Review - "William Henry Seward's Quest to Save the Nation During the Secession Winter" by C. Evan Stewart

[William Henry Seward's Quest to Save the Nation During the Secession Winter (November 1860-April 1861) by C. Evan Stewart (Twelve Tables Press, 2026). Hardcover, photos, illustrations, chapter notes. Pages:xiii,205. ISBN:978-1-946074-46-1. $20.95]

As the momentous 1860 Republican National Convention approached, the general expectation was that New York's William Henry Seward would be the party's presidential nominee. The man himself clearly anticipated it, and was crushed by the defeat. Nevertheless, while Seward failed to reach the pinnacle of American political aspirations, he still saw himself as a man on a mission. After President-elect Abraham Lincoln retreated into an extended stretch of pre-inaugural silence after his great victory, a choice deemed "masterly inactivity" by some and a grave mistake by others, Seward went to work indefatigably trying to prevent further defections from the Union, seven states having seceded in close succession that winter of 1860-61. Seward set out, presumptuously, to act as the power behind the throne, a 'Premier' of sorts who would sagely guide the inexperienced Lincoln through the coming political shoals.

The hardline Lincoln and the more moderate Seward both sought to avoid war, but they weren't on the same page when it came to risking escalation. Seward's mollifying approach during that time, which included unauthorized dealings with southern representatives, provoked strong reactions, including accusations that he was a disloyal Republican. The historical literature has been similarly critical of his actions. More sympathetic is C. Evan Stewart's William Henry Seward's Quest to Save the Nation During the Secession Winter (November 1860-April 1861), which presents Seward's diligent conciliatory efforts as an organized plan, distinct from Lincoln's own apparent lack of a clear plan, to avoid intersectional conflict long enough to keep the balance of restless slave states within the federal union and cool national passions. It may have been a vain hope in hindsight, but it was also considered possible, given time and absent provocation, that a resurgence of unionist pressure, both from within and without, might force the already seceded states to reconsider their folly.

As Stewart outlines it in the book, Seward's plan to save the nation unfolded in three parts. Unlike Lincoln, who steadfastly adhered to his party's national election platform opposing any further extension of slavery and was fiercely partisan in placing Republican interests above all else, Seward adopted a conciliatory approach open to what he felt were moderate concessions. So the first part of Seward's plan, as explained by the author, was to conciliate Border State Unionists [in the context of his analysis, Stewart's definition of "Border States" also encompasses the Upper South] by supporting some sort of acceptable territorial compromise. One option was to allow a proslavery New Mexico. Citing a private statement by Lincoln himself indicating that he might budge in the case of New Mexico (a unique exception to his otherwise uncompromising stance that was likely rooted, as biographer Michael Burlingame and others have suggested, in the widespread belief that slavery itself was impractical there), it seemed like a possibility. However, when considered within the full context of Lincoln's firm and longstanding opposition to slavery's extension, it is not surprising that compromise proposals such as the "New Mexico Plan" or the "Border State Plan" went nowhere.

Even if Lincoln had been explicit in accepting some level of backtracking on his previous pledge regarding slavery's extension, he would have encountered significant, perhaps overwhelming, opposition among his newly formed Republican coalition. Nevertheless, Seward did leverage his considerable influence in a strong attempt at lobbying fellow Republicans to unite with Border State Unionists in some common cause. This was the second part of his plan. The basis of this common cause would be Lincoln's own set of proposals, which included stronger federal legislation (with safeguards against abuse) enforcing the fugitive clause of the Constitution, insistence that state laws contradicting the federal statutes be repealed, and that the Union be preserved.

Intertwined with the second, the third part of the Seward plan involved reorienting the face of the national crisis from it being primarily a matter of 'proslavery versus antislavery' to 'union versus disunion,' the latter question far more unifying. Unlike Lincoln, Seward had personal relationships with key southern leaders and understood their concerns and perspectives, and Stewart credits Seward with clear success in this key part of his plan, which was primarily directed toward Virginia. While it is debatable how much credit should be awarded to Seward personally, overall success is evidenced by the clear unionist majorities that emerged from the winter debates among state delegates in critical Upper South states such as Virginia and Tennessee. The conditional versus unconditional nature of that pro-Union support is not explored, but the point is that the efforts of Seward to center the political discussion on the choice between union and disunion resonated in slave states outside the Deep South. This status quo was maintained until the Lincoln administration attempted to force the issue in Charleston Harbor, the resulting acts of "coercion" (as many southerners of all stripes termed Lincoln's insistence on maintaining a military presence in the harbor but especially his national call to arms after the Confederate firing on Fort Sumter) ultimately pushing the Upper South into the secessionist fold.

Seward was among those who favored withdrawing federal forces from Charleston Harbor. It is one of the great what-ifs of events leading up to the outbreak of the war. Abandoning Fort Sumter could be interpreted as being symbolic of weakness that would only embolden the secessionist movement, but it could also be part of a wily political strategy that avoided igniting the crisis' most dangerous powder keg by giving up a strategic point that was by all measures indefensible while still maintaining possession of the other U.S.-held fortified installations in the Deep South, such as Fort Pickens, which were defensible. Regardless, Lincoln's risky actions placed Seward's cherished conciliatory campaign in a profoundly awkward, to put it lightly, position that ended up catching fire from all sides. Seward's backdoor dealings, which included unauthorized promises that could not be kept, both destroyed his credibility among the southern allies he had cultivated for weeks and months and deeply angered fellow Republicans who felt that Seward was betraying their party's avowed principles.

A compact 5"x7" hardcover with roughly half its pages filled with explanatory chapter notes, Stewart's narrative account can be read in a single sitting. Every reader would do well to pay close attention to the notes as they are not only composed of source citations but are crammed with interesting nuggets of background information and additional discussion, the latter including deeper looks into the documentation along with judicious measurement and analysis of competing interpretations from Lincoln scholars, Seward biographers, and other leading historians.

C. Evan Stewart's William Henry Seward's Quest to Save the Nation During the Secession Winter does not try to argue that Seward's plan was superior to Lincoln's handling of the crisis, or that it could or would have eventually brought about reunion without war. One wonders about the degree to which some of the more fantastical elements of Seward's scheming, particularly his infamous memorandum proposing a means of reuniting the country through declaring war against European nations Spain and France (which Stewart believes to have been more threatening tool, part of a combined domestic and foreign strategy, than earnest desire), have unduly overshadowed the totality of his efforts. Rather than seeing Seward's Southern Strategy to be an unqualified failure, Stewart concludes that Seward's post-election plan "indisputably bought the administration time to get into place and start to wield the levers of power." With inflamed passions all around, how much longer Seward's conciliatory process could have been maintained remains an open question. In the end, Lincoln's decision to directly risk war by resupplying Fort Sumter upended Seward's moderate course, but Stewart seems to agree with keen observer Henry Adams that it was "right to make the effort even if overruled" (pp. 197-98). William Seward's role in the Secession Winter will always be a topic of discussion rife with disagreement, and Stewart feeds the debate with a balanced assessment that offers a great deal of food for thought.