Review - "Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation" by Robert Tanner

[Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Robert G. Tanner (University of Tennessee Press, 2023). Softcover, 17 maps, photos, illustrations, appendix section, notes, bibliography, index. Pages:xviii,200. ISBN:978-1-62190-769-5. $29.95]

University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America's Civil War continues to provide a fresh and unique methodology through which to rethink Civil War campaigns and battles that already have extensive narrative history coverage. Published last year, Robert Tanner's Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation tackles one of the war's most dynamic military operations.

For those new to the series, a critical decision is defined as "a choice of such magnitude that it shaped not only the events immediately following it, but also the campaign from that point forward" (xiii). Analytical discussion proceeds through five stages—"Situation," "Options," "Decision," "Result(s)/Impact," and "Alternate Decision/Scenario." "Situation" describes the state of affairs at a crossroads moment in the course of the campaign or battle. It provides readers with the background information necessary to recognize and evaluate the decision "Options" (most frequently two or three in number) that immediately follow. The historical "Decision" is then outlined, usually very briefly, before the "Result(s)/Impact" section recounts what happened historically and how those events shaped the rest of the battle/campaign and beyond. The best "Situation" and "Result(s)/Impact" sections reference earlier decisions in meaningful ways, making clear the cascading consequences of critical decisions made earlier. Not present for every decision, the optional "Alternate Decision/Scenario" section delves into alternative history conjecture based on choices not made.

An active campaign that involved a great many troops in aggregate (especially on the Union side) but only resulted in relatively small battles at any given moment, the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign was rife with drastic order of battle changes (as major formations on either side regularly entered and exited the Shenandoah) and momentous strategic and operational pauses and resets of both geographical positioning and initiative. All of that is well represented in Tanner's critical decision selection and characterization, which has very few (two) tactical-level decisions and a great many others involving strategy, operations, and (re)organization.

The sixteen decisions compiled in the book are organized into six chapters with a time scale stretching from February 1862 to mid-June of that year. Together, they "examine decisions made at the campaign's outset, the Battle of Kernstown and a subsequent major reorganization of Union forces, Confederate plans and marches during April and early May 1862, Federal concentration outside the valley while Confederates concentrated and attacked in the Shenandoah during the pivotal second half of May, the Union's counterstrike against the Confederate offensive, and decisions to end the campaign" (xiv). Option numbers are typically in the two or three range (mostly the former), consistent with the rest of the series. There is a five-option decision, perhaps unprecedented in the series, that really illustrates well the sheer number of critical concerns, of both dangerous and opportunistic varieties, that confronted Jackson at a key moment. Modern armchair observers frequently dispute the brilliance of the Valley Campaign's result as being a function of B and C-team leadership opposition, but the author's critical decision analysis staunchly reinforces the book's argument that deliberative Confederate agency at numerous watershed moments was just as significant as Union bungling when it came to determining victory or defeat in the valley.

That there are eight critical decisions for each side supports the notion that both opposing leaderships possessed ample opportunities for seizing overall initiative. That a great many of the decisions were made by Abraham Lincoln also clearly demonstrates the degree to which the frustrated U.S. president personally seized the directing reins of the Union war effort in Virginia during the time of this campaign, to frequently poor result. Excepting Chapter Three, in which all three critical decisions are Confederate-sourced, Lincoln figures in all the remaining five chapters (by direct decision-making in four of those and in heavily shaping the George McClellan decision made in the remaining one). Throughout all six chapters, Tanner appropriately stresses interconnectivity when it comes to assessing decisions and events in the Shenandoah, Allegheny mountains, north and central Virginia, and Virginia Peninsula fronts. Showing how and why what happened in the Shenandoah Valley during the spring months of 1862 had a tremendous impact on military fortunes across Virginia is a strong element of Tanner's campaign analysis.

The series has always stressed to its readers that decision options are selected for their capacity to set or change the course of a campaign, and thus should not be seen as necessarily good or bad (or right or wrong). Indeed, in order for a choice to represent a real option it must have some strong basis for consideration, and Tanner does an exceptionally fine job of articulating the opportunities, feasibility, risk-levels, and potential pitfalls involved with each decision-making process. Properly eschewing the no-brainer approach, every option is assigned one or more supportable reasons for it to exist in the mind of the decision maker. Not all of the books in the series achieve this process as strongly as Tanner's does here. One of the best examples of that quality can be found in Tanner's dispassionate and keenly analyzed assessment of John C. Fremont's much-pilloried decision not to move on Harrisonburg during the late May-early June Union offensive aimed at trapping and destroying Jackson's army in the valley. In addition to the president himself, subsequent writers and historians have often been dismayed by Fremont's failure to fulfill Lincoln's directive, but Tanner pretty convincingly shows that the wording of the order was more ambiguous than Lincoln apparently intended. That factor, combined with pressing issues of time, distance, supply and logistical constraints, lack of information regarding an overall plan (including the positions of other friendly columns), and other considerations, rendered Fremont's ultimate decision far from being a cut and dried example of egregious blunder or a direct disobeying of orders (though Tanner justly condemns Fremont for not seeking clarification).

The series defines critical decisions very narrowly, but the reality is that no two individuals, no matter how well informed in regard to the topic at hand, would come up with the exact same list of options and scenarios. As one example here, in Chapter Two, one might be justified in deeming the higher-level operational decision to regain lost contact with federal forces in the Lower Shenandoah, the bulk of which were understood to be leaving, to be a more 'critical' decision than the tactical-level one presented in the book in which Jackson must decide to either attack immediately or on the following day.

Some analyses offer tidbits not often appreciated in the literature's extensive discussions of those events. A good example is Tanner's coverage of Edwin Stanton's assignment of General William S. Rosecrans to find Louis Blenker's "lost" division and expedite the effort in getting the recently formed Mountain Department shipshape. Also mentioned is the Secretary of War's brusque rejection of Rosecrans's unsolicited suggestions regarding coordinated operations in the East and the absence of a single guiding force with a military background. It's a small part in the play to be sure, but something worthy of consideration in assessing the larger matter of Lincoln declining to assign another general to oversee affairs in the theater, instead taking on that momentous responsibility himself.

With their ample illustration of city and town locations, rail and road networks, rivers, and other key terrain features, ten maps assist the reader in visualizing the situations at hand and the options available. Seven additional maps are attached to the extensive driving tour. The tour, which is focused upon visiting sites directly related to the critical decisions explored earlier, is an important facet of all series volumes.

Seeing this series installment come from Robert Tanner was a pleasant surprise given the amount of time that has elapsed since his last book-length publication. His Stonewall in the Valley, a major work mostly examining the campaign from the Confederate perspective, was first published way back in 1976 and was re-released in a revised edition in 1996. That was followed in 2001 by the conversation-inspiring analytical study Retreat to Victory?: Confederate Strategy Reconsidered. In the Acknowledgments section of this book, Tanner notes that he cold-called Command Decisions in America's Civil War series creator Matt Spruill with a proposal for a 1862 Valley Campaign volume, so it's nice to see the series having the prestige and capability of getting a subject matter expert who had been away from publishing for quite some time to 'get back in the game' (so to speak). The result of that is one of the very best volumes the series has to offer.