, tailored to my study.

All these documents said the same basic thing: we have no powder, few or no shells, and if attacked cannot hold our positions. This was true of virtually every fort, city, coastal area, and field force large and small. The first time or two I read that I thought, “Huh, that’s interesting.” Then I learned that the Confederate War Department knew the problem was widespread. The common reply from Richmond was that it would send powder only to whomever was being threatened or attacked—when and if it could get powder. Meanwhile, hold on and show a bold front. The “Huh, that’s interesting” morphed into “My God, this was everywhere, and they could not hold, if pressed, anywhere.”

Searches in newspapers (worldwide) and letter books from arsenals and depots, compiled service records, and more uncovered a deeper treasure trove that supported and expanded on all this. I found so much I could not even use it all. My research produced a picture of a very different war than the one in the books.

The third was the discovery of a critically important, misfiled Jefferson Davis document that tied all this together to strategy. As far as I can tell, no one had ever used it, including his biographers and any other writers who would have had a deep interest in doing so. It’s not even in his collected papers. I shared it with a couple of Davis historians, and they admitted that they had never seen it. William C. Davis, a good friend of mine who read my manuscript, told me it surprised him and raised serious questions, especially about how the first year of the war was fought.

To summarize, these sources unlocked and explained two things. First, they put Rains’s heretofore unknown work for General Johnston in Tennessee (and in other states) in 1861 in proper context, and second, they reframed the strategy of the entire first year of the war. (I won’t get into it here, but it also alters, in my opinion, how we must look at the last eight or so months of the end of the war.) I have studied the Civil War for 50 years. I had never seen any of this.

CWBA: You estimate that Rains’s facilities produced over 3 million pounds of quality military-grade powder between April 1862 and April 1865. Of the combined total of domestically produced powder and that imported through the blockade over the length of the war, around what percentage was manufactured at Augusta?

TS: I’d love to give you a clean number, but no one can do it honestly, and I’d be skeptical of anyone who claims to be able to do so. It was clearly the large majority of all the powder available after April 1862.

The Augusta side of the equation is solid. Charles Ross worked through the daily ledgers and found the works made 3,168,450 pounds between April 1862 and April 1865, nearly half a million pounds more than Rains himself claimed. The import side is not. We know about individual cargoes, but there is no complete count, and the surviving figures often disagree. Estimates of the powder the Fingal brought into Savannah in 1861, for example, range from 17,000 pounds to 48 tons! In addition, a lot of imported powder arrived wet and often ruined. Much of it had to be reworked. How much was ruined or lost is unknown.

What I can say with confidence is that among domestic producers east of the Mississippi, Augusta dwarfed everyone else. The two Tennessee mills Rains established and/or reorganized and equipped were vital but small affairs and short-lived. Records for the mill at Columbia, South Carolina, have never been found, and that powder was for the Navy. The two North Carolina mills (one private and the other a quasi-state affair) blew themselves up repeatedly, and records are scarce. The two small South Carolina blasting mills at Pendleton and Walhalla turned out powder that was so bad that the Confederate government stopped working with them early in the war. Mansfield Lovell eventually erected two mills in New Orleans. Neither produced good powder. One blew up at the end of 1861, and the powder from the other was so bad that gunners watched their shells arc out of the barrels and drop into the water.

CWBA: With demand for Augusta powder coming from all parts of the Confederacy, how was distribution prioritized?

TS: Calls came routinely from all compass points, all the time. We know to the pound where it went, and it was mostly dictated by threat and need. A significant amount of correspondence among Rains, Josiah Gorgas, and the War Department, of course, is missing, but Richmond decided where the big shipments went, and that often meant whoever was in the most danger that month. When John Pemberton needed powder for Vicksburg in January 1863, for example, he didn’t wire Augusta. He wired Gorgas: “Please order General Rains, at Augusta, to send me at once 30,000 pounds of powder. Must have it immediately.”

Most of the powder went to arsenals. Richmond, Charleston, and the Augusta Arsenal received the most, and they turned it into the cartridges and fixed ammunition for the main field armies and the heavy guns. Beyond them, Rains shipped to about two dozen points east of the Mississippi. The records are detailed enough, for example, that we know what the major posts received, to the pound, and when. The daily records are incredibly detailed, and I include a full appendix breaking down the racial makeup of the employees and the skilled and unskilled laborers who ran the mill.

The priorities shifted with the fighting. Tons went to Lee before the Gettysburg campaign, and then more in its aftermath. Rains sent 100,000 pounds of columbiad powder to Mobile in the months preceding Farragut’s attack in 1864, and several tons to Wilmington in the run-up to Fort Fisher’s fall. There was often a cost to these choices. In April 1863, for example, with most of the powder cars headed up the coast to Charleston and Lee, the Macon laboratory (and I think an arsenal or two) shut down for a time for want of powder of all types. That meant the Army of Tennessee and other forces suffered a shortage, temporarily.

Geography set its own limits and restrictions. Getting powder to Selma, Alabama, or Jackson or Vicksburg, Mississippi, meant unloading trains onto wagons, then boats, then trains again, because the railroads didn’t connect. Rains had picked Augusta partly because it sat at the hinge of the Southern rail network between the two halves of the Confederacy, but even the best location couldn’t fix a railroad system that was never designed to work as one united artery.

CWBA: You also mention that Rains’s efforts in Tennessee over the latter half of 1861 are equally deserving of approbation. What did he accomplish during that time and how do you rate its significance?

TS: This is part of his story virtually no one has ever heard about, and I might rank it as important as Augusta. The completion of the Augusta Powder Works made it possible for the Confederacy to fight a long war. Rains’s work in Tennessee helped the Confederacy survive the first year to finish the Augusta mill so it could fight a long war. But for his work in Tennessee and the Western Theater (while he was simultaneously building the Augusta complex), the war would never have stretched beyond one year. Indeed, he, Johnston, and others were shocked they made it through the fall of 1861. Previous writers focus on Johnston’s lack of firearms (and only occasionally mention powder, though without context of what it really meant). That was not really the issue. Even if the Confederates had had triple the number of rifled muskets and artillery pieces they needed, it would have done them no good because they had no gunpowder and little or no niter to make it.

As Rains often noted, Johnston (and his lieutenants) could not fight more than a long skirmish. “There was no remedy,” wrote Rains, “until I could manufacture it for him [Johnston].” Without those mills and the niter refinery Rains built in Nashville (you can’t make military powder without pure niter, and it was the only refinery in the entire Confederacy at that time), there’s no defense of Kentucky, no defense of the major rivers, no Forts Henry and Donelson, no New Madrid and Island No. 10, and no Shiloh. By the time Johnston died at Shiloh, his army had the powder it needed for a major battle or two, and nearly all of it can be traced back to what Rains built from the ground up in Tennessee during the second half of 1861 and early 1862.

Fortunately for the Confederacy, it was at that precise moment in time (April 1862) that the Augusta Powder Works came online. It had taken nine months to finish, and the first month of production was woefully inadequate. Had the works come online just one month later, say in May 1862, Lee probably could not have fought the Seven Days’ Battles to save Richmond. It was that close. It’s not a coincidence that the Confederates were able to gather a large army around Richmond, fight there, and then carry the offensive north all the way into Maryland. None of that would have been possible if Rains had failed, or if President Davis had not had the foresight to erect a massive central powder mill.

All of this spans multiple chapters in great depth in my book. I don’t want to give too much away, because I think it is important for students to read and grasp all of this new information, and I am only sharing a tiny slice of what I have discovered. And as I noted earlier, all of this is in the notes so readers can look it up themselves.

CWBA: Thanks, Ted. You've left us with much to ponder. I am sure I join a great many in wanting to read more about these matters. Readers, The Indispensable Man is scheduled for release from Savas Beatie in the latter half of November so keep an eye out for it next month.

Friday, January 31, 2025

2024 - The CIVIL WAR BOOKS and AUTHORS Top Ten Year in Review

BOOK OF THE YEAR
1. The Cassville Affairs: Johnston, Hood, and the Failed Confederate Strategy in the Atlanta Campaign, 19 May 1864 by Robert D. Jenkins, Sr. (Mercer).

This book offers the most meticulously detailed and most thoroughly convincing interpretation of arguably the greatest enduring controversy that emerged during the event-filled interval between the 1864 Atlanta Campaign's onset and the dismissal of Johnston. What put it over the top for me was the profoundly enlightening manner in which author Robert Jenkins combined conventional battle narrative with forensic historical map analysis unlike anything I've ever encountered before in the Civil War literature [for more on this title, see the Site Review (5/8/24)].


The Rest of the Year's TOP TEN (in no particular order)

2. High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac: Reclaiming Their Honor by Edwin P. Rutan II (Kent St).

Rutan's study represents a groundbreaking reassessment of our understanding of the Union Army's late-war regiments and their contributions to final victory [see the full 10/22/24 site Review].

3. Hell by the Acre: A Narrative History of the Stones River Campaign, November 1862-January 1863 by Daniel Masters (Savas Beatie).

One of the finest single-volume campaign studies of recent memory, this book deserves recognition as the new standard history of Stones River [12/23/24 Review].

4. Treasure and Empire in the Civil War: The Panama Route, the West and the Campaigns to Control America's Mineral Wealth by Neil P. Chatelain (McFarland).

An excellent multi-themed transnational history of the land and sea route utilized by the United States to securely transport the Far West's vital mineral wealth to where it could be integrated into the country's war economy [5/24/24 Review].

5. New Fields of Adventure: The Writings of Lyman G. Bennett, Civil War Soldier and Topographical Engineer, 1861–1865 edited by M. Jane Johansson (Tennessee).

Combining coverage of uncommonly explored wartime topics, occupations, and settings with unusually descriptive prose, Bennett's writings are a dream resource for historians, the entire package enhanced through Johansson's expert editing [8/15/24 Review].

6. The Atlanta Campaign - Volume 1: Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864 by David A. Powell (Savas Beatie).

Powell's latest multi-volume campaign history project is off to a rousing start. This book certainly exhibits the same exacting standards established through the author's previous works [9/18/24 Review].

7. Between Extremes: Seeking the Political Center in the Civil War North by Jack Furniss (LSU).

A fresh and convincing way of reconsidering the dynamics of party politics and political strategy in the United States during the Civil War [1/22/25 Review].

8. Massacre at St. Louis: The Road to the Camp Jackson Affair and Civil War by Kenneth E. Burchett (McFarland).

The most comprehensive treatment to date of a chaos-filled seminal event from the early-Civil War period in Missouri [10/3/24 Review].

9. Union General Daniel Butterfield: A Civil War Biography by James S. Pula (Savas Beatie).

In addition to painting a compellingly favorable picture of Butterfield's Civil War legacy, this study possesses that rare quality of fully meeting expectations in terms of depth while as the same time remaining relatively concise in page length [7/24/24 Review].

10. North Carolina Troops, 1861-1865: A Roster, Volume XXII - Confederate States Navy, Confederate States Marine Corps, and Charlotte Naval Yard edited by Katelynn A. Hatton & Alex Christopher Meekins (NC Office Archives & Hist).

This is a great example of the supporting text in a roster history being both expansive enough and qualitatively strong enough to be worthy of publication on its own [7/17/24 Review].

Wednesday, January 8, 2025

2024 Pate Award winner

Congratulations to Neil Chatelain, winner of the 2024 A.M. Pate Award for the "best book providing original research on the Trans-Mississippi sector of the Civil War." His Treasure and Empire in the Civil War: The Panama Route, the West and the Campaigns to Control America's Mineral Wealth (McFarland, 2024) is well worthy of the recognition.

Named in honor of the late A.M. Pate, Jr., a Fort Worth businessman, museum founder, and philanthropist, the award is handed out yearly by the fine folks of the Fort Worth Civil War Roundtable (of which Pate was a founding member). Go here for the award press release.

As you might guess after reading the linked review in the first paragraph above, I also hold Chatelain's book in high regard. It will very likely make my own Top Ten list for last year, which should be posted on the site sometime this month.

Tuesday, January 5, 2021

Rein wins 2020 A.M. Pate Award

The Fort Worth CWRT announced today that they will be presenting the 2020 A. M. Pate, Jr. Award in Civil War History later this month to historian Christopher M. Rein for his book The Second Colorado Cavalry: A Civil War Regiment on the Great Plains, which was published early last year by University of Oklahoma Press. Because the Pate Award is the only book prize that specifically targets the best Trans-Mississippi Civil War scholarship, which also happens to be my primary area of interest, spreading the word is a distinct pleasure. Congratulations to Dr. Rein for this honor and recognition of his work. It is much deserved.

The announcement also fills in the last remaining gap in the site's select book award compilation list for the year 2020 (see here).

Thursday, June 4, 2020

Author Q&A: Eric Faust on "The 6th Michigan Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War"

Eric R. Faust is the author of three books exploring the state of Michigan's contributions to the Union war effort. Conspicuous Gallantry: The Civil War and Reconstruction Letters of James W. King, 11th Michigan Volunteer Infantry was published in 2015 as part of Kent State University Press's Civil War in the North series, and his first regimental study, The 11th Michigan Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War: A History and Roster , was released that same year by McFarland. Also from McFarland, Faust's most recent book, The 6th Michigan Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War: A History and Roster, was published back in March and is the topic of this interview.

CWBA: Thank you for joining us, Eric. You’ve now authored three Civil War books, all Michigan related. What inspired your particular interest in the 6th Michigan Volunteer Infantry regiment?

EF: It was a happy accident. My first book, Conspicuous Gallantry, presented the letters of a soldier in the 11th Michigan, James W. King. King’s future father-in-law, Darius Ambrose Babcock, enlisted as a private in the 6th Michigan late in the war, so I looked into his service. He was injured in a train wreck immediately after departing Michigan and served as an officer’s cook before being discharged for disability. Nothing too exciting, but that research brought out tantalizing hints that the 6th Regiment possessed a fascinating, and largely untold, story. Even by volunteer standards, they were a poorly behaved bunch, yet you sure wouldn’t want to face them on a battlefield. There was no way I could walk away from that—their story was begging for a book-length treatment.


CWBA: What do you enjoy most about researching and writing regimental histories?

EF: Unit histories offer the best of both worlds. Like campaign and battle studies, they narrate the sweeping scope of major historical events. At the same time, like biographies and published letter collections, they reveal the daily lives and inner thoughts of individual soldiers. By the end of a good regimental you’ve gotten to know several soldiers so well that they are old friends (or enemies) by the time you turn the last page. The regiment was the infantryman’s whole world, and these histories bring us closer to understanding daily life in the armies as well as what the war really meant in the eyes of those who fought it. And it never gets old, because that answer is different for every unit, every soldier. As a researcher and writer, I enjoy watching these stories unfold and observing (and sometimes reconciling) how men who witnessed the exact same events often perceived them very differently. I also find it rewarding to stumble across all kinds of interesting little incidents that would never make it into books on broader topics.


CWBA: Tell us about the early-war period of the 6th’s Civil War service in Maryland and the Eastern Shore of Virginia?

EF: The 6th Michigan started out attached to the Army of the Potomac and was stationed in Baltimore. The Michiganders and Marylanders were on surprisingly friendly terms. There was tension here and there to be sure, but the soldiers, by and large, were on their best behavior. And they were showered with kindnesses in return: one captain, for example, received seven invitations for Christmas dinner, and many of the men courted, and in some cases later married, local women. The citizens even petitioned the War Department to keep the 6th stationed there. But all of that proved so deceptive. The instant those same troops crossed the border into Virginia for the first time in November 1861, they exhibited two defining traits: first, an insatiable appetite for foraging (which would evolve into remorseless pillaging), and second, a seething, open defiance of their brigadier, which would only worsen under subsequent general officers.

The Eastern Shore expedition foreshadowed the Michiganders’ service along the Mississippi. First, Curtenius was unavailable (on court-martial duty), so the unit marched out under Major Bacon’s command. Bacon was incapable of managing his men, and discipline collapsed in enemy territory. Next, the expedition’s commanding officer, Brigadier General Henry Lockwood, was operating under orders from John Dix to treat Confederate civilians and their rights to property (human or otherwise) with respect, and that did not sit well with the Michiganders. When they encamped in enemy territory for the first time, one officer reported, “for miles around camp could be heard all night long, the squealing of pigs, squawking of geese, cackling of hens, and all kinds of noises.” This expedition was characterized by hard marching and no fighting, a combination that bred discontent. The climax came when Lockwood confronted the entire regiment in a rage over a stolen turkey. As he departed, according to one private, “the boys forgot all military discipline for the moment, and such cheers and imitating of the fowl captured I never heard; they fairly gobbled him out of camp, and the… general retired, baffled and discomfited, pouring out vile epithets upon the Michigan men.” Bacon later testified against Lockwood before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, effectively accusing him of treason for following Dix’s orders. This was a recurring theme with Bacon—lividly attacking the reputation of any superior officer who criticized or opposed him. He should have been more worried about himself: his own subordinates “came home tittering over the frivolity and lack of executive ability exhibited by Major Bacon.” Things got back to normal, though, once the men were back in Baltimore under Colonel Curtenius. That made it easy to blame everything on Bacon, but it wasn’t that simple.


CWBA: Serious discipline problems seem to be a common theme wherever the regiment went. As far as you can tell, what was the source of it, and how much blame do you lay at the feet of the officers (including Col. Curtenius, Lt. Col. Clark and Maj. Bacon)?

EF: Clark and Bacon were disciplinary disasters, but Colonel Curtenius was competent and respected. His enforcement was lax at times, typical for a volunteer officer, but he could step up when the situation called for it. For example, he unhesitatingly threw several men in the stockade for refusing to drill in protest of noncom pay rates. But the colonel was getting on in years, and his health failed him by the time the unit engaged in active operations. That raises the big 'what if' in this regiment’s history, because his successors failed their subordinates miserably. Clark was a drunkard and a shameless profiteer; Bacon was incapable not only of showing deference to superiors but also of performing a field officer’s command duties. He is a fascinating case. He authored an entire book covering the period from Baton Rouge to Port Hudson—less than one year—and that entire effort amounts to a thinly veiled smear campaign against his superiors, particularly targeting three officers who had him arrested on separate occasions. He was court-martialed twice and ultimately dismissed from the service. Bacon held so little regard for the truth that his book constitutes a minefield for historians because it is fascinating, well-written, and contains juicy gossip and useful information, yet it is also chock full of lies, both blatant and subtle. With all that being said, two different things had to happen for this unit’s demeanor to falter: first, Curtenius sickened and eventually resigned, leaving two lesser men in command; and second, a perfect storm of epidemics, logistical failures, guerrilla warfare, profiteering, and all the stresses incidental to active operations served as a catalyst to degrade morale and bring out the worst in everyone. This unit was ravaged by disease along the mosquito-infested Mississippi, losing a shocking 500 dead to sickness alone—far and away the record for any Michigan unit in the war.


CWBA: Sounds like their repeated flaunting of army regulations might also have extended to camp sanitation! Many Civil War volunteer units that played hell in camp and on the march redeemed themselves on the battlefield. Was this the case for the 6th Michigan at the Battle of Baton Rouge?

EF: Undeniably. One would be hard-pressed to find a better example of that phenomenon than what transpired with this regiment over just a two-month span in mid-1862. The 6th clashed with Brigadier General Thomas Williams, taunting him mercilessly at every opportunity. He was a regular army martinet if ever there was one, and he was disgusted with the regiment’s taste for plunder, so they were playing with fire. Sure enough, things got ugly fast. As punishment, Williams ordered the regiment out of its comfortable barracks in Baton Rouge to bivouac exposed to the debilitating Louisiana summer. Tents were available, yet they weren’t allowed to use them. Everyone knew this could only result in sickness and death. Curtenius was gone by then, and Clark, Bacon, and the two senior captains were all arrested, one after another, for disobeying the order to expose the men. This happened just prior to the Battle of Baton Rouge, so thanks to Williams the 6th Michigan entered a desperate fight in a sickly state and under the command of a captain who, until recently, was seventh in command. To make matters worse, Williams declined to fortify and arrayed his regiments outside of immediate supporting distance from each other. Those blunders put the Federals at a dire disadvantage. Then, at the outset of the fight, he split the already shorthanded 6th Michigan in the face of the enemy. With two companies already out on picket duty, he diverted one battalion of five companies to support the 21st Indiana, leaving just 3 isolated companies to hold the right flank.

The great irony here is that the arrests of Clark and Bacon—who would later prove themselves of highly dubious value under fire—enabled the regiment’s two finest captains to show their mettle and save the day. Each of them literally battled Confederate regiments with Union companies. Harrison Soule’s company foiled a flanking maneuver by the 6th Kentucky at Magnolia Cemetery, employing the bayonet. They endured 60 percent casualties, including Soule himself, and even then they withdrew only when ordered to do so. And John Corden routed Henry Watkins Allen’s brigade with those three aforementioned companies on the far right. The balance of the battalion at the cemetery (4 companies) fended off an entire brigade to hold the center.

Heroics like these would be famous if they had taken place in one of the big battles out east, and bear in mind that the 6th had never seen combat before. The rest of the brigade recognized all that: Sidney Bean of the 4th Wisconsin prefaced his comments on Corden’s performance with, “However incredible it may seem.” As the story goes, General Williams, the Michiganders’ greatest critic, was moved during the battle to say, “I wish to God I had ten thousand of you western thieves!” Whatever the truth of that, sources from multiple regiments assert that he was stunned to see his indisciplined volunteers fight tenaciously, and he complimented their courage profusely. High praise from a man who’d recently said he preferred conscripts to volunteers.


CWBA: Regimental histories are often useful vehicles for exploring obscure events that occurred behind the lines or on secondary fighting fronts. Can you talk about some little-known episodes of the 6th’s service in the West?

EF: Where to begin? I will pick out some highlights. Colonel Curtenius clashed with General Williams over the latter’s insistence that slaves should not be harbored from their masters. The Act Prohibiting the Return of Slaves was passed and integrated into the Articles of War by then, yet Williams ordered the refugees expelled from the Union lines after one master demanded the 6th Michigan return his slave. Curtenius was arrested for his refusal, and then released hours later without comment or personal consequence. Williams would expel all the contrabands after Curtenius resigned—there was nobody left with the will and wherewithal to protect them.

Near Ponchatoula, the regiment once skirmished with Choctaws in the swamp and captured several. One captain quoted his comrades saying “there will be some civilization taught them,” though that seems to have been an idle threat. Illustrating the intensely personal scale on which the war was fought at times along the Mississippi, the first fatal fire the 6th Regiment ever took was from an irate plantation owner—on a rare occasion where the Michiganders actually intended to pay for farm goods. And the 6th once escaped a potential rout thanks to a delaying action fought by just eight soldiers who braved a concentrated assault while comrades skedaddled around them.

River travel was hazardous: the regiment’s transports drew artillery fire on four occasions, twice inflicting fatalities. It was traumatic to come under attack with little or no means to respond—they nearly capsized one vessel by herding to the port side when they came under fire from the starboard. After the second such assault, the regiment and its counterparts disembarked and pillaged the town from which they came under fire (Grand Gulf, Mississippi)—just one example where civilians paid the price when troops were frustrated by guerrilla tactics. Clark once squandered an important local naval asset, the partially ironclad gunboat Barataria, by apparently taking it to seek plunder while the ship’s commanding officer was absent. The vessel ran aground and was abandoned in response to an attack by a few dismounted cavalry [Now there’s an interesting trivia question: how many Union naval vessels were lost to cavalry actions?].

On one larger expedition, almost the entire regiment left the line of march to forage. “One could scarcely tell what place the 6th Michigan occupied in the line,” wrote one soldier, “there was a color bearer and a few commissioned officers." In March 1863 John C. Pemberton sent a message via the 6th Michigan to Nathaniel Banks, offering to trade cotton with the Department of the Gulf. I found no evidence that this gained any traction, but it was surely an eye-opening proposition that late in the war. The department suffered systemic logistical issues—the kind you normally associate with the Confederate army—and the Michiganders marched at times in bare feet, went hungry, drank infested swamp water, and so on. This is all just a sampling, but the experiences of isolated units often differed starkly from life in the larger armies out east.


CWBA: In summer 1863, the regiment found itself in the trench lines at Port Hudson. How did it fare there?

EF: Port Hudson was an unmitigated nightmare for the 6th. Nathaniel Banks was the worst kind of political general. He had no business leading an army, and half his force was comprised of nine-months men who, as one Michigander put it, “cannot tell the difference between an Enfield rifle and a ten-inch siege gun." The 6th went straight from having zero experience assaulting fortifications to joining in the longest siege in American history up to that point and participated in hopeless charges supported only by raw troops. The regiment went into Port Hudson with capable brigade and division commanders for a change (and even got along with them), but Generals Neal Dow and Thomas W. Sherman were both wounded straight away in the first assault on May 27, 1863. The Michiganders entered that engagement with 450 men and officers. By July 4, they could muster a mere 160 present for duty (they’d lost about one-third killed or wounded and another third to disease in the muck of the trenches). Corden, on Independence Day, was the sole officer present above the rank of lieutenant. After May 27, division command devolved to William Dwight, a rigid disciplinarian and heavy drinker (love that combination) already infamous for using volunteers as cannon fodder. Even Corden and Soule, heroes of Baton Rouge, refused to implement suicidal attack orders on separate occasions. Dwight went on to devise multiple schemes where a few soldiers were supposed to sneak into the Rebel fortifications under cover of darkness and somehow engineer the doom of an entire Confederate army. (Thirty thousand men couldn’t do it. Let’s try thirty instead.) Some of the 6th Michigan’s finest rank-and-file boys were shot dead in the dark following alcohol-inspired orders—and only days shy of surviving the last of their unit’s active combat operations.


CWBA: Interestingly, all of the regiments in Gen. Thomas Williams’s original brigade at Ship Island (21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan) were later converted to a different service branch (the 4th to the cavalry, and the 21st and 6th to the heavy artillery). At least for the 6th Michigan, what was the rationale behind the change?

EF: These conversions became almost commonplace for experienced infantry in the Department of the Gulf. I assume Halleck prioritized the main battlefield armies when it came to requests for cavalry and artillery, and this was the workaround. I’ve seen no official explanation for the 6th’s conversion. The men considered it a reward for meritorious service at Port Hudson, but that may have been wishful thinking. The soldiers knew it would mean a lot of garrison duty and considered it cause for celebration because, as Corden put it, “we shall have an easier time of it, and not near the exposure to all kinds of weather and hard marching and fighting we have had to endure as infantry.” Conversion from infantry did not guarantee that the Michiganders wouldn’t have their old rifles shoved back in their hands and be told to play infantryman now and again. “We have been artillery,” one officer joked, “then infantry [again], the engineer corps now, and next I think we will be the Invalid Corps or Corps d’Afrique.” In any event, the move to artillery signaled a virtual end to active operations for the 6th Michigan in July 1863, although they wouldn’t muster out until August 1865. This period was so uneventful that I summarized it in the final chapter, emphasizing the highlights (some of which are amusing—bored volunteers do the darnedest things). In the doldrums of camp life, discipline grew so lax that one late-war inspection report makes the regiment sound like something out of an episode of F Troop. It makes for hilarious reading now but probably not so much at the time. The unit almost mutinied four months after Appomattox, impatient from awaiting orders to return home.


CWBA: What’s next for you? Do you have more Michigan regimental studies in the pipeline?

EF: I am serving on the oversight committee for a lengthy documentary film about the 11th Michigan Infantry (the subject of my first two books). I haven’t settled on my next book topic yet, though I’ve been kicking some ideas around. It is likely I will author another regimental at some point—Michigan or not—and I have come across a letter collection or two I’d like to publish. I also hope at some point to research a lesser-known battle. There are always a hundred things I’d like to be doing, and never enough hours in a day. While pondering what’s next, I’ve been writing a novel of the Reconstruction period.


CWBA: Thanks again for your time, Eric. Our talk has made me look forward to reading your book even more. And readers, once again the title is The 6th Michigan Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War: A History and Roster.

Tuesday, April 28, 2020

Book News: Breaking the Blockade

At least in academic circles, study of the Civil War as a transnational event is currently one of the hottest sub-fields. Quite a number of manuscripts and essay anthologies exploring antebellum, wartime, and postwar connections with Central and South America, Europe, the Caribbean, and even the Pacific Rim have been published in recent years. On the other hand, diplomatic studies (mostly centered on Britain and France) and blockade-related books have always been around. However, one conspicuous omission has been a truly detailed history of the conflict's greatest transshipment point involved in the exchange of southern cotton for much-needed European arms, munitions, equipment, food, and supplies. That gap in the literature will be addressed in early 2021 with the release of Charles D. Ross's Breaking the Blockade: The Bahamas during the Civil War (UP of Mississippi).

From the description: "Boats worked their way back and forth from the Confederacy to Nassau and England, and everyone from scoundrels to naval officers wanted a piece of the action. Poor men became rich in a single transaction, and dances and drinking―from the posh Royal Victoria hotel to the boarding houses lining the harbor―were the order of the day. British, United States, and Confederate sailors intermingled in the streets, eyeing each other warily as boats snuck in and out of Nassau. But it was all to come crashing down as the blockade finally tightened and the final Confederate ports were captured." Breaking the Blockade "focuses on the political dynamics and tensions that existed between the United States Consular Service, the governor of the Bahamas, and the representatives of the southern and English firms making a large profit off the blockade."

On an author note, readers might recognize physicist Ross from his earlier science-related Civil War studies. White Mane titles were once a staple of Civil War sections in bookstores, and it wasn't uncommon to see a copy of Ross's Civil War Acoustic Shadows (2001). I never did read that one, or his other book Trial by Fire: Science, Technology and the Civil War (2000), but it's always nice to see an author return to the fold after a long break.

Thursday, July 18, 2019

Author Q&A: Allen Carden & Thomas Ebert on "John George Nicolay: The Man in Lincoln's Shadow"

Dr. Allen Carden
Thank you to authors Allen Carden and Thomas Ebert for joining me to discuss their book John George Nicolay: The Man in Lincoln's Shadow, which was released last month by University of Tennessee Press. Carden is a professor of history at Fresno Pacific University and is the author of Puritan Christianity in America: Religion and Life in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts (1990) and Freedom’s Delay: America’s Struggle for Emancipation, 1776-1865 (2014). Ebert is a Librarian Emeritus (reference and government documents) and Emeritus Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs at California State University, Fresno.

Here are some excerpts from the description to serve as an introduction to their book (or you can just skip down below to the interview itself): "Apart from the president’s family, arguably no one was closer to Abraham Lincoln during his tenure in the White House than John George Nicolay. A German immigrant with a keen intelligence and tenacious work ethic, Nicolay (1832-1901) served as Lincoln’s personal secretary and, owing to the extraordinary challenges facing the White House, became in effect its first chief of staff. His subsequent role as lead researcher and coauthor of a monumental ten-volume biography of the sixteenth president made him the progenitor of Lincoln scholarship.

Thomas J. Ebert
This study represents the first scholarly biography of this self-effacing man so long overshadowed by Lincoln. Drawing on extensive research in the Nicolay Papers, Allen Carden and Thomas Ebert trace Nicolay’s childhood arrival in America to his involvement in journalism and state government in Illinois. Acquainted with Lincoln in Springfield, Nicolay became a trusted assistant selected by Lincoln to be his private secretary. Intensely devoted to the president, he kept the White House running smoothly and allowed Lincoln to focus on the top priorities. After Lincoln’s death, Nicolay’s greatest achievement was his co-authorship, with his White House assistant, John Hay, of the first thoroughly documented account of Lincoln’s life and administration, a work still consulted by historians."


CWBA: To start things off, can you provide a quick summary of Nicolay’s early life up to the time he met the future president?

AC&TE: Nicolay was born in Essingen in the Rhenish Palatinate in 1832. He had a hard childhood as his family emigrated to America in 1837. His mother died when he was seven, his father when he was fourteen. At fourteen, his older brother kicked him out into the world. After working in a mercantile in White Hall, Illinois, he eventually worked for the Pike County Free Press, a newspaper in Pittsfield, Illinois. By age twenty-two, he was the owner of the Free Press and a rising figure in the community. He sold the paper in 1856.


CWBA: How and when did Nicolay first meet Abraham Lincoln?

AC&TE:  According to Robert Lincoln, Nicolay and Lincoln first met when Nicolay was working for Ozias M. Hatch, the Illinois Secretary of State. The two men often played chess together in the large room which also doubled as the State Library in the old capitol building.


CWBA: Why did Lincoln choose Nicolay as his personal secretary?

AC&TE: We believe Lincoln chose Nicolay for his connections to the German American press and to demonstrate in a quiet manner to the German American community that he (i.e. Lincoln) was not a nativist.


CWBA: Do you believe that Nicolay had a significant role in shaping Lincoln’s knowledge of and attitude toward the large German-American segment of the U.S. population?

AC&TE: Nicolay, who could read, write, and speak German, could keep Lincoln informed about the opinions and mood of the German immigrant community and German cultural practices and attitudes. However, Nicolay, whose family lived in rural western Illinois where there were few if any German immigrants, did not identify himself as part of the German immigrant community.


CWBA: Did Nicolay personally participate in the war effort’s ethnic lobbying? Did German-American politicians, military officers, etc. ever attempt to use him as a conduit to the president?

AC&TE: There is no evidence that Nicolay personally participated in ethnic lobbying. Nor would he have likely done so given that he only took cues from Lincoln. However, his German cultural background, his ability to act as translator for Lincoln when necessary, and his ability to socialize with these politicians, military officers, etc. in their native tongue afforded Nicolay the opportunity to glean additional information from them on behalf of Lincoln. Nicolay was very adept at not revealing anything to others while pumping others for information. Nicolay was an important link to the German American community during the war.


CWBA: In the capacity of the president’s private secretary, what were Nicolay’s daily duties in the Lincoln White House?

AC&TE: Nicolay was responsible for oversight of the White House operation, which consisted at various times of John Hay, William Stoddard, Edward Neill, and Charles Philbrick. In contrast to Lincoln’s lack of organizational skills, Nicolay brought in file cabinets, created a filing system, and organized the office routines. He handled important correspondence, sometimes responded on behalf of the President, sat in and took notes on meetings in Lincoln’s office as requested, prepared legal documents, acted as chief gatekeeper limiting access to the President, went on missions on behalf of the President, and did anything and everything to ease the President’s workload. There is no evidence that Nicolay ever revealed the contents of any discussion he had with Lincoln, unless instructed by Lincoln to do so. Then Nicolay would merely repeat word for word what he was instructed to say without interpretation or embellishment.


CWBA: Did Nicolay ever clash with the president over personal or policy matters?

AC&TE: Nicolay had unquestioning loyalty to Lincoln and his leadership and as such would only voice an opinion when asked. Nicolay saw his role as Private Secretary as one where he sought to remain as unobtrusive as possible. His daughter Helen noted that, according to her father, there was never any "red tape” between Nicolay and Lincoln. There is no evidence of any clash between the President and his secretary.


CWBA: What was his relationship with John Hay like? In terms of White House ‘rank,’ was there a pecking order in the duties and responsibilities exercised by both secretaries?

AC&TE: Although Nicolay and Hay were close, life-long friends; shared the same sleeping quarters; had meals together, and were otherwise constant companions; Hay recognized that Nicolay was ultimately 'in charge.' Consequently, the working relationship was cooperative and with a shared responsibility in assisting the "Tycoon," whom they both adored.


CWBA: Did Nicolay maintain any regular personal correspondence that you found especially useful in your research?

AC&TE:  Much that we know about Nicolay in the White House years comes from his correspondence with his fiance Therena Bates back in Pittsfield, Illinois. Unfortunately, we only have his correspondence since he complied with a request from Therena to destroy her letters.


CWBA:  Of course, Nicolay is primarily remembered for the ten-volume biography Abraham Lincoln: A History (1890) he co-authored with John Hay. Can you describe the origins of the project and the research and writing process that went into it (including how Hay and Nicolay divided the work)?

AC&TE:  Nicolay had always wanted to write a biography of Lincoln. He was severely disappointed when Lincoln chose William Dean Howells to write the 1860 campaign biography. A Lincoln biography was discussed with the president before his death. After their return from Europe on diplomatic missions, Nicolay and Hay began working with Robert Lincoln to gain access to the Lincoln papers. The history is based on only verifiable documented facts as Nicolay and Hay declined to include any of their memories without substantiation. Hence, their more intimate conversations with Lincoln, which historians would have valued even more, are lost to us. Each man would take on a series of chapters on a particular topic and then share them with the other for editing and further verification. From their correspondence it is evident that Nicolay, whose sole goal in life was the completion of the Lincoln history, did a significantly larger portion of the writing and editing, including the page proofs.


CWBA:  One might surmise that both biographers were not in complete accord over every aspect of Lincoln’s life. Were there any major areas of disagreement between Hay and Nicolay? And if so, how were they resolved in the final version of their manuscript?

AC&TE:  There is no evidence that Nicolay and Hay had any major disagreements, both being Lincoln men through and through. There is some evidence that one or the other would “tone down” criticisms of individuals. This was done through their conversations either by letter or sometimes in person. A case in point is when Hay got Nicolay to tone down his criticism of Robert E. Lee. Hay wrote Century Magazine editor Richard Watson Gilder that Nicolay thought Lee should be shot as a traitor, an opinion that did not make its way into the history.


CWBA: Families of major historical figures frequently seek some measure of control over biographer access to private documents. How well were Nicolay and Hay able to work with Robert Lincoln? Wanting his father portrayed in the best light possible, did Robert also employ major editorial power over the project?

AC&TE:  Unquestionably, Robert Lincoln was a background presence in the writing of the history. Nicolay and Hay were very conscious that their continued access to the Lincoln papers depended on Robert’s good graces. However, since Nicolay and Hay had the goal of writing political hagiography, a goal shared by Robert, there was little conflict. Some sensitive topics in the Lincoln history were treated gingerly, including Lincoln’s relationship with his father, his love for Ann Rutledge, and the portrayal of the First Lady. In such cases the authors looked over their shoulder, especially in light of Robert Lincoln’s relationship with his own father, the embarrassment to the family that Robert’s mother might have been seen as a consolation prize, and the subject of the erratic behavior and mercurial temperament of Mary Lincoln (who at one time had been committed to an insane asylum by her son).


CWBA: What were the commercial and critical responses to the biography?

AC&TE: The critical reviews were generally positive as Nicolay kept copies of them in his papers. Carl Schurz wrote a particularly positive review. At the initial publication in 1890, there was a strong demand for the history. However, as time went on, subscriptions dropped off. This was due to a number of factors, including a Northern slant to the work and their refusal to go along with the national reconciliation at the time which enshrined the Lost Cause mythology and the Confederate leadership as heroes. They blamed the cause for the war squarely on the planter class and, particularly, slavery. For them, “states rights” had been a Southern code word for “slavery.” Their negative comments on Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee along with a number of other Confederate political and military leaders undoubtedly turned off Southern subscribers who wanted their heroes treated as patriots not traitors. Another factor was the size of the history—ten volumes, 4800 pages—that discouraged a mass audience. There were also criticisms from Northern military men who, in the print media of the day, were still fighting the war and justifying their actions and pointing their fingers at others. Many of these individuals took exception to how their leadership was portrayed.


CWBA: Beyond the published biography, what else did Nicolay do to shape the early Lincoln legacy?

AC&TE: Nicolay devoted his life, his being, to the glorification of Abraham Lincoln. He would give talks on Lincoln, and he was a founding member of Washington’s Literary Society. After the completion of the history, Nicolay and Hay published the first compilation of Lincoln papers. He also prepared notes for another Lincoln book on the president’s personal traits. However, poor eyesight and declining health prevented its publication in his lifetime. His daughter, Helen, published Personal Traits of Abraham Lincoln in 1912 based on her father’s notes. It may be considered a supplement to the history. Helen, in 1902, published a condensed version of the history based on her father’s editing. Helen, through the influence of her father for all things Lincoln, wrote a popular biography of Lincoln, The Boys' Life of Abraham Lincoln, for young people. The book went through multiple editions. Finally, in 1949, Helen wrote a biography of her father, Lincoln’s Secretary: A Biography of John George Nicolay. The biography, like anything connected with John George Nicolay, has much about the sixteenth president.


CWBA: Thanks for your time gentlemen. Readers, once again, the title is John George Nicolay: The Man in Lincoln's Shadow. Check it out.

Sunday, December 30, 2018

Grasso wins 2018 Pate Award

The Fort Worth Civil War Round Table just announced the 2018 recipient of the A. M. Pate, Jr. Award and congratulations are in order to Christopher Grasso for his winning book Bloody Engagements: John R. Kelso's Civil War (Yale, 2017). The honor, the only purely Trans-Mississippi Civil War book award, is handed out on a yearly basis but candidates from the previous twenty-four months are considered (a probably wise state of affairs given that some years, like 2018, can be quite thin ones when it comes to T-M publications). The Kelso material is an exceptional Civil War Missouri memoir and Grasso demonstrated a good eye in seeing its value and did very fine work editing it for publication.

More options are always good and in that way things might be looking up for the award committee in 2019. Currently, there are a decent number of Trans-Mississippi titles scheduled for release over the first half of next year:

• Bluecoat and Pioneer: The Recollections of John Benton Hart, 1864–1868
• The Civil War on the Rio Grande, 1846–1876
• Confederate Generals in the Trans-Mississippi, Vol. 3: Essays on America's Civil War
• A Burned Land: The Trans-Mississippi in the Civil War
• Caught in the Maelstrom: The Indian Nations in the Civil War, 1861-1865
• Campaign for Wilson's Creek: The Fight for Missouri Begins, Updated Edition
• An East Texas Family’s Civil War: The Letters of Nancy and William Whatley, May–December 1862

Let's hope there will be even more to come during the rest of the year.

Monday, October 8, 2018

Author Q&A: John Selby and "Meade: The Price of Command, 1863–1865"

John G. Selby is a professor of history at Roanoke College and the author of Civil War Talks: Further Reminiscences of George S. Bernard and His Fellow Veterans (2012) and Virginians at War: The Civil War Experiences of Seven Young Confederates (2002). His latest book is Meade: The Price of Command, 1863–1865 (KSU Press, 2018), which seeks to challenge the prevailing view of George Gordon Meade by offering readers a fresh reevaluation of the general's lengthy tenure at the head of the Army of the Potomac.
____________________________________


• DW: Thanks for coming on CWBA to talk about Meade. Resistance remains but appreciation of General Meade’s contributions to Union victory seems to have risen in recent times, at least within the ranks of those that study the Civil War closely. Do you get the sense that the Civil War audience in general feels the same way?

JS: No, I don’t. Meade remains a minor and neglected Union general and still receives a heavy dose of criticism from historians like Guelzo, Greene, and Rhea.


• DW: I never did get around to reading Guelzo's Gettysburg book. Was there anything in particular about how Meade has been treated in the literature that inspired you to write this book?

JS: It actually began with me questioning the central premise of most of the literature on the war in the East; namely, that the commanders of the Army of the Potomac could never have defeated Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia without the firm and relentless leadership of Ulysses S. Grant. I felt that did a disservice to the Army of the Potomac. As I dug deeper, I found that the criticism of the Army of the Potomac remained fairly constant in themes from McClellan to Meade. But didn’t Meade win at Gettysburg? And push Lee’s army back from northern Virginia to Richmond-Petersburg? And defeat Lee in 1865? There had to be more to Meade’s leadership than was usually stated.


• DW: What do you see as Meade’s primary strengths as an army commander?

JS: Executive abilities such as organization, logistics, and planning. He led subordinates by example; he usually assessed situations accurately and shared that knowledge with subordinates; and he had solid tactical ideas and successful strategic goals (though Grant procured permission from Washington to pursue those goals). He was personally brave and a man of integrity.


• DW: What about weaknesses?

JS: Quite cautious at times, hesitating to strike unless the odds for success were decidedly in his favor. Never learned how to work with the politicians in Washington and never fully trusted the press. His quick temper is usually cited as his biggest weakness, but I argue it was not. His extreme reluctance to dismiss his top lieutenants when they failed to carry out his orders was his greatest weakness as an army commander.


• DW: Everyone knows Meade as the acclaimed victor of Gettysburg, but what are some lesser-known achievements that you believe deserve wider recognition?

JS: He kept Lee from launching another offensive or starting a major battle in the fall of 1863. He worked hand-in-hand with Grant during the strategically successful Overland Campaign and faithfully kept up the pressure on Lee’s extended line from Richmond to Petersburg from the summer of 1864 to the spring of 1865. He led his army to victory over Lee in the final weeks of the war.


• DW: I think the great majority of readers of your book will be a bit taken aback by your ranking Meade as one of the top 3 Union generals. How did you arrive at that bold assertion?

JS: I took my cue from Ulysses S. Grant. In May of 1864 he recommended Sherman and Meade be promoted to the rank of major general in the regular army because they were the “fittest officers for large commands” he had met. Grant never rescinded his recommendation nor did he replace Meade with another general. Their professional relationship was shaky at times, and in time Grant did favor Sherman over Meade, but he kept him in command of the Army of the Potomac—and supported him—until the end of the war.


• DW: Citing Meade’s failure to crush Lee north of the Potomac after Gettysburg and his inability to force the Army of Northern Virginia into a major battle on favorable terms during the rest of 1863, many have concluded that Meade did not have the killer instinct (or whatever you want to call it) needed to achieve ultimate victory in the East. Beyond it being an entirely untestable hypothesis, how would you counter that argument?

JS: I would say it is a false hypothesis. Meade ordered attacks at Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, the Crater, and several other times in the summer and fall of 1864. He also oversaw the attacks on Petersburg at the end of the war and the Army of the Potomac’s pursuit of Lee in April 1865. Some of these attacks saw a great loss of life on the Union side, which disproves a corollary of the untestable hypothesis: that Meade was unwilling to sustain large casualties in the service of a larger strategic goal. What is clear, though, from Meade’s record, is that he always wanted to be thoroughly prepared before battle, and if he felt that the odds of success were slim he would not order an assault simply to prove he could.


• DW: Recently, A. Wilson Greene, in the first volume of his Petersburg Campaign trilogy, expressed the opinion that Meade, by thoroughly alienating his principal subordinates during the Overland Campaign and the early stages of the Petersburg operation, had already outlived his usefulness by the end of July 1864 [add. 12/16/18: it should be mentioned that the author objects to this summarization. See here for more]. How would you respond to that?

JS: Although I have not yet read Greene’s latest book, I could not disagree more strongly with his argument as stated above. Everyone’s nerves were frayed by the end of July 1864, except perhaps those of Grant and his staff. Some of Meade’s corps commanders felt he had pushed them too hard, but he in turn felt that Grant had pushed the Army of the Potomac almost to its breaking point. Furthermore, if the command structure had fallen apart, then the Army of the Potomac could not have fought effectively in four offensives in the fall and early winter of 1864 and three more offensives in February-March-April of 1865.


• DW: The awkward high command arrangement in the eastern theater during 1864-65 is almost universally condemned. It is also often seen as a lose-lose situation for Meade personally, with Grant getting all the credit for the army’s successes and Meade left to absorb the political and military heat generated by the many failures. Do you believe it possible to separate their closely-tied roles enough to offer a meaningful independent assessment of Meade’s performance during the Overland and Richmond-Petersburg campaigns?

JS: I believe it is almost impossible to do the separation, and I try to cut that Gordian knot in my book by referring to decisions that can be directly attributed to one general or the other by name, i.e. “Meade ordered” or “Grant wrote.” When there is no clearly evident source for a decision (especially regarding strategy and responses to evolving situations in battle), then I write that “Grant and Meade decided,” or “Meade and Grant agreed,” or something like that. That said, except for some instances (which I detail) when Grant specifically overruled Meade or gave a direct order to units under Meade, I argue that the characterization by one contemporary journalist that “Grant directed the army and Meade commanded the army” is still the best description (especially since Meade agreed with that assessment early in their joint command).


• DW: Finally, a major theme of Meade is the “price of command,” the personal and professional toll involved in heading the Union’s principal and most politicized army. Can you end by talking a little about how your book addresses that topic?

JS: Meade was a devoted soldier and a true patriot. He also was ambitious, like just about every general who has ever lived, and always hoped to receive promotions for jobs well done. Though he expressed some concern to his wife and close friends about his ability to manage the army when first appointed, after the Battle of Gettysburg he had no doubt that he could command a large army in the field. At the same time, he worried about the political demands of his position and never fully trusted the press. He had few friends in Washington, and after he threw a correspondent off the battlefield in 1864 he was treated as persona non grata by the press. He was attacked by politicians, the press, and some former subordinates in the winter of 1863-64, and though they never got him dismissed they continued to hound him until the end of the war—and after. Meade zealously guarded his reputation as a forthright man and measured commander, and when these (and other aspects of his leadership) come under withering criticism in the 1863-64 it was a blow to his pride that he never completely recovered from. What Meade discovers is that the top job he sought, commander of the Army of the Potomac, would also wound that which he held most dear, his reputation. George G. Meade paid an enormous personal price to retain his position and help win the war for the Union.


• DW: Thanks again for your time, John. Maybe some venue will host a round table debate between you and those most critical of Meade's performance. That would be lively and interesting. Readers, check out Meade: The Price of Command, 1863–1865, which is already out direct from the publisher and should be widely available very soon.

Saturday, August 18, 2018

Hartwig's Antietam Vol. 2

For those who enjoyed Scott Hartwig's To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 (JHUP, 2012) and are wondering how the second volume is shaping up, a helpful reader directed me to the author's Facebook page, where periodic progress reports appear. The last one from early June noted that the writing of the book's Sunken Road section (three chapters at over 100 pages) was just completed. Hartwig also gives a little insight into his process, too.

Sunday, July 15, 2018

Author Q&A - Paul Taylor and "The Most Complete Political Machine Ever Known"

Paul Taylor is the award-winning author of a number of well-received Civil War titles, among them Glory Was Not Their Companion: The Twenty-Sixth New York Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War (2005), He Hath Loosed the Fateful Lightning: The Battle of Ox Hill (Chantilly), September 1, 1862 (2003), Orlando M. Poe: Civil War General and Great Lakes Engineer (2009), and "Old Slow Town": Detroit during the Civil War (2013). His latest book is The Most Complete Political Machine Ever Known: The North's Union Leagues in the American Civil War (Kent St Univ Press, 2018). It covers an important topic that until now has not received the full attention it deserves and is the subject of this interview.

DW: Do we know when and where the first Union League chapter formed? Is any particular individual regarded as the group’s founder?

PT: Several disparate organizations existed prior to summer 1862 that utilized the words “Union League” in their name, including a politically conservative New York organization that existed for a year or so prior to the 1860 election but folded soon after Lincoln’s win. The first council to form under what became the national Union League of America umbrella group is credited to the Pekin, Illinois council (Tazewell County) in June 1862. It was formed by 12 local and prominent men, some of whom had previously experienced the ravages of being a Unionist in Confederate-held East Tennessee. No one man can claim to be the “founder” of the Civil War’s Union League movement.

DW: What did the leagues see as their primary mission(s)?

PT: Their primary mission was to promote unqualified loyalty toward the policies and decisions of the Lincoln administration. The Leagues argued that in the midst of a civil war where the nation’s survival was at stake, there was no differentiating between the government and the administration. They were one and the same. As one of the Constitution’s definitions of treason is offering “aid and comfort” to the enemy, any resistance to the administration’s policies – especially if that resistance was overt and subversive – surely afforded the rebels aid and comfort, since the Confederacy would learn of such dissent through easy access to Northern newspapers. Therefore, this opposition or even “conditional” support was equated with treason. For many of the smaller Midwestern Leagues, a second though no less important reason for their formation was for protection against anti-Lincoln (Copperhead) violence. They considered themselves not only a patriotic society but also an armed home guard.

DW: What sort of political propaganda activities did they engage in?

PT: As I point out in the Introduction, it’s important to note that I use the term “propaganda” in the more classical sense, defined simply as “the shaping of public opinion.” Through their quasi-affiliated Publication Societies, the Leagues sponsored, prepared, and disseminated hundreds of thousands of pamphlets and broadsides that varied between heartfelt pleas for support of the Lincoln administration as well as open hostility toward their political enemies. One excellent example was the modus operandi of the New England Loyal Publication Society (NELPS). It sent out scores of inexpensive broadsides free of charge to hundreds of small town pro-Lincoln newspapers throughout the North. These broadsides featured previously published, pro-Lincoln newspaper articles or editorials. Many of those newspaper editors often struggled for timely, front-page material and therefore welcomed the NELPS broadsides. Thus, the NELPS became the unseen co-editor for scores of Northern newspapers. Though the Union League movement initially described itself as nonpartisan, by the last year of the war they were an open arm of the Republican Party, with League members working diligently on the party’s behalf. By the way, this clear alliance with the Republican Party was viewed by the Leagues as a consequence, as those “properly loyal” Democrats were already supporting the war with full vigor. I liken the Leagues to a forerunner of the modern political action committee.

DW: You mention that the movement spread rapidly into cities, towns, and villages. Was there any kind of central organization?

PT: As the movement began to build in the second half of 1862 and early 1863, the small and mid-sized town councils realized the need for some manner of coordination. This resulted in what became known as the Cleveland Convention in May 1863, where the Union League of America was born with its national headquarters in Washington D.C. It’s also important to point out that the aristocratic and wealthy Union League of Philadelphia, the Union League Club of New York, and the Union Club of Boston – each formed in late 1862, early 1863 – all chose to maintain their autonomy, though there was ample cooperation amongst these three elite clubs and the nationalized ULA.

DW: Did the Union League model any of its recruitment, initiation rituals, or any other practices on those of past or existing secret/fraternal orders? Would league chapters be best described as open or closed organizations?

PT: Secretive fraternal organizations were extremely popular to 19th-century men. Popular examples include the Masons, the Odd Fellows, and the Sons of Temperance. Like the Masons, the Union Leagues utilized secret handshakes, signs, and passwords so that members might be known to each other in areas where loyalty to the Union was contested.

League chapters were closed in the sense that proposed new members were discussed and then voted on by existing members. Those who were refused membership were not told why they were declined though, in some cases, they were told if and when they might reapply. In the case of the Union Leagues, a new member’s initiation rite featured prayers, oaths, and song that was akin to a solemn religious ceremony.

DW: When did the Union Leagues reach their peak in membership and influence?

PT: Probably during the 1864 presidential campaign and election’s home stretch. By that point, the Union Leagues, related offshoots, and other smaller yet like-minded groups represented a million-man civilian army working on behalf of the Lincoln administration.

DW: Did members frequently engage in violence or other acts of political intimidation (for example, at polling places during major elections)?

PT: Sometimes. During an election, a polling place’s exterior ground was deemed a public space. Both sides often used burly men to intimidate those voters known to be sympathetic to the other side. Democrats also accused League men of gathering at local businesses to “warn” employees what a vote for Democrats could mean for their future employment. In addition, Democrats accused “Union Leaguers” of smashing and torching Democratic newspaper offices and presses.

DW: Union Leagues fiercely advocated unconditional support of the Lincoln administration and all of its war policies as a loyalty test, an extreme position that would obviously clash with conservative proslavery Unionist majorities in states like Missouri and Kentucky. Outside of obvious Republican strongholds (ex. the city of St. Louis), did Border State communities generally welcome or oppose Union League chapters and their activities?

PT: It all depended on the community’s overall sentiment. In areas where proslavery, anti-Lincoln sentiment was strong, a Union League council served as a means of collective support and protection for its members and their families. Moreover, Union League men often served as a form of civilian informers for the Union military as the army made its way through a particular area. In far west California, for example, Union generals viewed armed Union League men as a reliable civilian paramilitary force, to the consternation of local Democrats.

DW: Do you believe the Union Leagues collectively were instrumental to the success of Lincoln’s reelection campaign?

PT: Absolutely. These men served as campaign workers, stood on sidewalks and handed out pro-Lincoln newspapers, went door to door ensuring that the residents (or resident soldier in the field) was properly registered to vote with all pertinent taxes paid. They also worked tirelessly to recruit new members; by 1864 the Leagues’ leadership realized there was no difference between Union League membership and a Republican vote.

DW: What roles did women play in the organization?

PT: Like almost all political activities of the era, the Union Leagues were originally created as a male-only domain. By the spring of 1863, however, pro-Lincoln women saw what their husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons were creating and wanted to take part as well. Thus, what became known as Ladies Union Leagues were formed by patriotic women, particularly in the Midwest. They continued the home front war in ways that men could not, such as occasionally punching Democratic women and ensuring that local merchants were properly patriotic. Those merchants who were not were often boycotted.

DW: Presumably, membership rapidly dwindled at the war’s conclusion. What responsibilities did remaining league members take upon themselves during Reconstruction?

PT: Having won the Northern home front war, the nationalized Union League of America turned its eyes southward during Reconstruction with the objective of organizing freedmen. Its twin goals of racial political equality and Republican Party dominance went hand in hand. For many post-war Southerners, there was no difference between a northern Union League man and a “carpetbagger,” regardless of the former’s intentions. Those southern-born men who joined or were sympathetic to the Leagues were known as “scalawags.”

DW: When did the leagues finally cease operation (at least in the capacity of political action groups)? You mention in the book that some survive to this day as tony social clubs.

PT: The small town councils were the first to close up shop in the summer and fall of 1865; their reason for being having ended. The aristocratic Union Leagues in Philadelphia and New York, as well as Boston’s Union Club continued on – essentially as social clubs – and still exist to this day.

DW: Thanks, Paul.