Review - "Grant & Meade: An Uneasy Alliance" by Bradley & Linda Gottfried

[Grant & Meade: An Uneasy Alliance by Bradley M. Gottfried and Linda I. Gottfried (Seminole Press, 2026). Softcover, maps, photos, illustrations, appendix, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:170/203. ISBN:979-8-234-03694-0. $19.95]

When Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed U.S. Army general-in-chief, George Gordon Meade's position as Army of the Potomac commander faced renewed uncertainty. In March of 1864, Meade was still the hero of Gettysburg, but the escape of Robert E. Lee's defeated Army of Northern Virginia across the swollen Potomac River and the indecisive results of the autumn campaigning in Virginia that year combined to tarnish Meade's image in the minds of many. One doubts that the administration or public at large would have put up much of an objection had Grant been determined to replace Meade with a western theater favorite. To Meade's delight, Grant sustained him.

Grant's decision to locate his headquarters in the field with the Army of the Potomac, where he would be figuratively looking over Meade's shoulder the entire time, was a unique command arrangement that carried both risks and rewards. As before, Meade would handle the myriad of administrative duties and tactical direction that army command required, but Grant would handle the big decisions of campaign operations and strategy. To maintain proper chain of command, Grant's orders would flow through Meade's headquarters. That command structure has been justly criticized by many historians. Though it freed Grant from having to carry out the time and energy consuming day to day duties of army administration and afforded him more freedom to manage the rest of the Union war effort and mull strategic options, the extra bureaucratic layer that was added to the theater's command structure slowed order transmission and army-wide reaction time (important factors to consider when it came to countering enemy moves and seizing opportunities as they arose). It was also true that there were more chances for orders to be garbled in the process, but Grant's trademark clarity in order writing helped ameliorate those possibilities. The personal and professional relationship between the two generals was solid from the beginning, but how well would it hold up under the pressures of the upcoming campaign season? That question and more are examined in Brad and Linda Gottfried's Grant & Meade: An Uneasy Alliance.

The authors acknowledge the unique and challenging nature of the late-war Army of the Potomac command structure as outlined above. Various aspects of the Grant-Meade relationship have been scrutinized at some length by other modern contributors to the now quite extensive secondary literature of the Overland and Richmond/Petersburg campaigns of 1864-65; however, devoting a volume solely to the topic, like this one does, allows for a clearer picture and understanding of the timeline and evolution of the command partnership. At points along the way, it can difficult to know for certain whether a particular tactical plan or movement originated in the mind of Grant or Meade, and this book also addresses those ongoing questions with informed insights.

Grant began the 1864 campaign in Virginia issuing broad "suggestions" to Meade, leaving the operational details and tactical conduct almost entirely to the army commander's discretion. However, as one might have expected from a highly confident and headstrong general-in-chief, Grant gradually asserted more direct control as the campaign dragged on, casualties mounted, and expectations often went unmet. To his credit, though, Grant still took great pains to transmit his increasingly detailed directions through Meade's headquarters (the authors only note one moment when time was of the essence and Grant issued orders directly to units subordinated to Meade). In marking that turning point, historians cite different dates (and these are reviewed in the book), but Gottfried argues that the May 12 fighting at Spotsylvania should be regarded as the true watershed moment.

In terms of documenting what Grant and Meade thought of each other in their own words, the overall picture is a bit one-sided. Meade wrote extensively about Grant in his wartime letters to his wife, but Grant wrote comparatively little about Meade in his celebrated memoirs. The Meade letters are an invaluable source for tracing the evolution of the relationship through all its ups and downs, at least from Meade's perspective, and the book uses them to good effect in documenting Meade's mounting frustration on a number of scores. Staff recollections are also effectively utilized to shine light on Meade's legendary temper and thin-skinned nature.

Throughout most the period examined in the book, Meade was appreciative of Grant's unwavering support and professed confidence in the prickly Pennsylvanian. When Grant failed to give Meade his just due as the latter saw it, Meade afforded Grant the benefit of the doubt and mostly attributed alleged slights to Grant being influenced by designing men. As casualties exploded during the Overland Campaign and the army continually failed, often with heavy losses, to decisively lever Lee's army out of its fortified defenses around Petersburg, Meade, while still admiring Grant's dogged vision, gradually became disillusioned with his chief's strategic oversight. As the authors explain, Meade also eventually gave up on his belief in Grant's professional friendship. That point arrived after Meade concluded that Grant was disingenuous in his involvement with both Meade's promotion to major general in the Regular Army and the process of appointing the head of the new Middle Military Division (a prestige post which Meade expected to gain but instead went to Sheridan). Meade could overlook not receiving rewards he thought he deserved, but he couldn't stand disrespect. That hypersensitivity to slights large and small, contrasted with Grant's relative insensitivity to press and public criticism, is a major theme of the book. For much of the war, Meade recognized and to a degree respected those differences in their personalities and outlook, but that tolerance eventually eroded completely in the face of Grant not giving Meade the unqualified public vote of confidence that Grant assumed unnecessary but Meade wanted desperately.

No one will argue that the command arrangement between Grant and Meade in the eastern theater over the course of the 1864-65 campaigns was ideal in nature and practicality, but it is also the case that the pairing achieved total victory over a strong, well-led, and determined foe. Grant brought to the East a well-earned record for issuing unambiguous orders while Meade faithfully carried them out thoroughly and without resistance. Both generals deserve credit for succeeding when others might have failed. A great many factors can be cited when attempting to explain why wars are won and lost, and this volume serves as a shining example of why personality matters a great deal. On can readily imagine another command relationship between officers possessing personal natures and temperaments as divergent as Grant's and Meade's were breaking down completely under the incredible stresses imposed by these brutal campaigns. As Brad and Linda Gottfried argue, the working relationship between Grant and Meade was indeed an "uneasy alliance," but one that proved effective in the end.