Snapshots from the Collection: "The Siege of Suffolk: The Forgotten Campaign April 11-May 4, 1863"

Steven A. Cormier's The Siege of Suffolk: The Forgotten Campaign April 11-May 4, 1863 was first published in 1989 by H.E. Howard in a numbered edition that was part of The Virginia Civil War Battles and Leaders series. I missed the boat on that one, but I was able to secure a Second Edition some time ago. It sat on my bookshelf for many years, always passed over by new releases. However, during this most recent lull, I was determined to finally get around to reading it, and I'm very glad I did as it is one of the very best volumes in a series widely known for being uneven in depth and quality.

Though it had a major impact on the 1863 Chancellorsville Campaign, Lieutenant General James Longstreet's Southside Virginia operation directed toward Major General John Peck's substantial Union garrison of Suffolk has received no detailed treatment outside Cormier's decades-old study. That isn't terribly surprising, given that casualties were low on both sides and there was no culminating battle to spark wider interest in the campaign.

Cormier outlines the four "missions" behind sending Longstreet and a large detachment from his corps (two divisions) south of the James River and into the Union-occupied eastern counties. The protection of Richmond was easily enough secured by their mere presence in the area and seizing enemy garrisons in the region (including the one at Suffolk) was a non-essential, although hoped for, goal given the problems (and probable heavy losses) involved in attempting to storm heavily fortified positions backed by naval support. As the author astutely observes, the dilemma came when two of the missions were incompatible with each other. Longstreet was enjoined by his army commander, General Robert E. Lee, to keep his divisions close to the Richmond-Petersburg railheads in case Union general Joseph Hooker's massive Army of the Potomac unexpectedly stirred. At the same time, Confederate War Secretary James Seddon ordered Longstreet to press deep into the coastal counties to gather supplies and relieve the Army of Northern Virginia's subsistence concerns, which were pressing due to the previous year's poor harvest. Longstreet could not fulfill both missions at the same, and it nearly resulted in disaster as Hooker struck while Longstreet, still engaged in securing food and fodder in the eastern counties, could not reach Lee's army in time for Chancellorsville.

Backed by a diverse collection of source materials (including manuscript research), Cormier explores the campaign's strategic origins and meticulously traces its conduct at both operational and micro-tactical levels. Though, as mentioned above, no major battles occurred, there were regular artillery duels, sharp fighting along the skirmish line, and guerrilla warfare to contend with as the Confederates sought to bottle up the Union garrison, freeing the countryside for extensive food and fodder collection. Longstreet also explored opportunities to seize the town, all of which Peck and his naval support effectively thwarted. Incorporating extensive quotes from reports, letters, and diaries, the text also conveys a rich portrait of the personal experiences of rank and file soldiers and civilians alike in their own words.

Cormier praises Peck's successful efforts in fortifying and defending Suffolk, which were rewarded by consistent support from above (including heavy reinforcement). Higher level dysfunction in army-navy cooperation is duly criticized, but the officers closest to the scene were able to produce some notable achievements. The Union naval war on the Nansemond River during this period, which consisted of numerous ship versus shore engagements and amphibious landings, is explored at great depth and is one of the volume's most original and noteworthy aspects. The author seems of two minds when it comes to assessing Longstreet's aggressiveness, on the one hand being critical of his failure to force a crossing of the upper Nansemond and on the other clearly recognizing the risks involved in forcing the issue by leaping into the Union rear. It is clear that Longstreet, closely engaged as he was before Suffolk, could never have reached Lee's army in time for the Chancellorsville battle without much more prior notice than was given. Accusations of tardiness during the withdrawal are effectively refuted by noting the necessity of covering the command's heavily laden subsistence trains. In attempting to gauge just how much food and fodder the Confederates were able to extract from the region during the operation, the late-war destruction of Subsistence Department records is lamented. However, estimates from other sources reveal a haul that did much to meet the needs of Lee's army as it prepared for its next campaign.

The only large complaint I have with the book is the state of its cartography, which is frankly dreadful. There are just a few bare-bones, hand-drawn area maps included, none of which show the movements and positions of either side, the Suffolk defenses, or the upper Nansemond front that yielded so much action. It is a testament to Cormier's organization and writing that the narrative is still comprehensible and highly readable. This map deficiency, which definitely holds the book back from greatness, makes the volume a strong candidate for a fresh update from Savas Beatie, who has published a number of revised and expanded editions of H.E. Howard series titles with new and improved maps. I have my doubts that they would be interested, given the aforementioned issues that make the operation so obscure to begin with, but we can still hope!