Review - " Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31 - June 1, 1862 " by Victor Vignola

[Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31 - June 1, 1862 by Victor Vignola (Savas Beatie, 2023). Hardcover, 13 maps, photos, illustrations, footnotes, appendix section, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xvii,227/286. ISBN:978-1-61121-682-0. $34.95]

With nearly 12,000 casualties stemming from fighting that raged at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines from roughly 1pm on May 31, 1862 to around 11am on the following day, the sharp clash just east of Richmond between elements of three Union corps and the Confederate army led by General Joseph E. Johnston was by any measure (and especially by early-war standards) a major battle. Even so, its comparatively meager coverage in the military history literature remains a baffling state of affairs to most students of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign. Mostly consigned to chapters inside wider campaign-scale works such as Stephen Sears's To the Gates of Richmond, the only modern standalone study is Steven Newton's slender H.E. Howard series volume, The Battle of Seven Pines, May 31-June 1, 1862. While Newton's more than three decades old book is still regarded as a capable overview, it was only able to devote one very brief chapter to the heavy May 31 fighting that occurred north of the Richmond & York River Railroad and between Fair Oaks Station and the Adams House. Moving far beyond that spare chronicling of those events is Victor Vignola's groundbreaking new study Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31 - June 1, 1862, which devotes its primary attention to that far less understood and appreciated part of the May 31-June 1 battlefield.

Vignola's book cites a number of strong reasons behind limited coverage of the battle in both scholarly and popular publishing. Walking the ground is rightly considered an important part of gaining a deeper understanding of any battlefield, but Richmond's modern development of Seven Pines-Fair Oaks precludes that possibility. Additionally, precious few Confederate official reports were submitted, some of that a function of many key leaders becoming casualties. In addition to being almost immediately overshadowed by the events of the Seven Days and the rise to prominence of Robert E. Lee, the battle also lacks a cohesive historical memory. With Confederate partisans understandably focusing on the Seven Pines part of the battlefield, where the southern forces had their only successes (albeit at very high cost), and Union sources trumpeting their unwavering defensive stands at the Adams House on May 31 and around Fair Oaks Station on June 1, the naming of the battle flips back and forth depending upon who is asked. In his February 1863 testimony to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Union Second Corps commander Edwin V. Sumner, the highest-ranking hero of the Fair Oaks fighting front, even tried to claim that "Seven Pines was a separate battle" from his own.

Though, for the pivotal events of May 31, the main focus of Vignola's study is on the fighting north of the railroad, combat in the Seven Pines sector of the battlefield is strongly summarized. Supported by maps, all of the context necessary to understand the full breadth and scale of the day's fighting is well provided. In discussing what happened in the Fair Oaks/Adams House sector at the micro-tactical level, the book offers readers for the first time ever a thorough picture of the ground upon which the battle was fought, a highly detailed account of the fighting at regimental scale, and deep analysis of the decision-making involved at multiple command levels. Confederate colonel Micah Jenkins's impressive assault down the railroad toward Fair Oaks Station, well recognized by historians of the battle, is described at length, its consequences being an exploitable breach in the Union defense and isolation of a demi-brigade sized contingent of Union brigadier general John Abercrombie's command around the Adams House.

What the Confederates did not realize at the time of Jenkins's success was that major reinforcements, two divisions of General Sumner's Second Corps, were already on the way. With a strong assist from rising waters that greatly narrowed the fighting front by effectively shielding from attack most of the western approaches to the battlefield, these fresh troops and artillery support joined with Abercrombie (and division commander Darius Couch) in transforming the Adams house rise into an unflankable position and raised artillery platform that together strongly resisted a series of ferocious, if disjointed, Confederate assaults. The resumption of battle planned by the Confederates (now under Major General Gustavus W. Smith after Johnston's wounding in action) for June 1, which did not unfold as planned and sputtered out by approximately 11am, is meticulously recounted in the text as are the extensive rearrangements of the Union defenses designed to finally achieve a continuous front. The top-notch maps in Vignola's book, a massive upgrade over the simple computer-aided drawings found in Newton's much older study, display all the unit and terrain information that modern readers demand.

In setting the scene, Vignola does a remarkably thorough job of explaining the weather challenges that affected both sides. His text paints a vivid picture of herculean Union efforts required in order to successfully pass infantry and artillery through the flood-widened Chickahominy bottomlands. The heavy rains that produced the high water and deep mud that hindered Sumner's reinforcements also affected Confederate movements and tactics. They were unable to bring forward artillery support and, as mentioned earlier, the flooded stream on their left funneled their infantry attacks against the well-defended Adams House position onto a very narrow front. The author seems very confident that had Johnston's battle plan been properly executed catastrophic damage would have been inflicted upon the Union corps positioned south of the river. That's debatable. Given the degree to which ground conditions were so non-conducive to offensive operations and the depth of the Union defenses behind General Casey's Division, one might still be reasonably skeptical of results grand enough to relieve the capital.

The "contrasts in command" of the book's title refers to the stark differences in leadership, initiative, and coordination displayed by the opposing sides. Of the Confederate high command, only D.H Hill, who led the Seven Pines assault, receives praise for his performance. Johnston is credited for a sound battle plan that should have worked but is at the same time appropriately criticized for utterly failing to properly oversee its execution. Most strident criticism is reserved for the abysmal performance of Major General James Longstreet. Essentially tasked by Johnston with tactical direction of the battle (but without written orders!), Longstreet immediately and drastically altered the overall plan without consulting his superior, was a prime instigator of the horrific traffic jam that delayed the battle's onset for many hours, and got only a fraction of the army's available brigades into action on the 31st. He then exaggerated his role in the May 31 fighting, sending a profoundly misleading message to Johnston at 4pm that only furthered confusion. As was the case on this and so many other Civil War battlefields, the competence and hard-hitting heroics of Confederate leadership at the brigade and regimental levels could not overcome misdirection from above. Vignola's narrative demonstrates that common truth in spades.

By contrast, Union initiative and leadership at Fair Oaks, from top to bottom, was superb, and it came from generals not considered among the army's best. Without any prodding from McClellan, Sumner had his command ready to cross the river at a moment's notice and, in getting to the battlefield, did everything humanly possible to overcome the aforementioned obstacles nature placed in his way. Vignola argues persuasively that Fair Oaks was Sumner's best day of the Civil War (and one might say the same for the generally luster-free careers of Couch and Abercrombie). Though assisted by both nature and being the defensive side, overall tactical direction from Union commanders was arguably flawless, shrinking the battlefield into a manageable box swept by brutal infantry and artillery cross-fire action. Union dispositions channeled all of the Confederate attackers into a veritable killing ground.

The most interesting part of the appendix section is Vignola's fleshing out of his already profoundly negative assessment of General Longstreet's performance during the battle. Unmoved by any of the latter-day accolades and defenses directed toward Longstreet's long Civil War career, the author is clearly brothers in arms with the elder Krick when it comes to not being a fan of the general. Throughout the book, Vignola repeatedly utilizes strongly censorious adjectives to describe Longstreet's character and conduct during this battle and beyond. Whether or not one agrees with the author's generalized commentary on Longstreet's Civil War career, the appendix leaves the open-minded reader with a powerful, point by point analysis of Longstreet's deceptions and misconduct during and after the Fair Oaks-Seven Pines battle. Even at this early stage of the war, Longstreet was already, in the author's viewpoint, routinely "insolent," "insubordinate," and angling for independent command. To facilitate the last, the general was more than willing to disregard orders. The appendix convincingly argues that what transpired at Fair Oaks-Seven Pines was clearly not a "misunderstanding" between Longstreet and Johnston but rather willful action on the part of Longstreet to alter a battle plan with which he did not agree. The author also clearly determines that Major General Benjamin Huger, an easy target already under a cloud after evacuating Norfolk earlier under orders, was unjustly scapegoated by both Johnston and Longstreet for the miscarried battle. One enduring question is why the reputation-obsessed Johnston, in asking General Smith to omit the pages most damning of Longstreet from his official report and colluding in the victimization of Huger, directly shielded from criticism the very man most responsible for mucking up his own battle plan. There are a number of possibilities to explore, but a definitive answer escapes us.

There are still a number of yawning gaps remaining in standalone study of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign's stock of battles, Glendale/White Oak Swamp, Gaines' Mill, and Malvern Hill among them, but one of the largest and most significant voids in our pre-Seven Days understanding of the campaign has now been finally addressed in strongly satisfactory fashion by Victor Vignola in his impressive debut Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31 - June 1, 1862. It is highly recommended.