Review - "Decisions at Chancellorsville: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Battle" by Sarah Bierle

[Decisions at Chancellorsville: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Battle by Sarah Kay Bierle (Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series - University of Tennessee Press, 2025). Paperback, 17 maps, photographs, battlefield touring guide, orders of battle, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xx,142,277. ISBN:978-1-62190-956-9. $24.95]

Decisions at Chancellorsville is the latest installment of University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, which has published multiple titles each year since 2018. In addition to the prolific release schedule that the series continues to maintain, fresh blood is infused into its stable of authors on a fairly regular basis, too, and this is Sarah Kay Bierle's first contribution. And a fine one it is.

Now for the obligatory background summary for those unfamiliar with the series and its structure. First, it should be noted that these books do not examine Civil War campaigns and battles through the traditional narrative perspective and format. Instead, the main content is presented through a chronological sequence of "critical decision" analyses. In the hierarchy of decision-making, critical decisions are defined as being those command choices that produce profound consequences in their immediate aftermath and that meaningfully shape the course of ensuing events.

As outlined in previous reviews, analysis of each critical decision follows a standardized format to which every volume strictly adheres. Discussion progresses through five linked stages—Situation, Options, Decision, Result(s)/Impact, and Alternate Decision/Scenario. The first and typically lengthiest section, Situation describes the state of affairs at a crossroads moment in the campaign or battle. It provides readers with the background information necessary to recognize and evaluate the range of reasonable Options (most frequently two or three in number) available for addressing the situation. The historical Decision is then outlined before the Result(s)/Impact section recounts what happened and how those results shaped subsequent events. A degree of emphasis is placed on tracing lasting effects of critical decisions made earlier. Finally, an optional Alternate Decision/Scenario section delves into alternative history conjecture based on choices not made. In this case, Bierle elected not to engage with the optional alternate history component, which is perfectly fine.

In the series, critical decisions are categorized as being either strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, logistical, or personnel-related. Bierle organizes the sixteen decisions of her study into six groupings: the pre-battle January-April 1863 interval and the May 1, May 2, May 3 (in two parts), and May 4-6. Those six sub-sections contain three critical decisions each, the exception being the last, which includes a single one involving Army of the Potomac commander Joseph Hooker's retreat decision. There are a preponderance of tactical-level critical decisions. In the author's view, the total numbers disparity (nine for the Union side and six for the Confederates) represents Hooker's persistent struggle to reassert control of events after the strong start to his campaign quickly fizzled. Although he had many opportunities during those first days in May to impose (or reimpose) his will upon Robert E. Lee's vastly outnumbered army, Hooker's choices instead led him to "give up his military advantages and initiative, handing opportunity to Lee to react" (pg. xvi), with decisive reaction on the part of Lee forming several of the Confederate side's half-dozen critical decisions. Supporting the volume's decision analysis are 17 maps, a 12-stop driving tour, an appendix examining the campaign's historical memory (that is not a regular series feature), and orders of battle for both sides.

Beirle's selection of critical decisions and their available option formulations together exhibit a very strong grasp of both big picture and more nuanced elements of the military history literature associated with the Chancellorsville Campaign. Each option is effectively framed for the reader through thoughtful weighing of the benefits and risks attached to it (some of which have a fresh ring to them).

For the series as a whole, nearly all critical decisions are made by individuals, mostly high-ranking military officers and top government officials. Collective critical decisions are thus highly unusual, but Bierle has two of them. In her assessment, the final Union assault on Marye's Heights was a group decision among frontline small-unit commanders. Another decision involving multiple parties was the possibility of medical and military officers deciding as a group that Hooker was too incapacitated (presumably by concussion) to remain in command after the pillar he was leaning against was struck by cannon fire. Another interesting matter related to the Fredericksburg sector of the battlefield is Bierle's willingness to take up the truce flag controversy, a matter recently addressed at some length in Erik Nelson's 2024 study of the eastern half of the expansive Chancellorsville battlefield, as a critical decision impacting the final Fredericksburg assaults. Though not related to any particular critical decision (and thus not explored further), the author's criticism of Jeb Stuart's infantry tactics (characterizing them as overly wasteful frontal assaults) on May 3 after the cavalryman took over leadership of wounded Stonewall Jackson's Second Corps forms a dissenting opinion perhaps worthy of mention. Most modern writers, including the general's most recent biographer, have not adopted that same view, instead arguing that Stuart performed well after being abruptly thrust into infantry corps command in the middle of a major battle.

In terms of arguable 'misses,' Bierle's set lacks a standalone decision related to how George Stoneman's cavalry corps would be used during the campaign. Incorporating it into the discussion as just a part of Hooker's overall planning options lends an element of inevitability to how Stoneman's role in the campaign would unfold that is perhaps not warranted. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that Hooker, even if he had eschewed the deep raid option in favor of keeping his cavalry nearby, would have deployed his cavalry as close tactical support in ways that might have kept him better informed as to Lee's movements and protected the open right of his army from getting crushed by Jackson's massive flank attack.

As mentioned before, one of the conceptual qualities of the critical decision is that its impact extends beyond the immediate period in ways that meaningfully shape downstream campaign and battlefield events. Interestingly, Bierle goes beyond that, showing how critical decisions during the Chancellorsville Campaign affected the Gettysburg Campaign that followed it. For example, Bierle suggests that Third Corps commander Dan Sickles's dismay at Hooker's critical decision ordering him to abandon the Hazel Grove high ground (leaving it to the Confederates for use as a devastating artillery platform that transformed the fighting around the Chancellorsville crossroads) might very well have been a bitter learning experience that directly informed his determination, misguided or not, to press forward to occupy the higher ground fronting his assigned position as the left flank of the Union army at Gettysburg. As another example, contemporary observers and present day writers alike have praised Hooker's winter reforms that restored Army of the Potomac morale after Fredericksburg and placed it on a strong footing for the spring, but Chancellorsville exposed the flaws in Hooker's artillery arm reorganization. Hooker's belated, mid-battle decision cited by Bierle that restored Hunt's authority over the army's artillery had a positive short-term impact (albeit limited by circumstances), and it led to Hunt being given authority to reorganize the artillery after the battle in ways that improved its performance at Gettysburg. Bierle also suggests that Fifth Corps commander George Meade's experience with Hooker's mismanaged Chancellorsville council of war, which resulted in the commanding general going against majority opinion of his principal subordinates and ordering a retreat, shaped how Meade would conduct his own critical decision during a similarly key moment at Gettysburg on the night of July 2-3.

Consistency is a hallmark of the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, which is pretty remarkable given the hectic release schedule and multitude of contributors involved, and Sarah Bierle's Decisions at Chancellorsville strongly upholds that reputation while also adding some unique elements of its own. Hopefully, we'll see more of her quality input in the future.