Review - "Desert Empire: The 1862 New Mexico Campaign" by Kelly-Fischer & Greenwalt

[Desert Empire: The 1862 New Mexico Campaign by Patrick Kelly-Fischer and Phillip S. Greenwalt (Savas Beatie, 2026). Softcover, 5 maps, photos, illustrations, integrated driving tour, appendix section, orders of battle, reading list. Pages main/total:xxviii,131/191. ISBN:978-1-61121-775-9. $16.95]

The Confederacy's early-war New Mexico Campaign is one of those Civil War operations that seems foolhardy in retrospect, seemingly destined for failure if not complete disaster. On the other hand, world military history is replete with examples of campaigns and wars won against longer odds. From the Confederate government's perspective in faraway Richmond, the invasion of New Mexico Territory via the upper Rio Grande River Valley was a self-contained, low-risk gamble that placed a slate of grand rewards on the table. If successful in New Mexico and the declared territory of Arizona, Confederate forces would be well positioned to threaten U.S. overland communications in the West. Critically, they would also gain a pathway to the Pacific and vie for control of vital mineral resources in the Rockies and Desert Southwest. Happily for Confederate planners, the expedition would involve only local troops, local resources, and captured munitions, placing minimal demands upon a central government already overwhelmed by the process of funding, clothing, supplying, and arming the main Confederate armies then gathering in the war's main theaters. Of course, Richmond's rather detached 'nothing ventured, nothing gained' attitude toward the risks and challenged involved in the operation offered little comfort to those whose lives and reputations would be at stake in carrying it out.

The existing literature associated with the New Mexico Campaign is well developed. In addition to classic campaign overviews from pioneering Civil War in the Southwest scholar Martin Hall and, more recently, Donald Frazier, the combined efforts of Don Alberts, John Taylor, and Thomas Edrington have produced an excellent Valverde book and two fine Glorieta battle studies. The well-coordinated, multi-front Union response that first derailed then completely defeated the Confederate expedition has been thoroughly explored by Flint Whitlock and Andrew Masich. Jerry Thompson has also compiled an exhaustive record and study of the New Mexico territorial volunteers and militia. A number of very useful edited primary source materials have been published, too. Combining a strong synthesis of the secondary literature with fresh revisitation of the O.R. documents associated with the campaign (the footnotes are available here), Patrick Kelly-Fischer and Phillip Greenwalt serve up a fine new overview history of the campaign with their book Desert Empire: The 1862 New Mexico Campaign, the latest volume in the Emerging Civil War series of military overviews.

Co-authors Kelly-Fischer and Greenwalt work successfully within the established format of the series. In addition to providing a sound summary of the strategic picture in the Desert Southwest at the outbreak of the war, their narrative offers well-rounded operational and tactical-level summaries of the military events that unfolded across what is today's Arizona and New Mexico. The campaign's primary battles at Valverde and Glorieta are both well described and contextualized, the account of the multi-day fight for control of Glorieta Pass being the centerpiece of the study. Five maps and a multitude of period and modern photographs, along with many other illustrations, supplement the text. A driving tour, its components placed at the tail end of select chapters, is also incorporated into the study.

Logistical considerations, and how well or how poorly each side met their challenges, are a major theme of the book. Headed by General Henry Hopkins Sibley, the Confederate "army" of some 3,000 men, all mounted, was supported by a logistical apparatus entirely inadequate for the requirements of a long campaign conducted over great distances. The Rio Grande could supply most of its water requirements, but food for the men and forage for the horses would be an almost entirely improvised affair, dependent on local sources (most of which would be unfriendly to their cause). On the other side, Union authorities managed their affairs remarkably well. Preparing for the arrival of Confederate forces in the region, they did a good job of spiriting away or hiding supplies previously stored along what would become the main path of invasion, largely denying them to the enemy. At the same time, resources and reinforcements were being concentrated in the northeast corner of the territory at Fort Union for the coming counteroffensive. Sibley's most direct opposition, the sizable Union garrison at Fort Craig led by Col. E.R.S. Canby, was able to husband supplies within the fort for an indefinite stay. However, the authors also note that Canby's own logistical situation, his command's Santa Fe Trail supply line cut off by Sibley's presence in the Union rear, was itself less than ideal. Far to the west, the famed "California Column"'s long advance from southern California to New Mexico across hundreds of miles of inhospitable desert, its own successful logistical support plan undoubtedly informed by the U.S. Army's antebellum experiences conducting desert operations, is recounted in a sparkling essay attached as an appendix. Another shorter appendix discusses the importance and role of Fort Union, as well as New Mexico volunteers at large, to the outcome of the campaign.

Union commanders, none of whom were experienced in managing large numbers of fighting men over vast distances, proved themselves well up to the task of blunting Sibley's offensive. Aggressive Col. John Slough, while suffering a tactical setback at Glorieta Pass, nevertheless blocked the Confederates from reaching Fort Union, and his subordinate officers are credited with destroying much of the Confederate supply and ammunition train during their surprise attack at Johnson's Ranch. While his forces based at Fort Craig could not halt the Confederate advance in its early stages and lost the battle at Valverde, Canby still successfully managed to keep the fort and its stockpiles out of Confederate hands and continued to be a thorn in Sibley's side for the duration of the campaign. The authors, citing Canby's own mounting logistical concerns, are only mildly critical of his unwillingness, or inability, to directly oppose Sibley's retreat during the latter stages of the campaign. How much of Canby's innate caution bled into overcaution and a great missed opportunity to destroy Sibley's crippled remaining forces is left to the reader to decide. Col. James Carleton's deft handling of the California Column is justly praised. Desert logistics and scarce water resources necessitated a journey conducted in stages and at a measured pace. Carleton's arrival on the scene, though it was too late to cut the retreating Confederates off before they reached safe haven, nevertheless completed the final link in Union forces fully re-securing New Mexico Territory and eliminating the Texas-based threat for the rest of the war.

By all accounts, including the one presented in this volume, Henry Sibley had no business being entrusted with an enterprise as complicated and difficult as an invasion of New Mexico Territory. His military judgment and leadership capacity severely compromised by chronic alcoholism, Sibley was ill for most of the campaign, leaving tactical direction to his principal subordinates. Even though those regimental officers—notably Col. Thomas Green, Lt. Col. William Scurry, and Majors Charles Pyron, Henry Raguet, and John Shropshire (the last two killed in action)—were able to produce impressive tactical successes at Valverde and Glorieta, the lack of firm overall direction and persistent logistical nightmares meant that Confederate forces were typically scattered as the campaign progressed and could not fully leverage their speed and maneuverability advantage in being fully mounted. The Confederate offensive effort also did not possess enough artillery firepower to threaten enhanced defenses such as those newly erected at Fort Craig and Fort Union. One interesting what-if to contemplate is if Slough had not disregarded orders to remain at Fort Union and instead drawn the Confederates deeper into the mountains, further isolating them and perhaps affording the California Column enough additional time to truly seal Sibley's fate.

Desert Empire skillfully delivers a comprehensive campaign history in a tight package capable of appealing to a wide range of readers. In all likelihood, the Confederate invasion of New Mexico Territory represents the Civil War's most extreme disparity between the scale of what was at stake (militarily, politically, and economically) and the numbers of fighting men involved on both sides, and Patrick Kelly-Fischer and Phillip Greenwalt's engaging new account of that unique campaign is highly recommended.