Sunday, April 23, 2017

Owens & Ramsey interview with ECW

Today is World Book Day so check out the 5-part ECW interview with Marc Ramsey of Owens & Ramsey Historical Booksellers. Of course, it's just one guy's perspective of the business, but the interview covers an interesting array of topics. Here's the link to Part One, and you can go from there. Count yourself fortunate if you live in a part of the country that can support a brick and mortar Civil War wonderland like that one. I miss the days of going into a bookstore and actually finding something to take home with me.

Friday, April 21, 2017

Booknotes: A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition

New Arrival:
A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People by Carol Reardon & Tom Vossler (UNC Press, 2017).

Although it doesn't feel like it has been that long, it's already been four years since the first edition of A Field Guide to Gettysburg was published. Since then, authors Reardon and Vossler have put out A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition Expanded Ebook: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People that I haven't seen, as well as an Antietam guide of great merit that has been reviewed here on the site. The new print version of the Second Edition "will lead visitors to every important site across the battlefield and also give them ways to envision the action and empathize with the soldiers involved and the local people into whose lives and lands the battle intruded."

More from the description: "Divided into three day-long tours, this newly improved and expanded edition offers important historical background and context for the reader while providing answers to six key questions: What happened here? Who fought here? Who commanded here? Who fell here? Who lived here? And what did the participants have to say about it later? With new stops, maps, and illustrations, the second edition of A Field Guide to Gettysburg remains the most comprehensive guide to the events and history of this pivotal battle of the Civil War." I hold these Reardon and Vossler guides in very high regard.

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

Review of McKnight & Myers, eds. - "THE GUERRILLA HUNTERS: Irregular Conflicts during the Civil War"

[The Guerrilla Hunters: Irregular Conflicts during the Civil War edited by Brian D. McKnight & Barton A. Myers (Louisiana State University Press, 2017). Hardcover, maps, photos, illustrations, notes, reading list, index. Pages main/total:384/419. ISBN:978-0-8071-6497-6. $49.95]

Simply from the title, readers of The Guerrilla Hunters might justifiably expect an anthology specializing in those individuals and units engaged in Civil War counterguerrilla operations1, perhaps accompanied by discussions of the complex wartime milieu within which they operated, but that isn't really the case with the sixteen essays presented by contributing editors Brian McKnight and Barton Myers. Instead, chapters address a very diverse range of topics under the general umbrella of the irregular Civil War.

One of the healthy debates among Civil War guerrilla scholars revolves around categorizing the various irregular actors. Some, like Robert Mackey2, have taken their cue from Francis Lieber to closely define and stratify irregulars, while others, including Daniel Sutherland3, argue for much more flexible definitions. Among other more general observations, Brian McKnight's Guerrilla Hunters chapter explores the connections between the conventional and unconventional wars in Appalachia, with many individuals and groups freely moving back and forth between both worlds. Brian Steel Wills investigates the scholarship's continuing mischaracterization of Nathan Bedford Forrest (who consistently deprecated guerrillas as a whole throughout the war) as a guerrilla leader himself, while also noting that Forrest's contemporary enemies often intentionally mislabeled him as a guerrilla in an attempt to impugn the controversial cavalryman's conventional service. In his article studying the irregular war in Loudoun County (Va.), Scott Thompson examines the motivations (which combined both ideological and localist motives) and operations of three units [the Federal Independent Loudoun Rangers, the Confederate Army's 35th Battalion Virginia Cavalry, and John Mobberly's offshoot pro-Confederate guerrilla band] representative of Mackey's irregular categories. As with many other groups considered in the volume, the nature of their service encompassed both irregular and counterirregular warfare capacities. Another contributor, Adam Domby, finds the need for new definitions to describe individuals for whom existing categories seem unsuited. Domby argues powerfully that Confederate deserter John Gatewood, who often killed and plundered indiscriminately and never attempted to cooperate with or aid Confederate forces in any way, was the kind of pathological criminal for whom even bushwhacker status cannot apply. According to Domby, Gatewood's attempt to leverage the complete breakdown of social order and public institutions in late-1864 North Georgia into the expansion of his own personal dominion over the populace makes him most akin to the modern "warlord."

An emerging aspect of guerrilla scholarship has been the growing use of digital technology in various forms, including the mass digitization of manuscripts and genealogical databases along with the development of community and geographical mapping software for interpreting the information. Aaron Astor's chapter cites the importance of recently created digital resources of all types in his project to identify "Tinker Dave" Beaty's pro-Union guerrilla band and study the group's 'social network.' In other publications, Joseph Beilein has used quantitative tools to study guerrilla logistics networks in Missouri, and Andrew Fialka has plotted guerrilla incidents using "spatiotemporal" mapping in order to discover recognizable patterns amidst presumed chaos4. Here, Fialka continues his work in a chapter titled "A Spatial Approach to Civil War Missouri's Domestic Supply Line." Using conventional sources and digital technology, this essay maps guerrilla attacks, Confederate households, and Union occupation(s) in space and time as a tool for exploring their interrelationships (in particular, for the period before and after the issuance of the infamous Order No. 11). The project gathered valuable insights into the cause and effect nature of the irregular war itself, while also offering a more systematic analysis of the vast body of available anecdotal evidence.

Some good faith attempts to utilize guerrilla warfare for positive military results backfired badly for both sides during the war. Most scholars agree that the Partisan Ranger Act of 1862 rebounded to terrible effect on the Confederate home front and broadly undermined their war effort. Barton Myers offers support for this view, while also looking specifically at a number of petitions sent to the Confederate government by those seeking to join partisan service. In addition to tracing efforts by Union authorities to combat the uptick in guerrilla violence in northern Kentucky that occurred after emancipation and other hard war measures were implemented in the state, Stephen Rockenbach discusses the consequences of President Lincoln's generous amnesty program, a policy that allowed large numbers of enemy combatants to resettle behind Union lines and destabilize the Border State home front.

Lisa Tendrich Frank is critical of the moral restraint model of the relationship between Union soldiers and southern civilians popularized by Mark Neely and especially Mark Grimsley in his highly influential study The Hard Hand of War (1995), instead arguing that perhaps the Union war on enemy households, in particular those headed by adult females, was to a large extent fought outside accepted historical boundaries of conventional conflict and should be more generally regarded as part of the irregular sphere of warfare. It's an interesting criticism of the current consensus, but it's too bad Frank didn't go more into what this alternate view could or should mean to Civil War guerrilla studies or the wider scholarship going forward.

In an extension of his earlier work in Extreme Civil War5 (2016), Matthew Stith places the natural environment at the forefront of his look at guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare in the Trans-Mississippi. The most underdeveloped theater's unique diversity of terrain, weather, and natural cover made the environment a guerrilla ally and a guerrilla hunter's foe (at least until the latter learned to similarly exploit the surroundings). Stith also appropriately notes the result of this brutal unconventional warfare on the built environment, with property improvements reverting back to wilderness and transforming prosperous citizens into starving refugees on a mass scale.

The Civil War's guerrilla conflict also extended to the country's inland waterways, and Laura June Davis's chapter recounts the actions of pro-Confederate 'boat burners' with ties to St. Louis and who operating up and down the Lower Mississippi destroying enemy shipping. She also profiles the historiographically elusive river guerrillas themselves, and her upcoming book on the shadowy topic is much anticipated.

Joseph Beilein, one of the newest authorities on guerrilla culture (see note 3), highlights the permissive insobriety of bushwhacker society, and how it affected behavior in the field as well as the relationship between leaders and their men. Beilein marks the winter of 1863-64 (a time during which large numbers of Missouri bushwhackers raised hell for an extended off-season in Texas), as a transition period after which the twin pursuits of violence and alcohol became almost completely unrestrained when the bands returned to Missouri.

Larkin Skaggs, the lone guerrilla that got separated from his comrades during the 1863 Lawrence Raid and who was killed by the angered townspeople and his corpse mutilated, is most often treated as a historical footnote, but he is front and center to Matthew Hulbert's fascinating essay, which looks at the life and legacy of Skaggs in the context of competing historical guerrilla memories of the raid. It's interesting that the writer chooses to characterize Lawrence as a series of massacres, including single-person events like the death of Skaggs, which leads to a more intimate interpretation that he feels makes the Lawrence mass killings fit better into the accepted guerrilla warfare narrative.

Of course, those Union soldiers with the most sustained exposure to irregular warfare were those serving on occupation duty. According to Andrew Lang, occupation was the primary experience of one-third of all men that served in the federal army during the war, and this shattered their romantic ideal of the American citizen-soldier who fights a well-defined enemy with honorable restraint, defeats the opposition without harming civilians, and goes home. Instead, Union soldiers found themselves watching over a hostile population for years on end and engaging in a devolving household war of punishment and revenge. Out of all the essays in the book, this one perhaps most closely aligns itself with the book's title theme, as it focuses on the behaviors, attitudes, language, and tactics of the Union's counterguerrilla war and how all these factors drastically reshaped the early volunteer's naive views on how the conflict would and should be fought.

In the final essay, Earl Hess compares and contrasts the Civil War's guerrilla conflict with nineteenth and twentieth century guerrilla wars in other parts of the world. In it, he maintains the debatable view expressed in prior works that the irregular war was a strategically insignificant sideshow6, the domain of harried local commanders for whom guerrilla fighters were only one of many concerns. Citing the influential recent work of Charles Esdaile7, perhaps the chapter's most interesting aspect is its discussion of the many parallels drawn between the 1861-65 irregular war in the South and the 1808-14 Spanish Uprising of the Napoleonic Wars.

The volume also provides a wealth of reading suggestions for those wishing to dive deeper into the topic of irregular warfare. One can find helpful recommendations both in the chapter notes and in the "reader's bibliography," which compiles a large selection (new and old) of books and articles.

With their variety of themes, topics, research methodologies, and expanded geography, the essays collected in The Guerrilla Hunters comprise a very revealing snapshot of the increasingly impressive current state of the scholarly literature pertaining to the unconventional Civil War. Contributors also identify clear areas for improvement [ex. just the fact that the 'Confederate guerrilla vs. Union counterguerrilla' paradigm so deeply pervades the volume shows us that much more work needs to be done on the other guerrilla war, the Union one]. As Daniel Sutherland notes in the afterword, these essays represent a step in the right direction toward a better synthesis of guerrilla studies into general histories of the Civil War, but we still have some distance to go.


Notes:
1 - Some examples of successful Union counterguerrilla units (including those pulling double duty with the conventional war) are Blazer's Scouts, the 2nd Colorado Cavalry, and a number of Missouri State Militia regiments.
2 - The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865 (2004). Worthy of notice is how very recent the phenomenon of the serious academic study of Civil War irregular warfare has been.
3 - A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War (2009).
4 - See Bushwhackers: Guerrilla Warfare, Manhood, and the Household in Civil War Missouri (2016) and The Civil War Guerrilla: Unfolding the Black Flag in History, Memory, and Myth (2015), the last co-edited with fellow Hunters contributor Matthew Hulbert.
5 - Extreme Civil War: Guerrilla Warfare, Environment, and Race on the Trans-Mississippi Frontier (2016).
6 - Hess develops his contrasting view of the strategic impact of the guerrilla conflict in The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi (2012). One wonders whether Daniel Sutherland regrets using the term "decisive" when describing the guerrilla war's role in Confederate defeat. Some critics still seem needlessly stuck on that perhaps ill-chosen adjective. Taken as a whole, the much more nuanced arguments contained in A Savage Conflict suggest fruitful areas of common ground in the 'sideshow' vs. 'decisive' debate.
7 - Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814 (2004).


TABLE OF CONTENTS:
  • Foreword NOE
  • Guerrilla Warfare's Place in the History of the American Civil War MCKNIGHT & MYERS
  • Partisan Ranger Petitions and the Confederacy's Authorized Petite Guerre Service MYERS
  • The Power of Shadow and Perception in the Appalachian Theater MCKNIGHT
  • Nathan Bedford Forrest and Guerrilla War WILLS
  • Home Rebels Amnesty and Anti-guerrilla Operations in Kentucky in 1864 ROCKENBACH
  • Hunting Guerrilla Social Networks ASTOR
  • The Irregular War in Loudoun County Virginia THOMPSON
  • Reconsidering Guerrilla Leader John Gatewood DOMBY
  • The Union War on Women FRANK
  • Guerrilla Warfare and the Environment in the Trans-Mississippi Theater STITH
  • Irregular Naval Warfare along the Lower Mississippi DAVIS
  • Whiskey Wild Men and Missouri's Guerrilla War BEILEIN
  • Larkin M. Skaggs and the Massacres at Lawrence HULBERT
  • A Spatial Approach to Civil War Missouri's Domestic Supply Line FIALKA
  • Challenging the Union Citizen-Soldier Ideal LANG
  • Civil War Guerrillas in a Global Comparative Context HESS
  • Afterword SUTHERLAND

Click here to view more CWBA reviews of LSU Press titles

Tuesday, April 18, 2017

2015-2016 Founders Award

Congratulations to Jane Johansson for being the newest recipient of the Founders Award, which "recognizes excellence in the editing of primary source documents related to the origins, life, and legacies of the Confederacy and the Civil War." Her book that earned the biennial prize is Albert C. Ellithorpe, the First Indian Home Guards, and the Civil War on the Trans-Mississippi Frontier (2016). Even though the amount of original research that goes into edited manuscripts frequently exceeds that of many narrative histories, the category as a whole is still most often discounted when it comes to award season, so it's entirely appropriate that the Founders Award was created to specially recognize such work.

Monday, April 17, 2017

Booknotes: Locomotives Up the Turnpike

New Arrival:
Locomotives Up the Turnpike: The Civil War Career of Quartermaster Captain Thomas R. Sharp, C.S.A. by David L. Bright (Author, 2017).

Most readers have surely read at least something about the Confederates dragging captured B&O locomotives up the Shenandoah Valley early in the war for use elsewhere. I seem to recall the operation being the object of some amount of controversy, too, with claims put forth that the event never occurred. Anyway, the man tasked with the job was a Virginia railroad superintendent named Thomas R. Sharp, and Bright's Locomotives Up the Turnpike is the first book-length study of the topic.

From the description: "Sharp hired dozens of men and hundreds of horses and wagons to haul the rolling stock south on the Valley of Virginia Turnpike, from Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry to Winchester to Strasburg. Seventeen locomotives and well over 100 cars were hauled over the country roads to intersections with the Manassas Gap Railroad and the Virginia Central Railroad, then on to Richmond."

The book also documents Sharp's later career. "By the summer of 1863, Sharp had been assigned to be the superintendent of the Charlotte & South Carolina Railroad, a critical road in the supply chain supporting Richmond and the main Confederate army. Later, Sharp was given responsibility for coordinating the railroad transportation of all of central and western South Carolina. As Gen. Sherman approached, in 1865, Sharp assisted in the evacuation of Columbia, and then worked to improve the railroads between Charlotte and Salisbury, N.C."

Four appendices are included. The first addresses the doubters, the second the question of a similar event that might have occurred at an earlier time, and the third describes in detail the locomotives saved. The last appendix comprises a series of manpower rosters of those that served under Sharp during his various wartime assignments. Original cartography and full-color artist renderings of six locomotives were created by Andrew Hall for the volume. On a related note, the author also runs the Confederate Railroads website.

Saturday, April 15, 2017

Booknotes: Theater of a Separate War

New Arrival:
Theater of a Separate War: The Civil War West of the Mississippi River, 1861-1865
by Thomas W. Cutrer (UNC Press, 2017).

Even though I am not very familiar with Cutrer's entire body of work (I would guess that he's best known in Civil War circles for his Ben McCulloch biography), this was a highly anticipated title for me. "In this comprehensive military history of the war west of the Mississippi River, Thomas W. Cutrer shows that the theater's distance from events in the East does not diminish its importance to the unfolding of the larger struggle." No one has attempted this kind of project before. "Theater of a Separate War details the battles between North and South in these far-flung regions, assessing the complex political and military strategies on both sides. While providing the definitive history of the rise and fall of the South's armies in the far West, Cutrer shows, even if the region's influence on the Confederacy's cause waned, its role persisted well beyond the fall of Richmond and Lee's surrender to Grant."

I was asked for my thoughts on the severe rating given the book at the link above. One of my unwritten rules is to not read serious comments on books I plan on reviewing myself until after I've posted my own review on the site, but the unexpected savaging meted out to Theater had me curious enough to make an exception. It should be mentioned to those unfamiliar with the writer [unlike many online reviewers, he uses his real name so you can easily find it yourself] that he and his regular writing partner have published a number of excellent articles on the Civil War in the T-M theater together, so he's no crank. It's unclear from the long list of sins of omission and commission how much of the book he's actually read outside his own area of expertise, but the global 1/5 star rating seems unduly dismissive. The partial review raises legitimately troubling concerns, but I still plan on reading the thing and judging for myself its overall merits.

Thursday, April 13, 2017

Review of McCluney - "THE YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION: A Union Thrust into the Delta"

[The Yazoo Pass Expedition: A Union Thrust into the Delta by Larry Allen McCluney, Jr. (Arcadia Publishing & The History Press, 2017). Softcover, maps, photos, illustrations, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:100/121. ISBN:978-1-62585-839-9. $21.99]

When faced with the daunting task of capturing fortified Vicksburg, U.S. Grant basically had four options (or some combination of them) to choose from in order to get at the Hill City. The first approach, an overland advance, failed and was (prematurely?) discarded from further consideration, and a direct amphibious assault on the city's riverfront was never seriously countenanced. That left marching the army down the right bank of the Mississippi River and crossing either above or below Vicksburg and attacking its landward defenses from behind. The last choice, one of the riskiest, was eventually tried and succeeded beyond expectations, but it was preceded by a number of operations launched north of Vicksburg, all of which sought to take advantage of the many navigable waterways of the Yazoo delta. Larry Allen McCluney's The Yazoo Pass Expedition: A Union Thrust into the Delta examines one of the most promising attempts.

Beginning with the breach of the levee at Yazoo Pass in February 1863, an amphibious expedition jointly led by Brigadier General Leonard Ross (later superseded by BG Isaac Quinby) and navy Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith took advantage of a succession of rivers that fed into each other—first the Coldwater, then the Tallahatchie, and finally the Yazoo (which was formed by the confluence of the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha rivers a short distance north of Greenwood, Mississippi)—to penetrate the delta. Progress was slowed by tough environmental conditions, enemy obstructions, and also arguably by over-caution. In the end, Union forces could not overcome Confederate Major General W.W. Loring's well-placed and well-manned defenses located in the Greenwood bend (most prominent of these being Fort Pemberton), and the movement was eventually abandoned in April.

The operational treatment in the book may not be as detailed as the one found in the first volume of Ed Bearss's classic Vicksburg trilogy, but McCluney's brisk narrative provides a fine overview of the Yazoo Pass Expedition. For many authors, employing lengthy uninterpreted block quotes from the source material is a bit of a lazy way to write history, but McCluney's keen selections add significant participant insights that are intimately tied to the narrative. Maps, photographs, and other illustrations thickly populate the pages and add both appealing flavor and useful information. Regardless of the ship's prior fame, the volume's inclusion of so much background history of the Star of the West (one of the vessels sunk in the river by the Confederates for use as a navigation obstruction) represents a questionable use of already limited space, but the key elements of the expedition history are left adequately covered.

Typically, Union combined army-navy operations conducted with this degree of disparity in manpower and firepower did not end well for the Confederates, but the book convincingly argues that strong Confederate leadership and planning from General Loring (who put in a peak performance at Ft. Pemberton) combined with an atypically sluggish naval component on the Union side (the ill Watson Smith should have been replaced much earlier) doomed the Union venture to failure. Loring and his engineers quickly took advantage of local knowledge of the ground and placed their fortifications where the earthworks would be above the river, command all approaches, and be largely invulnerable to infantry attack. If you're looking for a popular-style, standalone narrative of the Yazoo Pass Expedition, this is the first and only one available in book-length format, but it's also a pretty good one.

Tuesday, April 11, 2017

Booknotes: U.S. Colored Troops Defeat Confederate Cavalry

New Arrival:
U.S. Colored Troops Defeat Confederate Cavalry: Action at Wilson's Wharf, Virginia, 24 May 1864 by Edwin W. Besch (McFarland, 2017).

On May 24, 1864 at Wilson's Wharf in Virginia, the 1st and 10th USCT regiments under General Edward Wild, with the support of the U.S. Navy, repulsed an attack by General Fitzhugh Lee's Confederate cavalry. "This book describes the action in detail and in the larger context of the history of black U.S. servicemen, including the British recruitment of runaway slaves during the Revolutionary War, the black Colonial Marines who joined the British in torching Washington in the War of 1812, and the South's attempts to enlist slaves in the final months of the Civil War." The wider issue of black service (civilian vs. military) in the Confederate Army is also discussed in the volume.

The book concludes with a supplemental chapter on the archeological work being done at Fort Pocahontas. A pair of appendices discuss casualty figures from the battle. The bibliography suggests extensive manuscript research and the casting of a suitably wide net over other primary and secondary sources.

Monday, April 10, 2017

Booknotes: Fighting Irish in the American Civil War and the Invasion of Mexico

New Arrival:
Fighting Irish in the American Civil War and the Invasion of Mexico: Essays edited by Arthur H. Mitchell (McFarland, 2017).

"This collection of essays examines the involvement of Irish men and women in America's conflicts from 1840 to 1865." There are eighteen scholarly essays in total. The pair of Mexican War chapters in Part I address those Irish soldiers that fought on the American and Mexican sides, the latter including the men of the (in)famous San Patricio battalion.

The great majority of contributions (16 in total) are Civil War related and are contained in Part II. In this section, essays explore groups, movements, and individuals from both sides. Chapters discuss the Irish of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Boston, along with Irish women and the relationship between the Irish and African Americans in the U.S. Also covered are motivations for fighting in the Civil War and the Fenian movement. Biographical pieces on Judge Charles Daly of New York, the Mahans (Dennis Hart and son Alfred Thayer), the 10th Minnesota's Christopher Byrne, Charleston Bishop Patrick Lynch, and other Confederate figures like Irish nationalist and Richmond newspaper editor John Mitchel and famous Irish-American military officers Patrick Cleburne and Dick Dowling. Looks like a suitably diverse collection.

Saturday, April 8, 2017

Booknotes: Lincoln's Lieutenants

New Arrival:
Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac by Stephen W. Sears (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

Lincoln's Lieutenants is "a multilayered group biography of the commanders who led the Army of the Potomac." More from the description: "The high command of the Army of the Potomac was a changeable, often dysfunctional band of brothers, going through the fires of war under seven commanding generals in three years, until Grant came east in 1864. The men in charge all too frequently appeared to be fighting against the administration in Washington instead of for it, increasingly cast as political pawns facing down a vindictive congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. ... President Lincoln oversaw, argued with, and finally tamed his unruly team of generals as the eastern army was stabilized by an unsung supporting cast of corps, division, and brigade generals."

Freeman's Lee's Lieutenants was published in three relatively thick volumes, but Sears's Lincoln's Lieutenants makes do with one tome of around 900 pages. With his earlier Peninsula, Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg books, Sears has already covered large patches of ground relevant to Lieutenants, and it makes me wonder how much critical reevaluation (vs. cut-paste integration) of his earlier work went into this new one. The bibliography is fairly modest for a volume of this great scope. At the very least, I plan to read the text up through the end of 1862 to see if anything grabs me.

Thursday, April 6, 2017

Review of Green - "MCCLELLAN AND THE UNION HIGH COMMAND, 1861-1863: Leadership Gaps That Cost a Timely Victory"

[McClellan and the Union High Command, 1861-1863: Leadership Gaps That Cost a Timely Victory by Jeffrey W. Green (McFarland 800-253-2187, 2017). Softcover, 2 maps, photos, notes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:185/214. ISBN:978-1-4766-6573-3. $35]

As we all know, the campaign and battlefield leadership abilities of various famous Civil War generals remain topics of earnest debate in the literature, but Jeffrey Green's McClellan and the Union High Command, 1861-1863 aims further up the chain of command to address theater-level strategy, specifically why the Union juggernaut failed to achieve early victory in the East. The popular villain of this period remains General George B. McClellan, but Green convincingly sees the Union high command derailed by the failings of a much broader group of military and civilian leaders, whose undefined roles and clashing ideologies, aims, egos, and ambitions rendered rapid success elusive.

The book's first chapter capably covers the parallel military traditions that existed during the antebellum republic. On one side was a professional military establishment governed by the science of war (later embodied by West Point and its graduates) and leading a small regular army. Existing at the same time, and frequently operating in direct opposition to the assumptions of military professionalism, was the traditional American democratic distrust of standing armies. From this viewpoint, during national emergencies the country would rely on an expansible army of militia and volunteers, as well as the natural genius of citizen-generals to lead them. As seen by the development of the Third System of American defense policy, both traditions would be maintained side by side through much of the first half of the nineteenth century.

As the following chapter shows, the above military traditions would immediately clash during the Civil War and contribute mightily to Union high command dysfunction. In an atmosphere of intense mutual distrust, Radical Republican elements of the political leadership chastised the Democrat-heavy military establishment for being too soft on the enemy. They would lobby powerfully for what would later be known as "hard war," while the Lincoln administration and the army would initially see eye to eye on a more conservative military policy of conciliation. This contentious milieu worked against consistent and coherent military planning.

The binding theme of Green's study revolves around the repeated violation by all parties involved (president, cabinet, lawmakers, and generals alike) of the integrity of the chain of command, the consistent unity and integration of which was necessary for the Army of the Potomac to function both in field and as the instrument of the civilian leadership and policy makers. General McClellan repeatedly bypassed General in Chief Winfield Scott to confer with Lincoln directly and failed to appreciate that his high-profile job had a significant political component that could not be safely deflected. Worse, Lincoln himself constantly went around the chain of command and, in doing so, created a toxic environment that meant army officers of all ranks felt themselves free to approach him directly without conferring first with their immediate superiors. As the book well demonstrates, this bore bitter fruit when the generals of William B. Franklin's Left Grand Division (Franklin himself and generals Smith, Cochrane, and Newton) conspired against army commander Ambrose Burnside and directly approached the president seeking Burnside's ouster. Lincoln also allowed Joseph Hooker, no stranger to intrigue himself, to skip communication with General in Chief Henry Halleck and report to the president directly, which created obvious problems in the military chain of command. The president also constantly interfered in field operations (to the army's great detriment on the Peninsula and in the Shenandoah in 1862), and had a almost irrational opinion over what was required to safeguard the capital. Senate and House Radicals sought the removal of those generals deemed insufficiently aggressive or loyal, and the prosecution of Democrat-generals like Charles Stone and Fitz John Porter created a fearful and mistrusting officer corps that some argue was rendered extra-cautious by such malignant threats from above. All of these factors made it impossible for the Army of the Potomac to operate in an efficient manner during the first half of the war.

Green does remind us, though perhaps not forcefully enough in the book, that simple institutional and individual actor inexperience could often explain high command disruption just as readily as willful malice and naked ambition. All occupants of the chain of command, from the commander in chief down to the lowest ranking general, were learning highly complex jobs on the fly (most without the benefit of any particularly useful precedent). Given that so many Civil War leaders were essentially defining their roles in a near vacuum, serious mistakes on the scale of those that occurred were likely inevitable events.

Getting back to McClellan specifically, historians generally acknowledge that Lincoln's interference hamstrung McClellan's army on the Peninsula to some degree or another, but they still assign the vast preponderance of responsibility for the defeat to the general's mishandling of military operations. Green compellingly resets the scale to apportion more equitable blame between the army commander and the civilian leadership.

The author's statements in the conclusion that "(t)he failure of the Peninsula Campaign also demonstrated that fighting offensively in the East was the wrong strategy" and, in this, "both Lincoln and McClellan had got it wrong" (pg. 184) are both curious in that Green himself concedes earlier in the book that political realities (especially given the close proximity of opposing capitals) made active offensive operations in the Virginia theater imperative. Green is also a bit inconsistent on the issue of waging a conservative war as being "unrealistic" and never able to lead to victory. Beyond being a classic case of arguing backward from a known result to speculate on an untried unknown, it also unduly discounts the immense political pressures placed on Lincoln, especially in regard to his war effort's critically important loyal proslavery Border State constituency, to adopt a more limited approach to the war in the early period. Perhaps the greatest drawback of Green's analysis is its lack of recognition that the other side also had 'something to do with it'. The book's insightful enumeration of the Union cause's self-defeating "leadership gaps" is certainly instructive, but it might also be true that the highly motivated and well-led Army of the Northern Virginia was a contributing factor at least as important to Union failure to achieve victory during the first two years of war.

To what degree Green's argument collection enters into promised 'new areas' of debate will likely depend on the background of the reader. None are entirely original to the point that well-read students will not recognize existing related observations and discussions in print, but, as with all in-depth examinations of complicated questions, there are always individual differences when its comes to arrangement and weight of factors involved. Admirably avoiding the tired but still popular narrative of a brilliant Lincoln who created early on the conditions and formula for military success in the East only to have a series of promising commanders fail him until he 'found a general' in U.S. Grant, the book demonstrates an uncommon appreciation of the complexity of sources behind the Union high command's startling dysfunction during 1861-63. Green's ultimate conclusion that an ineffective high command was the primary factor among many in the Union's failure to achieve early victory in the East is compelling in many ways. Recommended.

Wednesday, April 5, 2017

Lee's Tigers Revisited

For a long time, Terry L. Jones's Lee's Tigers (1987) has been the standard study of the Louisiana contribution to the manpower of the Army of Northern Virginia. It was certainly groundbreaking at the time and was also reissued in paperback format in 2002. From the description: "Lee's Tigers is the first study to utilize letters, diaries, and muster rolls to provide a detailed account of the origins, enrollments, casualties, and desertion rates of these soldiers. Jones supplies the first major work to focus solely on Louisiana's infantry in Lee's army throughout the course of the war."

Jones himself remains active on message boards, both dispensing knowledge and soliciting information. The result of his sustained research and curiosity is a brand new book Lee's Tigers Revisited: The Louisiana Infantry in the Army of Northern Virginia (LSU, Sept 2017). It "dramatically expands and revises his acclaimed history of the approximately 12,000 Louisiana infantrymen who fought in Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia." If simple page count (296 in the paperback reprint vs. 544 in Revisited) is an accurate representation of such things, dramatic expansion in the new edition appears to be no exaggeration.

Monday, April 3, 2017

Five books on the United States Colored Troops Civil War experience


1. Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862-1867 by William A. Dobak (2011).

Cornish's The Sable Arm (1956) is a pathbreaking classic and Trudeau's Like Men of War (1998) might be most widely recognized, but Dobak's comprehensive book is arguably the best military history of the USCT contributions to the Union war effort. It ably discusses federal emancipation and recruitment policy, with the bulk of the study covering USCT organization and operations in all theaters while also extending its military treatment into Reconstruction.

2. Milliken's Bend: A Civil War Battle in History and Memory by Linda Barnickel (2013).

Surrendering black troops could often expect a grim variety of responses from their Confederate foes, from POW status (sometimes accompanied by hard labor) to reenslavement to execution. Fort Pillow is, of course, the most notorious large-scale killing of USCT soldiers taken in the act of surrendering, but like events of differing scales occurred on other fields, and Barnickel's study of Milliken's Bend ranks among the best examinations of those battles in which black troops figured most prominently.

3. Soldiers in the Army of Freedom: The 1st Kansas Colored, the Civil War's First African American Combat Unit by Ian Michael Spurgeon (2014).

The next three recommendations cover unit studies of USCT regiments that fought in those Civil War fronts where black military contributions were most significant. The 1st Kansas (later 79th USCT) was the first black regiment to see combat (at Island Mound in Missouri) and fought in the Trans-Mississippi borderlands for the rest of the war, along the way suffering tremendous losses at Poison Spring in 1864.

4. Firebrand of Liberty: The Story of Two Black Regiments That Changed the Course of the Civil War by Stephen V. Ash (2008).

Ash's book is a fine primer on the Sea Island experience, the Port Royal Experiment, the freedmen soldier partnership with eastern abolitionists, and lesser-known USCT operations conducted along the South Atlantic coastline.

5. The 36th Infantry United States Colored Troops in the Civil War: A History and Roster by James K. Bryant II (2012).

The 36th was a late-1863 USCT unit redesignation of the 2nd North Carolina Colored Infantry. The regiment participated in numerous raids in Virginia and North Carolina, and was one of the USCT regiments that figured most prominently at the Battle of New Market Heights (Richmond-Petersburg Campaign) in late September 1864. Bryant spent much of his academic training and career studying this unit, and it shows in the depth and quality of the history and roster.

Saturday, April 1, 2017

Theater histories

Thomas Cutrer's Theater of a Separate War: The Civil War West of the Mississippi River, 1861-1865 was just released a bit earlier than scheduled. If it proves to meet expectations, we'll now have useful up-to-date survey histories for each of the three major theaters of war. The other two I would highly recommend are The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi [review] from Earl Hess and the much more concise The Civil War in the East: Struggle, Stalemate, and Victory [review].

Friday, March 31, 2017

Booknotes: The Yazoo Pass Expedition

New Arrival:
The Yazoo Pass Expedition: A Union Thrust into the Delta
by Larry Allen McCluney, Jr. (Arcadia Pub & The Hist Pr, 2017).

Ed Bearss and Warren Grabau have given us a pair of tome-sized Vicksburg Campaign histories, and Michael Ballard has authored a concise and well received campaign overview, but the set of book-length standalone battle and sub-operations studies remains limited. Larry Allen McCluney's The Yazoo Pass Expedition: A Union Thrust into the Delta belongs in that last category and is, I believe, the first of its kind.

From the description: "After six failed attempts to reach Vicksburg, General Ulysses S. Grant developed a plan. The Yazoo Pass Expedition was a Union army/navy operation meant to bypass Vicksburg by using the backwaters of the Mississippi Delta. Operations began on February 3, 1863, with a levee breach on the Mississippi River. The expedition was delayed as a result of natural obstacles and Confederate resistance, which allowed the Confederate army under Lieutenant General John Pemberton to block passage of the Federal fleet. The Confederates continued to rebuff the fleet and finally defeated it in the spring."

Wednesday, March 29, 2017

Review of Scythes, ed. - "THIS WILL MAKE A MAN OF ME: The Life and Letters of a Teenage Officer in the Civil War"

[This Will Make a Man of Me: The Life and Letters of a Teenage Officer in the Civil War edited by James Scythes (Lehigh University Press, 2016). Hardcover, 4 maps, photos, notes, bibliography, index. 195 pp. ISBN:978-1-61146-218-0. $75]

Benjamin Gould's Investigations in the Military and Anthropological Statistics of American Soldiers (1869) found that only five of the 37,183 Union Army officers in its study sample were seventeen years of age. This makes 17-year-old Lieutenant Thomas James Howell of the 3rd New Jersey Volunteer Infantry Regiment a rarity, indeed. His series of wartime letters home are the chief attraction of James Scythes's This Will Make a Man of Me, which also provides an informative biographical treatment of its youthful subject.

Sixty-five of Howell's letters survive, either in original form (31) or as transcriptions (34), and the book organizes them into two parts. Part I begins with civilian Howell's trip to the Virginia front in January 1862 in order to secure a freshly vacated second lieutenant post in the 3rd New Jersey and ends with the unit's embarkation to the Virginia Peninsula. Part II spans April 15-June 26, 1862, when Howell and the 3rd joined the Army of the Potomac for the drive on Richmond. Unfortunately for the army and for Howell himself, things did not go according to plan. On June 27, Howell was killed during the closing moments of the Battle of Gaines's Mill, and by the end of the Seven Days the Confederate army had earned a hard won campaign victory.

The 3rd NJ (Kearny's Brigade, Franklin's Division) did not directly participate in the main fighting for any of the major Peninsula battles prior to Gaines's Mill, so Howell's letters are not filled with detailed accounts from the firing line. For what he did see, however, Howell was a regular and highly observant correspondent. During his first months of duty, he penned detailed descriptions of the outpost war in northern Virginia. After arriving on the  Peninsula, he wrote long letters to his family chronicling what he witnessed from his reserve position at the Battle of Eltham's Landing and from his rear post behind the far right flank of the Union line south of the Chickahominy River during the early stages of the Seven Days.

Howell's lengthy letters home are rich in details about camp life and company officer's duties. He wrote frequently about drilling, dress parades, and target practice, while also relating to his family, among other things, what it was like to be officer of the guard and officer of the day. The tone and content of the letters really show Howell to be mature beyond his years. Forced to learn on the run, he seems to have adjusted to his weighty responsibilities quickly and well. All the more impressive is the fact that his company's captain and ranking lieutenant were absent most of the time, leaving junior officer Howell in charge of the company.

As Scythes notes, it's unfortunate for us that no diaries or letters written by the privates and non-coms that served under Howell survive, as they might have provided insights into how the older men viewed their uncommonly youthful lieutenant. Howell himself relates that he felt he was well liked by his men and his letters note no significant problems with insubordination. Perhaps he was aided by his greater than average size (he was six feet tall). Of course, rare was the Civil War regiment with no petty jealousies and hatreds shared among the officers, and Howell frequently clashed with the 3rd NJ's Lieutenant Colonel Brown (who apparently drank heavily). Even Howell's best officer friend in the company ended up colluding against him with Brown, a disheartening situation that undoubtedly contributed mightily to Howell's generally negative opinion of his fellow volunteer officers.

For obvious reasons, Howell's letters home abruptly end on June 26. Using a number of sources, including eyewitness accounts of Howell's actions during the Battle of Gaines's Mill and of his death later that day, Scythes is able to admirably reconstruct in his book's concluding chapter the final moments of the teenage lieutenant's life. By all accounts, Howell coolly kept his company well in hand during the intense fighting around Boatswain's Creek and was able to quickly reform the men during the Union retreat to the Chickahominy bridges. It was at this time during the late afternoon that Howell was struck and killed by a stray round shot.

Scythes's editing contributes significantly to the value of the book. In researching his extensive biographical and contextual narratives, he consulted a broad range of sources (including manuscript collections, government documents and reports, books, periodicals, and newspapers). Endnotes are plentiful and, in addition to standard source identification, provide useful information on persons, places, and events mentioned in the letters.

Given that Howell's battlefield experiences were primarily behind the lines, and he was killed during his first major clash of arms (thus depriving us of any personal record of those moments), it would be difficult to argue that the volume ranks high among the collection of firsthand military accounts of the Peninsula Campaign. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, there are other points of interest that make the volume worthwhile. The letters, which are numerous, highly descriptive, and remarkably complete, offer readers a singular record of a teenage company officer's experiences and perceptions of the early stages of one the war's greatest campaigns. Through the fine efforts of historian James Scythes, This Will Make a Man of Me treats a tragically brief life story with the gravity and historical appreciation that its uniqueness deserves.

Tuesday, March 28, 2017

Booknotes: Bloody Engagements

New Arrival:
Bloody Engagements: John R. Kelso’s Civil War
by John R. Kelso, edited by Christopher Grasso (Yale UP, 2017).

This new book has some thematic similarities with Monday's Booknotes title. Missouri's John Russell Kelso experienced both regular and irregular aspects of Civil War service, first as a Missouri volunteer infantry private then later as a scout and cavalry officer fighting guerrillas and various Ozark outlaws.

In Bloody Engagements, Christopher Grasso edits the wartime sections of Kelso's unpublished autobiography, as well as two post-war political speeches. From the introduction, we learn that the original manuscript was lost after Kelso's death in 1891, and what survives is a copy of the autobiographical account up to 1863 (presumably, this is the document that resides in the Huntington Library). So the book covers secession, the beginning of the war in Missouri, the fighting at Wilson's Creek, Pea Ridge, Forsyth, and Springfield, and many other incidents and events from the war.

Grasso contributes a lengthy introduction to the volume, explanatory footnotes, a timeline of Kelso's life, an index, and also arranged for a trio of nice maps. If you have an interest in the Civil War in the Ozarks, this looks like a good one to add to the home library.

Monday, March 27, 2017

Booknotes: The Guerrilla Hunters

New Arrival:
The Guerrilla Hunters: Irregular Conflicts during the Civil War
edited by Brian D. McKnight & Barton A. Myers (LSU Press, 2017).

From the spring catalog offerings, this was one of the titles I underlined early on as a must-read. The guerrilla literature has been expanding rapidly in many different directions but much of the focus still remains on the fighters themselves. The initial assumption I had about The Guerrilla Hunters was that it would focus on the other side of the equation, the leaders, men, and units that conducted counter-guerrilla operations. Now that I've seen the actual book, the topics involved appear to be a bit more expansive than that kind of limited categorization. With sixteen chapters plus a foreword and afterword, the volume greatly exceeds the number of contributions (around ten or so) found in the typical Civil War essay anthology.

The table of contents isn't particularly easy to find so here it is:

Foreword NOE
Guerrilla Warfare's Place in the History of the American Civil War MCKNIGHT & MYERS
Partisan Ranger Petitions and the Confederacy's Authorized Petite Guerre Service MYERS
The Power of Shadow and Perception in the Appalachian Theater MCKNIGHT
Nathan Bedford Forrest and Guerrilla War WILLS
Home Rebels Amnesty and Anti-guerrilla Operations in Kentucky in 1864 ROCKENBACH
Hunting Guerrilla Social Networks ASTOR
The Irregular War in Loudoun County Virginia THOMPSON
Reconsidering Guerrilla Leader John Gatewood DOMBY
The Union War on Women FRANK
Guerrilla Warfare and the Environment in the Trans-Mississippi Theater STITH
Irregular Naval Warfare along the Lower Mississippi DAVIS
Whiskey Wild Men and Missouri's Guerrilla War BEILEIN
Larkin M. Skaggs and the Massacres at Lawrence HULBERT
A Spatial Approach to Civil War Missouri's Domestic Supply Line FIALKA
Challenging the Union Citizen-Soldier Ideal LANG
Civil War Guerrillas in a Global Comparative Context HESS
Afterword SUTHERLAND

Also included at the end is a dozen-page 'reader's bibliography' of the guerrilla war literature which should prove useful.

Saturday, March 25, 2017

Lincoln's Pathfinder

Yesterday, Dimitri Rotov was wondering about books on the 1856 election, if any good ones exist. I haven't looked into what's already out there, but John Bicknell's soon to be released Lincoln's Pathfinder: John C. Fremont and the Violent Election of 1856 (June '17, Chicago Review Pr) has been on my radar for a while, and I suspect that DR has seen it, too. I agree with Dimitri that 1856 holds points of interest more numerous than just a presidential election that established a blueprint for sectional party success four years later. For those seeking connections between 1856 and 1860, the fluffy, meandering book description of Lincoln's Pathfinder isn't much of an appetite builder, but you can never really trust those things anyway. The author does seem to enjoy framing elections as great national landscape-altering events [see also America 1844: Religious Fervor, Westward Expansion, and the Presidential Election That Transformed the Nation (2014)].

Thursday, March 23, 2017

Review of Doyle, ed. - "AMERICAN CIVIL WARS: The United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Crisis of the 1860s"

[American Civil Wars: The United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Crisis of the 1860s edited by Don H. Doyle (University of North Carolina Press, 2017). Softcover, map, chart, chapter notes, index. 272 pp. ISBN:978-1-4696-3109-7. $27.95]

At least for most North Americans, the epic struggle between the Union and the Confederacy has tended to shoulder aside popular knowledge of other much smaller, but still significant, Atlantic world conflicts that occurred during the decade of the 1860s. Many readers are familiar with French intervention and the civil war in Mexico, but there were other sources of strife in Latin America that drew the the world's attention at the time. Many of these events are described and analyzed at length in the new essay anthology American Civil Wars: The United States, Latin America, Europe, and the Crisis of the 1860s edited by Don Doyle. In this volume, Doyle has assembled an impressive cast of international scholars. In several cases, expert command of important source material in their native countries allows contributors to offer a number of insights that may have escaped many U.S. historians of the Civil War era.

Jay Sexton begins the proceedings. Like most modern scholars, he includes the United States in the list of great imperialist powers of the nineteenth century, though he perhaps appreciates better than some the non-linear, fits and starts nature of the progression and the robust level of domestic debate involved. One of the main points of his essay revolves around the Civil War's settlement of internal sectional division as prerequisite to sustained national expansion near and far (a situation greatly different from ancient Rome, for example).

In the following essay, Howard Jones, who has written extensively about Civil War diplomacy, effectively reminds readers that foreign recognition and possible intervention were always self-interested questions for the European empires, with moral qualms over slavery never figuring most prominently in their calculations. His chapter provides a very useful summary of the issues and concerns raised by the British, French, and Spanish governments in relation to how best to deal with, and perhaps take advantage of, the American Civil War. Multiple volume contributors (Jones among them) tend to agree with the traditional view that the possibility of European intervention peaked during the late summer and fall of 1862.

Patrick Kelly's examination of southern aspirations in Latin America persuasively argues that secession instantly (and more than bit ironically) neutered dreams of a greater slaveholding empire. Once secession unlinked the South from the vastly more powerful economic, military, and diplomatic backing of the United States, the Confederacy lacked the resources and navy necessary to seize and hold faraway lands. In the writer's view, Mexico and Spanish Cuba, both long desired targets of southern politicians, quickly realized how little they had to fear from a Confederacy fighting for its own life in North America. Far from being able to negotiate foreign concessions from a position of strength, Confederate leaders had to humble themselves before all and repeatedly assure even the weaker powers of Mexico and Spain that their country no longer had designs on previously coveted territories. While self-interested northern Mexico state governors like Santiago Vidaurri cooperated with Confederate officials, the Mexican central government confidently and repeatedly rebuffed Confederate alliance overtures. Continuing on this line of reasoning, ready Confederate acceptance of French intervention while getting nothing in return from Napoleon's government beyond baseless hopes of future recognition comprised further evidence of Confederate weakness in power projection.

Richard Huzzy marks the decade of the 1860s as a crisis of the British Empire in the Americas to coincide with the internal difficulties of the United States. In deciding how best to protect and further their own interests, Britons struggled over whether to cooperate with U.S. ambitions (citing common racial and cultural heritages) or adopt the riskier and more expensive confrontational stance of containment and competition. Imperial crises cited in the article include European intervention in Mexico, a bloody uprising in Jamaica, and concerns over how much imperial capital should be invested in furthering Canadian development as a counterbalancing force to growing U.S. capabilities (ex. building a transcontinental railroad to compete with the continental and Pacific aspirations of the U.S.). As Huzzy demonstrates, by the end of the decade it was clear to all involved that the U.S. was boundlessly ascendant and British dominion in the Americas was on permanent wane.

The American Civil War also put Napoleon III's "Grand Plan" of containing the growth of the United States into full motion. Citing official diplomatic documents in French archives, Steven Sainlaude contends that French intervention in Mexico was much less about collecting outstanding debts (France had the smallest claims among the three European powers that intervened) and more about blocking U.S. ambitions in the rest of the Americas. France didn't want any single power to dominate any of the world's continents, and its government sought to create a centrally located Latin alliance in the Americas as a regional counterweight to the Anglophone powers. While Kelly's previous chapter created the picture of a Confederacy unable to realize antebellum territorial ambitions, Sainlaude's position is that the professionals in the French diplomatic corps (unlike their emperor) were more concerned by the threat to Mexico of an independent Confederacy (with its filibustering tradition out of temporary retirement) than they were in weakening the United States. These career diplomats did everything in their power to block Napoleonic favor toward a Confederate government that was clearly not out to completely abandon the Monroe Doctrine and was only forced into currying favor with the French after badly botching initial overtures to Juarez. In the end, the French weren't prepared to do anything unilaterally when it came to intervening in the American Civil War. By the middle of the decade, the U.S. emerged even more powerful than before, and a complete French military withdrawal conceded the end of the Grand Plan.

Like France, the Spanish Empire also moved to take advantage of the internal troubles of the U.S. to both strengthen and expand its own holdings. Cuba, coveted for decades by a powerful southern proslavery political bloc, was Spain's imperial jewel and distrust of future Confederate aims toward it prompted Spain to keep the breakaway republic at arm's length. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara's article also cites the Spanish reannexation of the Dominican territory as an opportunistic move. But, like France in Mexico, Spain miscalculated and fighting Dominican insurgents proved an expensive drain on the imperial treasury. According to Schmidt-Nowara, Union victory in the Civil War also ignited latent abolitionist elements in Spain, which, in combination with a decade-long civil war in Cuba beginning in 1868, caused Spain to reconsider its colonial priorities and shift to a more Pacific focus (i.e. the Philippines). Anne Eller's companion piece goes into much more depth on eighteenth century Dominican history under a series of foreign and domestic rulers, concentrating on the disastrous failure of Spain's 1861-65 experiment in recolonization. Compounding Spanish discomfiture, the successful popular insurgency on the island inspired similar uprisings in Puerto Rico and Cuba. As both essays convincingly demonstrate, nothing went the Spanish Empire's way in the Caribbean during the 1860s.

Ever since it achieved independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico sought in vain political stability and economic prosperity for its population, as well as a workable relationship between the state and the rich and powerful Catholic Church. Erika Pani's essay usefully summarizes the political history of Mexico during the 1850s and 1860s, as the nation experimented without any great success with republicanism, dictatorships, and monarchism.

American Civil Wars also shows that the 1860s period was a decade of crisis for the smaller independent countries of Latin America. Hilda Sabato's chapter interestingly examines the evolution of the political and military institutions of Spanish America during the first half of the nineteenth century. Findings include the early prevalence of decentralized republican forms of government there (following various models), with armed citizenries willing and capable of applying force to politics. Distrustful of peacetime militaries from their colonial experiences, these citizen militias were the primary defense force in Latin America during this time. Professional armies gradually developed, but their relationships with the militias were deeply troubled. These civic and military combinations tended toward instability, and revolutions were frequent events. According to Sabata's analysis, the 1860s were something of a watershed period before centralized governments with dominant standing armies for defense and internal coercion became the norm in Latin America later in the century.

It could be said that the existence of slavery in the United States (the world's foremost beacon of freedom) shielded the institution from international pressure in other places in the Americas like Cuba and Brazil, and Matt Childs argues that three great events in the 1860s placed Cuban slavery on the road to extinction (though it would persist until 1886). The enduring Caribbean slave trade did much to sustain the system, and several American Civil Wars authors mark the Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862 as a seminal moment in putting real teeth into choking off the illicit trade. Also, the end of the Civil War sparked the abolition movement in Spain itself, which ended the slave trade participation on their end only two years later in 1867. Finally, Childs makes the excellent point that wars involving slave societies very often led to emancipation (planned or not), and that also proved to be the case in Cuba, where large numbers of slaves joined the rebels during the long civil war that began in 1868. After this great decade of crisis and change was over, slavery in Cuba was in irrevocable decline.

As it did with Cuba, the American Civil War also heavily influenced the end of slavery in the system's last bastion in the Americas, the Empire of Brazil. World opinion mattered, and Brazil was understandably unwilling to shoulder the collective scorn attached to being the only remaining slave power in the Atlantic world. Aided by the fact that slavery was not a sectional or party issue like it was in the U.S., Brazil was able to implement gradual emancipation in the form of a free-womb law. As essay author Rafael Marquese shows, worries over the economic consequences of abolition in Brazil were greatly alleviated by the relatively rapid recovery of the U.S. cotton industry, as well as certain structural economic changes in the decades following the 1860s. Twentieth-century Brazilian slavery was a distinct possibility without the great events of the 1860s, and Marquese's chapter successfully argues that Brazilian slavery could not have ended when it did (1888) or how it did without the American Civil War.

The volume contributors do lightly engage with each other in direct form in their essays, mostly in the form of positive reinforcement, and, in terms of collective themes, a few points are worthy of note. There is much consensus among the contributors about the high degree of fear felt by all involved (Great Britain, France, Spain, and Mexico) when it came to the real and latent power of the United States. While supported by the evidence, it does also seem likely that this interpretation is to at least some degree tinged by backward argument from current reality. An interesting additional essay might have charted how much world power views of the U.S. were altered by the scale and rapidity of the North's industrial expansion and military mobilization. Along this line, Schmidt-Nowara relates an illustrative tale of how deeply impressed a high Spanish official was by the size, material resources, and outward appearances of military professionalism displayed by the Army of the Potomac in early 1862.

Another common thread is just how much Great Power distrust of Confederate motives outweighed the superficially more pragmatic move of supporting Confederate independence as a way of weakening and containing the United States. The most popular view at the time seems to have been that the southern section was the driving force for expansion in the antebellum United States, and there was more to fear from that than a reunited republic, but this seems to somewhat contradict Patrick Kelly's persuasive interpretation of secession as self-defeating when it came to Confederate empire building. Then again, with so many known and unknown variables involved, no foreign policy is ever truly consistent. Regardless, the Confederacy's death in 1865 rendered many of these questions moot.

This is an utterly fascinating set of essays, a fine collection of cutting edge international scholarship examining the political and societal reverberations of the American Civil War as its shockwaves spread both eastward across the Atlantic and southward into the Caribbean islands and Central and South America. In addition to being highly recommended reading for any student of the North-South conflict, the volume would make an excellent addition to any course curriculum addressing the geopolitical dimensions of the Civil War.


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Wednesday, March 22, 2017

Booknotes: The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 - Volume III

New Arrival:
The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 - Volume III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign by Ezra Carman, edited and annotated by Thomas G. Clemens (Savas Beatie, 2017).

This third volume of The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 marks the end of Tom Clemens's journey to bring a definitive edited version of the massive Carman manuscript to print. 

The book's introduction provides a good rundown of the content within. The first chapter covers the Battle of Shepherdstown, the campaign's final battle. A casualty and results analysis is next, followed by a discussion of high level strategy and political conflicts that occurred during the campaign's aftermath. The original intent of the final two chapters is speculative. The second to last chapter covers events preceding the Maryland Campaign (including the Second Bull Run command fiasco), and the last is a general summary of the campaign up until the Antietam battle.

The appendix section has three parts. The first two appendices are composed of errata for the preceding volumes, and the third is an extensive 'biographical dictionary' (138 pages in length) of individuals (civilian and military, both famous and obscure) "mentioned in Carman's manuscript or mentioned by [Clemens] as providing information to Carman." The book also has four original maps.

Monday, March 20, 2017

Author Q & A: Jeffrey Green on "McClellan and the Union High Command, 1861-1863"

Today, we are joined from Down Under by Jeffrey Green to discuss his recently released book McClellan and the Union High Command, 1861-1863: Leadership Gaps That Cost a Timely Victory (McFarland, 2017). Green is Conjoint Lecturer in History at the University of Newcastle in New South Wales, and he's been kind enough to answer a few questions about his new book.

DW: There is a small body of literature discussing Australian and New Zealand connections to the American Civil War. Terry Smyth’s Australian Confederates (2015) is the most recent book that comes to mind. Does the American Civil War excite much interest among fellow military and social historians in your country?

JWG: I don’t think a lot of people in the U.S.A. understand the high level of interest many Australians have in American history. Obviously it is popularized in American films which have a wide audience here. Gone with the Wind is an iconic film here as it is in America. Other films such as Cold Mountain and Glory were also popular. The novel The Red Badge of Courage has been read by a lot of Australian high school students and is still in the book rooms of many schools. Most Australians are aware of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour but many do not know about the Japanese air raids on Darwin and that more bombs were dropped on Darwin than Pearl Harbour. The interest in American history began well before this. In 1908 the U.S. Navy visited Sydney. About half a million people turned out to watch the ‘Great White Fleet’. The level of interest was amazing when you consider there were only 600,000 people in Sydney at the time. World War Two was a watershed moment in Australian history. The Pacific War was the beginning of the alliance between the U.S. and Australia which still exists today. In fact it is the corner stone of our foreign policy. All these factors and more make American history and the history of the American Civil War popular courses at Australian tertiary institutions.

DW: Your very brief author bio cites your prior work on WW2 and SE Asia military conflicts. What got you interested in the ACW as a topic and George McClellan in particular?

JWG: I have always been interested in American history and in particular the Civil War. The Pacific War and the conflict in Indochina were focused on the American involvement in these two conflicts. Regarding the Civil War, I had always been fascinated by a war that cost more American lives than all their other wars put together. I remember reading about the war when I was a teenager and was amazed that such a war occurred in the first place and only just over a hundred years ago. Recently my interest has been in the strategy deployed by both sides to try to win the war. McClellan became the lens to look at the workings of the Union high command in the first half of the war. I was not interested in McClellan as a battlefield commander, but his influence on Union war aims, strategy, and operations.

DW: Being Australian, did it feel like something of an advantage to you not being as relentlessly exposed to the negative baggage that has been attached to George McClellan in the U.S. among scholars and enthusiasts alike?

JWG: Not really, because I have read a lot of literature about McClellan, so I was aware of the often intense criticism of him at the operational and tactical level. What I was more interested in was how he intended to win the war. At this level I found he was also deficient. Basically, he believed he alone would win the war with his army. This was contrasted against his organizational brilliance that created a Union army that would help the North win the war.

DW: Debating the merits of McClellan is a popular pastime in the Civil War community. Can you briefly describe your purpose in writing this particular book and how it differs from those that came before it?

JWG: I did not want to do another McClellan book. I wanted to focus on his influence on the war aims, strategy and operations of the Union. Importantly, I looked at how his legacy of division within the Army of the Potomac’s officer corps destabilized this army for many months. I also did not want to do another “Lincoln’s war” book where the focus was on Lincoln’s contribution to Union victory. I was interested in why it took the Union so long to win the war. I could not accept the idea that the Civil War had to be a long war. So I took the view that there were reasons why the Union could not achieve a victory in a shorter time. This was what I examined in this book.

DW: Which authors and their works helped most in shaping your views on McClellan and the Union high command?

JWG: There is no direct line from what I have read to my book. My ideas were formed from a diverse range of studies; however, I was interested in Union strategy. Mark Grimsley’s The Hard Hand of War is a brilliant look at the evolution of Union war aims, strategy and its impact on southern civilians. Hattaway and Jones in How the North Won is one of the best books which explains Union and Confederate strategy and operations. It is very good at linking the pre-war training of the Civil War generals on both sides to how they directed campaigns and battles. More recently, Donald Stoker’s The Grand Design is a detailed examination of Union strategy and how it eventually won the war for the Union. Controversially, he argues that the Union could have won the war in 1862 if it had followed McClellan’s plan. I was also interested in “The Revolt of the Generals,” a chapter in Sears's Controversies and Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac. This chapter focused on the political intrigue in the Army of the Potomac after the sacking of McClellan.

DW: Your book’s subtitle “Leadership Gaps That Cost a Timely Victory” is an intriguing one. Without giving all of them away for free, can you briefly discuss one of the “gaps” from your list and its consequence(s)?

JWG: I have identified several leadership gaps in the book. One of these gaps is the Union war aims. Lincoln wanted to restore the Union. He wanted to do this with limited fighting, loss of life and destruction of property. This has been referred to as the “limited war” aims of the Union. This war aim was based on the assumption of strong Unionist sympathy in the south and the belief that the rebellious states would come back into the Union rather than fight a costly war. This was not a realistic war aim and it helped to lengthen the conflict. There was a contradiction in this “limited war” aim because to restore the Union the Confederacy would have to be defeated. This would involve the Union invading the South and the destruction of the Confederacy. This would mean the Union would be fighting to defeat the South and destroy the political structures of the Confederacy. The Union, therefore, could not fight a limited war to defeat the South.

DW: You are about as far away from U.S. archives as you can possibly get. How did you manage your research from afar?

JWG: Access to primary sources influenced the type of study I undertook. A lot of primary sources are available online, such as access the Official Records. Writing a military history where I looked only at the leaders meant there was a lot of letters, diaries and memoirs available. There were published collections of letters as well. I also have all volumes on the Report on The Conduct of the War. It would have been very hard to integrate any type of social history into the book because access to the letters and diaries of the rank and file of the Army of the Potomac would not have been accessible.

DW: Do you have more Civil War projects in mind?

JWG: I am interested at examining the Union strategy of raiding into the South with large infantry armies. Sherman’s change of base from Atlanta to the Savannah coast would obviously be a focal point. However, I am more interested in the development of the strategy as a result of the changes to the Union’s war aims rather than a detailed examination of the campaign themselves.

DW: Thank you.

By the way, readers, I couldn't pass up the opportunity to ask Prof. Green to recommend a favorite obscure Oxploitation movie, and he proved game with the as yet unseen by me choice of Inn of the Damned.