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Showing posts sorted by date for query Command Decisions in America’s Civil War. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Thursday, August 27, 2026
Review - "Forward to Richmond: The Virginia Campaign of 1862" by Brian Burton
[Forward to Richmond: The Virginia Campaign of 1862 by Brian K. Burton (University of Nebraska Press, 2026). Hardcover, 17 maps, illustrations, endnotes, bibliographic essay, index. Pages main/total:xiv,259/335. ISBN:978-1-4962-2971-7. $39.95]
Brian Burton's Forward to Richmond: The Virginia Campaign of 1862 is the twelfth installment in University of Nebraska Press's Great Campaigns of the Civil War series, which is now just over a quarter-century old. The purpose of each volume is not to revisit a major Civil War campaign in exhaustive operational and tactical detail but rather to offer new and experienced readers alike a relatively concise synthesis of the modern scholarly treatment of the campaign in its military, political, social, and international contexts. Burton's contribution to the series fulfills all those requirements in robust fashion.
Existing single-volume histories of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, of which Stephen Sears's To the Gates of Richmond (1992) remains the standard, typically treat decisions and events outside the coastal plain as ancillary. That rather insular perspective of the campaign has been considerably altered (for the better) of late. To be fair, every good examination of the campaign has acknowledged important ties with concurrent operations in the Shenandoah Valley, but it is only recently that historians have stressed to this degree a portrait of the fighting in Virginia during that time as a single integrated, theater-wide campaign. This broader understanding is exemplified in Ethan Rafuse's excellent recent book From the Mountains to the Bay: The War in Virginia, January-May 1862 (2023), the follow-up volume of which is currently scheduled for release later this year. Strongly influenced by that earlier work, Burton's interpretation of the Virginia campaign for this series is very much in that vein. His narrative discusses relevant military operations across the breadth of the state: from the Shenandoah Valley (bordered by the Alleghenies to the west and the Blue Ridge mountains to the east) to the central corridor between Washington and Richmond (the Piedmont) to the fingers of coastal plain flanked by navigable rivers and jutting into Chesapeake Bay (the Tidewater). These geographically separated operations are presented as linked events with intertwining military and political impacts that the author lucidly explains.
After President Abraham Lincoln stripped George B. McClellan of his general-in-chief duties in March 1862, assuming them himself with the assistance of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, management of the Union war effort in Virginia was left entirely in the hands of civilian novices. Burton joins many other writers and historians in judging the level of micromanagement that came out of the White House and War Department during this time as often inefficient and frequently detrimental. Burton would probably agree with Donald Stoker, who greatly admires Lincoln's strategic vision in the broadest sense but sees Lincoln's hands-on management of the events covered in this book (situated between McClellan's demotion and the appointment of Henry Halleck as general-in-chief) as a low point. Confronted with a steep learning curve, the president also failed to appreciate how much conditions and logistical constraints limited the speed and range of operations. On the other side, the Confederates had the opportunity for creating unity of command under a military man after President Jefferson Davis brought in Robert E. Lee as his chief military advisor, but the top-level advisory position was not seamlessly integrated into the formal chain of command. This led to avoidable situations such as when a bewildered Richard Ewell and his wandering division received directions from three different superior officers (Joe Johnston, Stonewall Jackson, and Lee).
Most historians deem Lincoln's decision in May 1862 to launch a large-scale Valley offensive aimed at trapping Jackson's seemingly exposed command as a serious mistake that diverted forces poised to tip the balance in the fight over Richmond, the theater's primary strategic point. Burton acknowledges the strengths behind that argument, but he also is highly sympathetic toward the wisdom of a Valley offensive. As that argument goes, a reasonable opportunity to trap and destroy an enemy force of 17,000, which would have been a major event at any point in the war, was hard to pass up, and, if successful, would have only cost the Union forces time that they could have afforded. In the end, the degree to which one might be persuaded depends on how much one believes a Valley offensive capable of strategic results against Jackson and to what degree its timing was critical in denying reinforcements to McClellan's forces on the Peninsula.
Burton's examination of the modern literature's current understanding of the campaign includes critical engagement with its analyses and conclusions. Upon his narrative's arrival at key moments of contingency, Burton does a fine job of identifying and exploring the options available to each side along with the advantages and challenges that factored into each (inserting his own informed commentary in a non-heavy handed manner). Much like the process central to University of Tennessee Press's Campaign Decisions in America's Civil War series, Burton's emphasis is primarily placed on understanding why particular decisions were made instead of judging them in the end as wholly good or bad.
Generally speaking, Burton sees the Confederate forces as developing two main advantages over their Union foes during this time: operational speed and secrecy. Most recent scholarship has treated Stonewall Jackson's legendary command secrecy even more harshly than before. Burton acknowledges the faults inherent in that command trait, but he also sees a not inconsiderable associated benefit to Jackson keeping even his own principal subordinates in the dark and Johnston keeping his army strategy close to the vest. In going to those extremes, it significantly lessened the chance that Confederate plans and movements could be leaked to the enemy either intentionally or unintentionally. In terms of speed, everyone is aware of Jackson's effective exploitation of unencumbered mobility in the Valley, and Lee achieved two great moments of potentially decisive concentration (first at Gaines's Mill and second at Glendale) during the Seven Days. Burton ranks among those who believe Glendale to have been a great missed opportunity to significantly cripple, if not destroy, McClellan's retreating army. In the author's view, the failure to achieve greater results from Lee's massing of forces against vulnerable parts of McClellan's army was less about employing overly complicated plans and more about astoundingly poor staff work (for which Lee bears much responsibility) and bad performances from inexperienced and/or incompetent subordinate commanders.
What the Confederates couldn't match, in the opinion of many (including Burton), were clear Union superiorities in artillery firepower and military engineering. Most sources praise Union logistical capabilities during the campaign, but the author finds room for criticism in how both sides handled logistics during this still learning stage of the war. Burton is largely impressed with how most Union corps and division leaders performed during their first big tests in a major campaign. The defects he sees in McClellan's conduct are of the traditionally cited sort, among them major flaws in the gathering and interpretation of military intelligence (especially when it came to enemy numbers), general underappreciation of the political impact of military decisions, and absenting himself from the fighting front during key battles.
While the primary focus of the study is on the campaign's military aspects, considerable attention is paid to social, political, and diplomatic consequences. Widespread and sustained soldier-civilian interactions across the theater during the period examined in the text hastened hardening attitudes all around, and there was mutual recognition that both sides were in clear earnest. Unlike some observers, Burton does not see Union military failure across the board as necessarily signaling the failure of conciliation policy, but radical factions were nevertheless able to win a war of perception, successfully linking personal military failure (McClellan was the army's chief proponent of conciliation) with policy failure in ways that paved the way for hard war and emancipation. More briefly explored are the ways in which the campaign shaped foreign relations between the North American combatants and the forces of public opinion and political leaders in Britain and France. Burton also makes it a point to discuss the impact of environmental conditions on both the health of the combatants and on operations. Of course, bad weather affects both sides, but, given that timing is everything when it comes to their effects, the author argues that, on balance, weather events tended to favor the Confederates most often during this period.
In a comprehensive narrative synthesis that begins with initial campaign planning debates and ends with Confederate victory in the Seven Days offensive, Brian Burton's Forward to Richmond: The Virginia Campaign of 1862 deserves to be regarded as a strong candidate for consideration as the best single-volume treatment of the expansive military contest in the eastern theater over the first half of that year, one that further recognizes the campaign's status as one of the war's most significant social and political inflection points.
Wednesday, July 15, 2026
Booknotes: The Federal Signal Service at Antietam
New Arrival:
• The Federal Signal Service at Antietam: Stations, Officers and Battlefield Intelligence on America's Bloodiest Day by Cory M. Pfarr (McFarland, 2026). If you are a dedicated reader of Civil War military history you pick up bits and pieces of information about the U.S. Army Signal Corps service on a fairly regular basis, but if I had to pick a single publication that impressed me most it would be Service with the Signal Corps: The Civil War Memoir of Captain Louis R. Fortescue, edited by Greg Acken for University of Tennessee Press's Voices of the Civil War series. Focusing on the men and activities of the Signal Corps throughout the 1862 Maryland Campaign, during which Fortescue served, is Cory Pfarr's new book The Federal Signal Service at Antietam: Stations, Officers and Battlefield Intelligence on America's Bloodiest Day. From the description: "This book restores to view a forgotten but essential arm of the Union war effort. On September 17, 1862, while the bloodiest single day in American history raged at Antietam, a network of young officers with flags and telescopes linked staff headquarters, high-ground observation posts, and forward stations close to the fighting, furnishing Major General George B. McClellan with near real-time intelligence on Confederate movements." Pfarr's study unfolds in two parts. Part I addresses the origins of the Signal Corps and its service during the opening phases of the Maryland Campaign. Part II, which examines the role and services of specific Signal Corps stations during the battle itself, forms the bulk of the book. In it, eight chapters follow at length the activities of eight signal stations and feature the officers that manned them. "Drawing on a wealth of primary sources," each chapter "combines operational analysis with vivid biographical portraits of the men who carried out this overlooked but crucial work." While the aforementioned Fortescue is not given his own section of the book, the index does indicate frequent mention of him in the text. The volume also contains numerous helpful photographs (including modern views from station locations) and maps. In reexamining the Signal Corps service at Antietam and the part its stations played in providing McClellan with timely battlefield intelligence, Pfarr finds that "their constant signaling disproves the enduring "spectator general" myth and reveals how signal communications informed command decisions." In the end, the book "shows that the Federal Signal Service's role was far from that of an anonymous adjunct but rather was vital to command and control in the Maryland Campaign."
• The Federal Signal Service at Antietam: Stations, Officers and Battlefield Intelligence on America's Bloodiest Day by Cory M. Pfarr (McFarland, 2026). If you are a dedicated reader of Civil War military history you pick up bits and pieces of information about the U.S. Army Signal Corps service on a fairly regular basis, but if I had to pick a single publication that impressed me most it would be Service with the Signal Corps: The Civil War Memoir of Captain Louis R. Fortescue, edited by Greg Acken for University of Tennessee Press's Voices of the Civil War series. Focusing on the men and activities of the Signal Corps throughout the 1862 Maryland Campaign, during which Fortescue served, is Cory Pfarr's new book The Federal Signal Service at Antietam: Stations, Officers and Battlefield Intelligence on America's Bloodiest Day. From the description: "This book restores to view a forgotten but essential arm of the Union war effort. On September 17, 1862, while the bloodiest single day in American history raged at Antietam, a network of young officers with flags and telescopes linked staff headquarters, high-ground observation posts, and forward stations close to the fighting, furnishing Major General George B. McClellan with near real-time intelligence on Confederate movements." Pfarr's study unfolds in two parts. Part I addresses the origins of the Signal Corps and its service during the opening phases of the Maryland Campaign. Part II, which examines the role and services of specific Signal Corps stations during the battle itself, forms the bulk of the book. In it, eight chapters follow at length the activities of eight signal stations and feature the officers that manned them. "Drawing on a wealth of primary sources," each chapter "combines operational analysis with vivid biographical portraits of the men who carried out this overlooked but crucial work." While the aforementioned Fortescue is not given his own section of the book, the index does indicate frequent mention of him in the text. The volume also contains numerous helpful photographs (including modern views from station locations) and maps. In reexamining the Signal Corps service at Antietam and the part its stations played in providing McClellan with timely battlefield intelligence, Pfarr finds that "their constant signaling disproves the enduring "spectator general" myth and reveals how signal communications informed command decisions." In the end, the book "shows that the Federal Signal Service's role was far from that of an anonymous adjunct but rather was vital to command and control in the Maryland Campaign."
Friday, June 5, 2026
Review - "Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles" by Michael Becker
[Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles by Michael D. Becker (University of Tennessee Press, 2026). Softcover, 10 maps, photos, illustrations, driving tour, orders of battle, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xv,142/290. ISBN:979-8-89527-045-5. $24.95]
Naturally enough, the major land campaigns and battles fought in the eastern and western theaters have been the primary focus of University of Tennessee Press's prolific Campaign Decisions in America's Civil War series. However, there has been some shift in direction over the past year and a half or so, with the subject matter of two volumes [Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns (2024) and Decisions of the Red River Campaign (2025)] finally crossing into the Trans-Mississippi theater of operations. Naval orientation is also on the rise, another welcome development. As was the case with Edward Cotham's Galveston book, Michael Becker's Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles centers naval and combined operations in its analysis while also departing significantly from the established structural format of addressing only a single, sharply defined campaign. Indeed, Becker's book covers a series of interconnected land and naval operations played out over an extended period of time (1861-64), the unifying theme of which was the bitterly contested strategic struggle for control over the mighty Mississippi River and its major tributaries. Both Cotham and Becker's contributions demonstrate that the format of the series can be adaptable without losing the core elements of its character and identity.
Many readers of this review will already be familiar with the series and its structure, at the center of which is the concept of the "critical decision." For those new to the series, critical decisions, as distinct from mere important decisions, not only have major consequences in their own right but possess the key added feature of substantially shaping those decisions and events that follow it over the course of the rest of the campaign and beyond. For each critical decision, identification and analysis unfolds in the following sequence: Situation, Options, Decision, and Result(s)/Impact. Situation describes a particular state of politico-military affairs (categorized as strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, personnel related, or logistical in nature) at a moment pivotal enough to prompt a critical decision. That decision framework provides readers with the background context necessary to recognize and evaluate the Options (two or more in number) available to the decision-maker. The historical Decision selected from those options by a critical decision-maker is then briefly described. The ensuing Result(s)/Impact section recounts what happened and outlines the ways in which the decision's outcome shaped the historical events that followed. An Alternative Decision/Scenario section is optional for contributors (some go deep into alternate history conjecture while others omit it altogether). In this case, Becker ventures into that territory selectively.
Each of the six categories of critical decisions are represented at least twice in Becker's analysis. While operational and tactical decisions comprise the majority, their sources (both military and civilian leaders) and categorical diversity are emblematic of the range of key actors and factors involved with the initial conception, support, and conduct of Civil War military campaigns. The expansive time interval and geographical space involved with the events of this particular volume are uniquely broad, but the author is up to the challenge when it comes to connecting the decisions in coherent fashion.
The twenty-seven critical decisions involved in securing control over the key waterways of the inland West are organized into four chapters by year: 1861 (9 decisions), 1862 (14), 1863 (2), and 1864 (2). That the great majority are concentrated in the first two years of the war really highlights the exemplary foresight, urgency, determination, and flexibility of Union planners, who built a vast squadron of river gunboats of various types from scratch and quickly put them to highly effective use without any prior experience in the areas of design and tactics from earlier wars. The great rapidity with which that process occurred denied their much more resource-strapped and disorganized Confederate opponents the breathing space needed to coordinate an effective response. The result was that squadron-scale Confederate naval resistance on the western rivers was effectively destroyed by mid-1862. In terms of assessing the campaign to control the western waterways, it might be argued that there were no more critical decisions to had after Vicksburg and Port Hudson were both secured by Union forces in July 1863, but the Red River Campaign of the following spring placed a large proportion of Mississippi River Squadron capital ships at great risk, making Becker's two 1864 decisions (both related to that campaign) worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, even if the entire Union naval contingent was lost it is difficult to imagine the Confederates gaining the capacity to seriously threaten Union control of Mississippi River navigation at that late stage of the war.
Becker's discussion demonstrates strong awareness and appreciation of recent contributions to the literature. His presentation and analysis of critical 1861-62 Confederate decision-making aligns closely with the mistakes and challenges so astutely identified and examined in Neil Chatelain's insightful 2020 study Defending the Arteries of Rebellion: Confederate Naval Operations in the Mississippi River Valley, 1861-1865. Among these were inefficient resource allocation, dispersal of effort through debilitating competition over scarce resources, strategic indecision, and lack of unified command. Becker usefully reminds us that, at one point, five different civilian and governmental entities had jurisdiction over fighting vessels in the region, and the single professional naval officer given the most authority, George Hollins, was relieved of command at the worst possible moment. As the author outlines in the book, all of those factors impacted critical decision-making in ways that directly contributed to epic disaster for the Confederate defense of the Upper and Lower Mississippi River Valley during the early war period. In similar vein, the critical decision involving staff officer Lewis B. Parsons's reorganization of theater transportation resources demonstrates keen appreciation of the recent literature's assessment of Union rail and river logistics.
Books of this type are always going to have a subjective element to them. Some readers will point toward possible omissions or differ with the author in identifying certain decisions as being truly critical. One of the latter might be the decision surrounding Union construction of a mortar boat flotilla for shore bombardment. While these vessels were deployed during a number of important ship vs. shore actions fought along the Mississippi River Valley, it would be difficult to maintain that they had a critical impact on any of them. In the area of possible omissions, Becker makes strong cases for designating a number of naval administration matters as critical decisions, but one might also suggest that promoting David Dixon Porter to command the new Mississippi River Squadron was a critical personnel related decision. Compatible personalities mattered a very great deal when any and all naval assistance provided to army operations had to be framed as an interservice request. The personal and professional harmony that existed between Porter's navy and Grant and Sherman's army was instrumental to Union victory on a multitude of occasions, not least of which during the very difficult Vicksburg Campaign. In terms of actual complaints, the Decision and Results/Impact sections of some situations draw significant elements from more than one Option choice, which is a practice not typical of the series. Given that that pops up most often in situations with option numbers as high as four and five, option consolidation would have been one way to address that occasional source of confusion.
A major feature of every book in the series is the driving tour appendix tied to the main text's critical decision analysis. This is achieved through a combination of additional support text from the author and focused excerpts from official reports and military communications. As one might imagine, Becker's task was an especially challenging one given the vast size of the Mississippi River Valley area of operations. Even with careful organization, the twelve tour stops between Cairo, Illinois and Bailey's Dam on the Red River in Louisiana take the user on a journey of 1,300 miles! The appendix section also contains vessel orders of battle for each of the major actions discussed in the text.
A novel variation on the typical subject matter of the Campaign Decisions in America's Civil War series, Michael Becker's Decisions on Western Waters successfully applies the critical decision analysis structure to one of the war's longest running and most geographically extensive military contests, effectively framing the opening of the Mississippi as a single campaign of critical significance. With available land campaigns of major status dwindling in number, it will be interesting to see what other unusual pathways the series might take.
Friday, April 3, 2026
Booknotes: Decisions on Western Waters
New Arrival:
• Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles by Michael D. Becker (U Tenn Press, 2026). Decisions on Western Waters is a pretty major departure from the standard Command Decisions in America's Civil War series volume. Whereas every earlier installment, numbering well over two dozen and counting, addressed a single campaign or battle, Michael Becker's new contribution explores the decision-making behind a series of related operations spread over years, the unifying theme being the struggle for control of the Mississippi River Valley. From the description: "At the outset of the Civil War, General Winfield Scott drafted the Anaconda Plan, an ambitious strategy to blockade southern ports and use army forces supported by naval gunboats to secure control of the Mississippi River for the Union, effectively dividing the Confederacy in two. Over the course of the campaign, General Grant’s ground forces closely cooperated with river forces under the leadership of Flag Officers Andrew H. Foote and David Dixon Porter, as well as Rear Admiral David Farragut, to successfully seize Confederate strongholds along the Mississippi River and its tributaries." While the central 1861-63 contest ended in Union triumph after successful conclusions to the twin sieges at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the Union Brown Water Navy had to both maintain those gains and still directly support further combined operations. The volume's packet of critical decisions, arranged in four yearly chapters, are thus heavily concentrated in the years 1861-63, with two additional decisions related to the 1864 Red River Campaign. More from the description: Decisions on Western Waters "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal politicians and commanders during the campaign that shaped its outcome. Rather than offering a linear history of the campaign, Michael D. Becker homes in on decisions made by both sides of the contest to provide a clear blueprint of the campaign development and conduct at its tactical core." The driving tour, which stretches from the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers all the way down to Fort Jackson below New Orleans, has to the longest of the series. Also included are comprehensive combat and support vessel lists for each major operation. I'm looking forward to reading this, and it will be interesting to see if the series continues to expand its scope in other directions.
• Decisions on Western Waters: The Twenty-Seven Critical Decisions That Defined the Battles by Michael D. Becker (U Tenn Press, 2026). Decisions on Western Waters is a pretty major departure from the standard Command Decisions in America's Civil War series volume. Whereas every earlier installment, numbering well over two dozen and counting, addressed a single campaign or battle, Michael Becker's new contribution explores the decision-making behind a series of related operations spread over years, the unifying theme being the struggle for control of the Mississippi River Valley. From the description: "At the outset of the Civil War, General Winfield Scott drafted the Anaconda Plan, an ambitious strategy to blockade southern ports and use army forces supported by naval gunboats to secure control of the Mississippi River for the Union, effectively dividing the Confederacy in two. Over the course of the campaign, General Grant’s ground forces closely cooperated with river forces under the leadership of Flag Officers Andrew H. Foote and David Dixon Porter, as well as Rear Admiral David Farragut, to successfully seize Confederate strongholds along the Mississippi River and its tributaries." While the central 1861-63 contest ended in Union triumph after successful conclusions to the twin sieges at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the Union Brown Water Navy had to both maintain those gains and still directly support further combined operations. The volume's packet of critical decisions, arranged in four yearly chapters, are thus heavily concentrated in the years 1861-63, with two additional decisions related to the 1864 Red River Campaign. More from the description: Decisions on Western Waters "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal politicians and commanders during the campaign that shaped its outcome. Rather than offering a linear history of the campaign, Michael D. Becker homes in on decisions made by both sides of the contest to provide a clear blueprint of the campaign development and conduct at its tactical core." The driving tour, which stretches from the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers all the way down to Fort Jackson below New Orleans, has to the longest of the series. Also included are comprehensive combat and support vessel lists for each major operation. I'm looking forward to reading this, and it will be interesting to see if the series continues to expand its scope in other directions.
Wednesday, November 19, 2025
Review - "Decisions at Chancellorsville: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Battle" by Sarah Bierle
[Decisions at Chancellorsville: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Battle by Sarah Kay Bierle (Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series - University of Tennessee Press, 2025). Paperback, 17 maps, photographs, battlefield touring guide, orders of battle, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages main/total:xx,142,277. ISBN:978-1-62190-956-9. $24.95]
Decisions at Chancellorsville is the latest installment of University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, which has published multiple titles each year since 2018. In addition to the prolific release schedule that the series continues to maintain, fresh blood is infused into its stable of authors on a fairly regular basis, too, and this is Sarah Kay Bierle's first contribution. And a fine one it is.
Now for the obligatory background summary for those unfamiliar with the series and its structure. First, it should be noted that these books do not examine Civil War campaigns and battles through the traditional narrative perspective and format. Instead, the main content is presented through a chronological sequence of "critical decision" analyses. In the hierarchy of decision-making, critical decisions are defined as being those command choices that produce profound consequences in their immediate aftermath and that meaningfully shape the course of ensuing events.
As outlined in previous reviews, analysis of each critical decision follows a standardized format to which every volume strictly adheres. Discussion progresses through five linked stages—Situation, Options, Decision, Result(s)/Impact, and Alternate Decision/Scenario. The first and typically lengthiest section, Situation describes the state of affairs at a crossroads moment in the campaign or battle. It provides readers with the background information necessary to recognize and evaluate the range of reasonable Options (most frequently two or three in number) available for addressing the situation. The historical Decision is then outlined before the Result(s)/Impact section recounts what happened and how those results shaped subsequent events. A degree of emphasis is placed on tracing lasting effects of critical decisions made earlier. Finally, an optional Alternate Decision/Scenario section delves into alternative history conjecture based on choices not made. In this case, Bierle elected not to engage with the optional alternate history component, which is perfectly fine.
In the series, critical decisions are categorized as being either strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, logistical, or personnel-related. Bierle organizes the sixteen decisions of her study into six groupings: the pre-battle January-April 1863 interval and the May 1, May 2, May 3 (in two parts), and May 4-6. Those six sub-sections contain three critical decisions each, the exception being the last, which includes a single one involving Army of the Potomac commander Joseph Hooker's retreat decision. There are a preponderance of tactical-level critical decisions. In the author's view, the total numbers disparity (nine for the Union side and six for the Confederates) represents Hooker's persistent struggle to reassert control of events after the strong start to his campaign quickly fizzled. Although he had many opportunities during those first days in May to impose (or reimpose) his will upon Robert E. Lee's vastly outnumbered army, Hooker's choices instead led him to "give up his military advantages and initiative, handing opportunity to Lee to react" (pg. xvi), with decisive reaction on the part of Lee forming several of the Confederate side's half-dozen critical decisions. Supporting the volume's decision analysis are 17 maps, a 12-stop driving tour, an appendix examining the campaign's historical memory (that is not a regular series feature), and orders of battle for both sides.
Beirle's selection of critical decisions and their available option formulations together exhibit a very strong grasp of both big picture and more nuanced elements of the military history literature associated with the Chancellorsville Campaign. Each option is effectively framed for the reader through thoughtful weighing of the benefits and risks attached to it (some of which have a fresh ring to them).
For the series as a whole, nearly all critical decisions are made by individuals, mostly high-ranking military officers and top government officials. Collective critical decisions are thus highly unusual, but Bierle has two of them. In her assessment, the final Union assault on Marye's Heights was a group decision among frontline small-unit commanders. Another decision involving multiple parties was the possibility of medical and military officers deciding as a group that Hooker was too incapacitated (presumably by concussion) to remain in command after the pillar he was leaning against was struck by cannon fire. Another interesting matter related to the Fredericksburg sector of the battlefield is Bierle's willingness to take up the truce flag controversy, a matter recently addressed at some length in Erik Nelson's 2024 study of the eastern half of the expansive Chancellorsville battlefield, as a critical decision impacting the final Fredericksburg assaults. Though not related to any particular critical decision (and thus not explored further), the author's criticism of Jeb Stuart's infantry tactics (characterizing them as overly wasteful frontal assaults) on May 3 after the cavalryman took over leadership of wounded Stonewall Jackson's Second Corps forms a dissenting opinion perhaps worthy of mention. Most modern writers, including the general's most recent biographer, have not adopted that same view, instead arguing that Stuart performed well after being abruptly thrust into infantry corps command in the middle of a major battle.
In terms of arguable 'misses,' Bierle's set lacks a standalone decision related to how George Stoneman's cavalry corps would be used during the campaign. Incorporating it into the discussion as just a part of Hooker's overall planning options lends an element of inevitability to how Stoneman's role in the campaign would unfold that is perhaps not warranted. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that Hooker, even if he had eschewed the deep raid option in favor of keeping his cavalry nearby, would have deployed his cavalry as close tactical support in ways that might have kept him better informed as to Lee's movements and protected the open right of his army from getting crushed by Jackson's massive flank attack.
As mentioned before, one of the conceptual qualities of the critical decision is that its impact extends beyond the immediate period in ways that meaningfully shape downstream campaign and battlefield events. Interestingly, Bierle goes beyond that, showing how critical decisions during the Chancellorsville Campaign affected the Gettysburg Campaign that followed it. For example, Bierle suggests that Third Corps commander Dan Sickles's dismay at Hooker's critical decision ordering him to abandon the Hazel Grove high ground (leaving it to the Confederates for use as a devastating artillery platform that transformed the fighting around the Chancellorsville crossroads) might very well have been a bitter learning experience that directly informed his determination, misguided or not, to press forward to occupy the higher ground fronting his assigned position as the left flank of the Union army at Gettysburg. As another example, contemporary observers and present day writers alike have praised Hooker's winter reforms that restored Army of the Potomac morale after Fredericksburg and placed it on a strong footing for the spring, but Chancellorsville exposed the flaws in Hooker's artillery arm reorganization. Hooker's belated, mid-battle decision cited by Bierle that restored Hunt's authority over the army's artillery had a positive short-term impact (albeit limited by circumstances), and it led to Hunt being given authority to reorganize the artillery after the battle in ways that improved its performance at Gettysburg. Bierle also suggests that Fifth Corps commander George Meade's experience with Hooker's mismanaged Chancellorsville council of war, which resulted in the commanding general going against majority opinion of his principal subordinates and ordering a retreat, shaped how Meade would conduct his own critical decision during a similarly key moment at Gettysburg on the night of July 2-3.
Consistency is a hallmark of the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, which is pretty remarkable given the hectic release schedule and multitude of contributors involved, and Sarah Bierle's Decisions at Chancellorsville strongly upholds that reputation while also adding some unique elements of its own. Hopefully, we'll see more of her quality input in the future.
Friday, October 24, 2025
Booknotes: Decisions at Chancellorsville
New Arrival:
• Decisions at Chancellorsville: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Battle by Sarah Kay Bierle (U Tenn Press, 2025). Given how much the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series is talked about, and its many titles reviewed, on this site, regular readers won't need an introduction. For new visitors: Decisions at Chancellorsville "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal commanders during the campaign and how these decisions shaped its outcome. Rather than offering a history of the operation, Sarah Bierle hones in on a sequence of decisions made by commanders on both sides of the contest to provide a blueprint of the campaign at its tactical core. Identifying and exploring the critical decisions in this way allows students of the battles to progress from a knowledge of what happened to a mature grasp of why events happened." The time period addressed in the volume is January 1863 to May 6, 1863, and the sixteen critical decisions under consideration are organized into six chapters. There are 17 maps, a 12-stop driving tour, an appendix exploring Chancellorsville Campaign memory (that might be a series first), and orders of battle for both sides.
• Decisions at Chancellorsville: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Battle by Sarah Kay Bierle (U Tenn Press, 2025). Given how much the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series is talked about, and its many titles reviewed, on this site, regular readers won't need an introduction. For new visitors: Decisions at Chancellorsville "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal commanders during the campaign and how these decisions shaped its outcome. Rather than offering a history of the operation, Sarah Bierle hones in on a sequence of decisions made by commanders on both sides of the contest to provide a blueprint of the campaign at its tactical core. Identifying and exploring the critical decisions in this way allows students of the battles to progress from a knowledge of what happened to a mature grasp of why events happened." The time period addressed in the volume is January 1863 to May 6, 1863, and the sixteen critical decisions under consideration are organized into six chapters. There are 17 maps, a 12-stop driving tour, an appendix exploring Chancellorsville Campaign memory (that might be a series first), and orders of battle for both sides.
Wednesday, August 6, 2025
Review - "Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles" by Hank Koopman
[Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles by Hank Koopman (Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series - University of Tennessee Press, 2025). Paperback, 15 maps, photographs, touring guide, orders of battle, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages:xiv,281. ISBN:978-1-62190-847-0. $24.95].
When the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, the brainchild of retired U.S. Army colonel Matt Spruill, began its official run with 2018's Decisions at Stones River*, no one could have predicted how prolific it would become. With contributions from respected subject matter experts and avocational first-timers alike, the series, now approaching two dozen volumes, has in a very short time proved a resounding success. The latest volume, from series newcomer Hank Koopman, is Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles.
For those new to this series, it should be mentioned that these books do not examine Civil War campaigns and battles through the traditional narrative lens. Instead, analysis is through a series of "critical decisions," which are defined as those command choices that had profound consequences in their immediate aftermath and that meaningfully shaped the course of ensuing events. As outlined in previous reviews, analysis of each critical decision follows a structural format to which every volume closely adheres. Discussion progresses through five linked stages—Situation, Options, Decision, Result(s)/Impact, and Alternate Decision/Scenario. The first and typically lengthiest section, Situation describes the state of affairs at a crossroads moment in the campaign or battle. It provides readers with the background information necessary to recognize and evaluate the range of reasonable Options (most frequently two or three in number) available for addressing the situation. The historical Decision is then outlined very briefly before the Result(s)/Impact section recounts what happened and how those results shaped subsequent events. A degree of emphasis is placed on tracing lasting effects of critical decisions made earlier. Finally, an optional Alternate Decision/Scenario section delves into alternative history discussion based on choices not made.
In the series, critical decisions are categorized as being either strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, logistical, or personnel-related. One key message from the series as a whole is that the side that seizes the initiative and holds it longest will typically author the majority of critical decisions. That is certainly the case here for the Henry and Donelson Campaign's twenty-one critical decisions, with the Union side making thirteen decisions and the Confederates eight. Those totals breakdown further into ten operational and three tactical decisions for generals Henry Halleck, U.S. Grant, and their subordinates. On the Confederate side, there are three operational, three tactical, and two personnel-related decisions.
A chief takeaway from Koopman's analysis is the critical importance of unity of command and the firm wielding of it from above. Everyone recognizes how central those intertwined concepts are to successful military operations, but history is replete with examples of officers that failed to heed their lessons. Along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers in early 1862, federal forces used command unity to good effect throughout most of the campaign while the Confederates signally failed to achieve anything close to it. As Koopman keenly observes, Confederate general Albert Sidney Johnston, in his capacity as theater commander, made the two personnel-related decisions but, from faraway Bowling Green, left all of the critical operational decisions to a dysfunctional three-headed monster of his own creation in the form of generals John Floyd (the senior officer), Gideon Pillow, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, who together failed to carry out any semblance of united command and purpose.
If any one stage of the campaign could be considered the 'day of decision' it was February 15, that distinction reflected by all six of the volume's tactical-level critical decisions taking place on that day. Even though Grant gifted the Confederates with his greatest blunder of the campaign, his decision to leave his command headless and rudderless during a six-hour period that happened to coincide with the Confederate breakout attempt. Koopman's examination of those six decisions reveals a stark study in contrasts, with Grant's subordinate division commanders admirably filling the void while their Confederate counterparts, who started their assault without any concrete plan for extricating the army, operated at cross purposes. Though Pillow and his men earned just credit for hard fighting that dislocated the Union right and placed the absent Grant's entire command in some jeopardy, all of the critical decisions made by the Confederate high command at Donelson on that day (one each by Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner) proved calamitous to their small army and the overall Confederate position in the West. Grant, when he did finally arrive back on the field, is duly credited with calmly reasserting control of the situation and finishing the job of turning the tables on the haplessly indecisive Confederates, who incredibly decided to retreat back within their own lines rather than attempt to extricate themselves through the hard-won gap their morning attack had opened in the federal ring.
Though the avowed purpose of the series is not to provide a full narrative of events but rather to focus on key decision-making as a way "to progress from an understanding of 'what happened' to 'why events happened' as they did," Koopman arguably comes closer than most to providing readers with both. His Situation assessments are more developed than those typically presented by series authors, and his Result(s)/Impact discussions go much deeper than most in exploring tactical events and small-unit descriptive detail. In this volume, argumentation in regard to why each decision is determined to have been critical in nature is strong, and linkage and transition between decision analyses are exceptionally smooth. Like other volumes in the series, there is a collection of maps that help orient the reader as well as a driving tour guide (twelve stops in this case) tied to the critical decisions examined in the main text.
Hank Koopman's Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson is another fine entry in University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series. As to the future of the series as a whole, there have been some interesting developments of late. It has been recently revealed that the series is branching out from its prior focus on single campaigns and battles. For example, last year's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns examined multiple operations conducted at various times around a particular geographical point of strategic significance, and the upcoming Decisions on Western Waters will be a themed volume of a type not seen before. It will be worth keeping an eye out for more of those.
* - Spruill's Decisions at Gettysburg was first published in 2011, providing proof of concept, and it was later incorporated into the series as a formal installment with a 2019 second edition.
Tuesday, May 27, 2025
Booknotes: Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson
New Arrival:
• Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles by Hank Koopman [(Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series) U Tenn Press, 2025]. From the description: "The Battles of Forts Henry and Donelson took place in February of 1862 and were early indicators of the success the US would have in the Civil War’s Western Theater. Due to Kentucky’s neutrality at the time, Brig. Gen. Daniel S. Donelson was instructed to find suitable sites for fortification along the Tennessee River but just inside the state boundaries of Tennessee. Forts Henry and Donelson were constructed in the summer of 1861 and were quickly identified by Gen. Ulysses S. Grant as strategic fortifications that, if conquered, would open the Federal Army’s path to Alabama and Mississippi. Fort Henry fell to Federal control on February 6, 1862, and Fort Donelson fell six days later. With the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers now open to Federal gunboats, Grant and his army would head southwest to Memphis and on to Vicksburg." This was one of those Civil War campaigns in which the actions of smaller forces produced enormous strategic consequences. While it may not have been, as Kendall Gott maintains, "Where the South Lost the War," there is no denying that the twin Union victories at Henry and Donelson were unmitigated disasters for Confederate fortunes. It also firmly placed the careers of two key generals of the war, Confederate western department commander Albert Sidney Johnston and Union army commander U.S. Grant, on opposite trajectories that were cemented conclusively at Shiloh. That things might have turned out differently at key moments during the campaign makes Henry-Donelson a strong candidate for an interesting addition to University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series. More from the description: Hank Koopman's Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal commanders during the battle and how these decisions shaped its outcome. Rather than offering a history of the battle, Hank Koopman hones in on a sequence of critical decisions made by commanders on both sides of the conflict to provide a blueprint of the Battles of Forts Henry and Donelson at their tactical core. Identifying and exploring the critical decisions in this way allows students of the battles to progress from a knowledge of what happened to a mature grasp of why events happened." Of added interest is the presence of a new voice in the series, this being Koopman's first contribution. I look forward to delving into his interpretation of the campaign's key moments and how well he works within the well-established structure of the series.
• Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles by Hank Koopman [(Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series) U Tenn Press, 2025]. From the description: "The Battles of Forts Henry and Donelson took place in February of 1862 and were early indicators of the success the US would have in the Civil War’s Western Theater. Due to Kentucky’s neutrality at the time, Brig. Gen. Daniel S. Donelson was instructed to find suitable sites for fortification along the Tennessee River but just inside the state boundaries of Tennessee. Forts Henry and Donelson were constructed in the summer of 1861 and were quickly identified by Gen. Ulysses S. Grant as strategic fortifications that, if conquered, would open the Federal Army’s path to Alabama and Mississippi. Fort Henry fell to Federal control on February 6, 1862, and Fort Donelson fell six days later. With the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers now open to Federal gunboats, Grant and his army would head southwest to Memphis and on to Vicksburg." This was one of those Civil War campaigns in which the actions of smaller forces produced enormous strategic consequences. While it may not have been, as Kendall Gott maintains, "Where the South Lost the War," there is no denying that the twin Union victories at Henry and Donelson were unmitigated disasters for Confederate fortunes. It also firmly placed the careers of two key generals of the war, Confederate western department commander Albert Sidney Johnston and Union army commander U.S. Grant, on opposite trajectories that were cemented conclusively at Shiloh. That things might have turned out differently at key moments during the campaign makes Henry-Donelson a strong candidate for an interesting addition to University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series. More from the description: Hank Koopman's Decisions at Forts Henry and Donelson: The Twenty One Critical Decisions that Defined the Battles "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal commanders during the battle and how these decisions shaped its outcome. Rather than offering a history of the battle, Hank Koopman hones in on a sequence of critical decisions made by commanders on both sides of the conflict to provide a blueprint of the Battles of Forts Henry and Donelson at their tactical core. Identifying and exploring the critical decisions in this way allows students of the battles to progress from a knowledge of what happened to a mature grasp of why events happened." Of added interest is the presence of a new voice in the series, this being Koopman's first contribution. I look forward to delving into his interpretation of the campaign's key moments and how well he works within the well-established structure of the series.
Wednesday, March 19, 2025
Review - "Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation" by Michael Lang
[Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Michael S. Lang (University of Tennessee Press, 2025). Softcover, 16 maps, illustrations, appendix, orders of battle, strength tables, notes, bibliography, index. Pages:xx,293. ISBN:978-1-62190-916-3. $24.95]
Michael Lang's Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation is one of the more unique installments in UT Press's ever-growing Command Decisions in America's Civil War series. In a series now approaching two-dozen volumes, this is only the second Trans-Mississippi theater entry, and its subject, the 1864 Red River Campaign, is the only one to lack a comprehensive book-length treatment that anyone would consider definitive in nature. While numerous overview-level books covering the campaign's operations in the Red River Valley and Arkansas exist, it is still the case that no full-length studies of the campaign's climactic battles, those fought at Mansfield (April 8) and Pleasant Hill (April 9), have been published. In contrast with other series topics, which tend to address major military contests fought between principal field armies, the Red River Campaign is also atypical in that it was driven by political and economic considerations more than military ones. How that mix affected critical decision-making and its consequences adds some interesting elements to the analysis.
For those unfamiliar with the series and its structure, please refer to the site reviews of the early series titles for more explanation. In short, critical decisions are, as Lang explains, those that are "not only consequential in their own right, but also so important that they substantially shape the decisions and events that follow, thus forming the course of history" (pg. xiv). For each critical decision, identification and analysis unfolds in the following sequence: Situation, Options, Decision, and Result/Impact. Situation describes a particular state of affairs (be it "strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, personnel related, or logistical" in nature) at a pivotal moment prompting a critical decision. That background element provides readers with the context necessary to recognize and evaluate the Options (two or more in number) available to the decision-maker. The historical Decision that was selected by that high-level decision-maker is then described. The ensuing Result(s)/Impact section recounts what happened and show how the Situation's historical outcome shaped what followed. An Alternative Decision/Scenario section is optional for contributors (some really get into the alternate history conjecture while others omit it altogether), and Lang includes a brief one or two paragraphs of that type of content for all of his fifteen decisions.
Series contributors typically organize their critical decision compilations into several sub-groupings (most often by specific time intervals). Task ten knowledgeable individuals with the same job of identifying critical decisions and you'll undoubtedly receive back ten different lists. With that in mind, one might quibble with a few of Lang's selections, but that's alright as he brings all of the most centrally important situations and decisions into the conversation. In Lang's analysis, eight decisions are assigned to an extended stretch (January 1863-April 1864) of campaign preliminaries. This is where the bulk of the strategic, organizational, and personnel-related decisions reside. The second grouping, five in number (including the volume's only two tactical-level decisions), addresses the campaign's first big inflection point, the April 6-9 sequence of events encompassing the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. The third and final grouping, covering the period April 9-May 30, discusses the two critical decisions that most shaped the finishing stages of the campaign on both fronts, Union commander Nathaniel Banks's decision to withdraw to the Red River after his tactical victory at Pleasant Hill and Confederate commander Edmund Kirby Smith's decision to divert the bulk of his resources to Arkansas.
Like most others who have examined the campaign at length, Lang wonders what Richard Taylor, Kirby Smith's principal subordinate in the Red River Valley, might have accomplished against Banks's increasingly divided and demoralized command at Cane River had Kirby Smith not redirected the bulk of his available infantry firepower (the Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas divisions of Parsons, Churchill, and Walker) to Arkansas. What more that larger force might have done against the river fleet trapped above the falls at Alexandria is another interesting matter to contemplate. Lang is more noncommittal than most when it comes to taking sides in the epic clash of wills between Kirby Smith and Taylor, instead offering readers the tools to form their own opinions.
Two decisions are tied to the fighting in Arkansas, the first a logistical decision on the part of Frederick Steele, the Union general charged with leading what came to be known as the Camden Expedition, and the second Kirby Smith's weighty decision over where to concentrate his counteroffensive after Banks retreated back to the Red River and the naval support it provided. That relative paucity of critical decisions assigned to the Camden Expedition (essentially 1.5 out of 15) possibly represents a determination that Steele's column and its overextended supply line possessed little in the way of ability and opportunity to truly transform the course and results of the campaign (an opinion that Steele himself held from the outset).
Even though it's not explicitly part of the standardized structure of decision analysis adopted by the series, at times it might be helpful to explain why seemingly important decisions did not, in the mind of the author, qualify as critical decisions. For example, Steele's decision to abandon, perhaps temporarily (he did not yet know that Banks had been defeated at Mansfield and had retreated after Pleasant Hill), his advance on Shreveport and redeploy to Camden, where his supply line to Pine Bluff was shortened, might be considered a critical decision. Similarly, Steele's final decision to abandon Camden (after his two primary foraging missions were smashed by the Confederates and official confirmation arrived that Banks was not only no longer advancing but in trouble) and retreat back to his Arkansas River base might also be considered a critical decision. That said, critical decisions have to have realistic options and, in both cases, the author perhaps determined that Steele's supply situation left him no reasonable alternatives. On the Confederate side of the Arkansas operation, there are no critical decisions assigned to the execution, upon heavy reinforcement from the Red River Valley, of Kirby Smith's plan to cut off Steele's retreat. Cavalry division commander James Fagan was ordered to block Steele's retreat route (a movement that was apparently very feasible), but Fagan instead cleared out his entire force off to the west toward better foraging grounds, leaving Steele's path wide open. Some deem Fagan to have spoiled a golden opportunity to force the outright surrender of Steele's desperately low-supplied army. Of course, we'll never now what might have happened had Steele been compelled to fight his way out of a surrounding cordon of infantry and cavalry, but it was arguably a critical decision left unexamined.
As is the case with a few structural elements of the series, the scale of the driving tour appendix can vary between volumes. With eleven stops that begin in New Orleans and spread across Louisiana and Arkansas, Lang's tour is a substantial journey. In addition to providing driving directions and visual field orientation, the text attached to each stop explains how it is tied to a critical decision. Helpfully, many of the key orders and communications between leaders that are cited in the main text's decision analysis are reproduced at length in the tour appendix. Added to the orders of battle for both sides are some strength tables (divisional for Union forces and district level for the Confederates) and lists of naval forces (gunboats and transports) deployed by both sides.
One of the most noticeable changes in the series between its inception and today is in the cartography, the earliest volumes having wider coverage (with maps in the dozens spread over both the main decision analysis and integrated driving tour) and more small-unit detail. Lacking insider knowledge, one might guess that evolving economics of publishing played some part in this. It's less of a concern in this volume, which has very few tactical-level critical decisions.
In addition to its strong consideration of the campaign's most momentous decisions, Michael Lang's Decisions of the Red River Campaign also, more than any other entry in the series, starkly demonstrates the ways in which leadership and personality factors can erase seemingly overwhelming one-sided advantages in manpower, firepower, materiel, and waterborne support. Lang's measured analysis of Union plans and their execution, as well as Confederate lost opportunities, only confirms General Sherman's caustic condemnation of the campaign's conduct as being, at least from the Union perspective, "one damn blunder from beginning to end."
Monday, March 3, 2025
Booknotes: Decisions of the Red River Campaign
New Arrival:
• Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Michael S. Lang (U Tenn Press, 2025). This is only the second Trans-Mississippi theater entry in UT Press's highly prolific Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, which is fast approaching two-dozen volumes. The first, Ed Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns (2024), was one of the best in the series. On the face of it, the 1864 Red River Campaign is a fascinating topic for critical decision analysis. Personality clashes within the Confederate high command in the theater hover heavily over the campaign, but its strategic and operational aspects ooze contingency in ways that still divide opinion. One chronicler of the Red River Campaign and its associated Camden Expedition, Michael Forsyth, even goes so far as to say that the Confederates bungled a golden opportunity to alter the course of the war. Michael Lang's Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation tackles a campaign that resulted in a clear Confederate victory that nevertheless left both sides dissatisfied with the result. From the description: "By the time of the Red River Campaign, which occurred between March 10 and May 22, 1864, Federal victory in the American Civil War was nearly assured. This final Union offensive in the trans-Mississippi theater was launched to capture Shreveport, a strategic river port and Confederate military complex. The fall of Shreveport would split Confederate forces, allowing the Federals to encircle and destroy the Confederate Army in western Louisiana and southern Arkansas as well as open a gateway to an invasion of Texas. But the dense piney woods and swamps of Louisiana made for difficult maneuvering, and both sides made severe tactical mistakes, leading General William Tecumseh Sherman to declare the Red River Campaign “one damn blunder from beginning to end.”" In support of the decision analysis are sixteen maps, an 11-stop driving tour, orders of battle, and strength tables. I've already started reading this so the review should appear sometime in the coming weeks.
• Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Michael S. Lang (U Tenn Press, 2025). This is only the second Trans-Mississippi theater entry in UT Press's highly prolific Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series, which is fast approaching two-dozen volumes. The first, Ed Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns (2024), was one of the best in the series. On the face of it, the 1864 Red River Campaign is a fascinating topic for critical decision analysis. Personality clashes within the Confederate high command in the theater hover heavily over the campaign, but its strategic and operational aspects ooze contingency in ways that still divide opinion. One chronicler of the Red River Campaign and its associated Camden Expedition, Michael Forsyth, even goes so far as to say that the Confederates bungled a golden opportunity to alter the course of the war. Michael Lang's Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation tackles a campaign that resulted in a clear Confederate victory that nevertheless left both sides dissatisfied with the result. From the description: "By the time of the Red River Campaign, which occurred between March 10 and May 22, 1864, Federal victory in the American Civil War was nearly assured. This final Union offensive in the trans-Mississippi theater was launched to capture Shreveport, a strategic river port and Confederate military complex. The fall of Shreveport would split Confederate forces, allowing the Federals to encircle and destroy the Confederate Army in western Louisiana and southern Arkansas as well as open a gateway to an invasion of Texas. But the dense piney woods and swamps of Louisiana made for difficult maneuvering, and both sides made severe tactical mistakes, leading General William Tecumseh Sherman to declare the Red River Campaign “one damn blunder from beginning to end.”" In support of the decision analysis are sixteen maps, an 11-stop driving tour, orders of battle, and strength tables. I've already started reading this so the review should appear sometime in the coming weeks.
Thursday, November 14, 2024
Review - "Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations" by Edward Cotham
[Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations by Edward T. Cotham, Jr. (University of Tennessee Press, 2024). Softcover, maps, photos, illustrations, appendix, orders of battle, endnotes, bibliography, index. Pages:xiii,170. ISBN:978-1-62190-913-2. $24.95]
It's easy to see why Galveston, Texas was considered a strategic point of interest for both sides during the Civil War. Galveston was Texas's most populous city, its most important commercial center, and it possessed the state's finest deep water port. Its rail connection with the interior also made it a prime base for a Union campaign to seize Houston. The occupation of both places would make Union forces masters of the heart of Texas and its limited modern transportation network. Initially determined to be indefensible with the meager resources available at the time, Galveston was reluctantly abandoned by its Confederate Army defenders. It was quickly occupied in turn by a small Union garrison supported by a naval squadron that easily outgunned anything the Confederates could muster against it. Before the Union foothold on Texas soil could be exploited, however, the port city was recaptured during a dramatic and improbably successful New Year's Day 1863 land and sea assault. Compounding the US Navy's embarrassment, just ten days later the Confederate commerce raider CSS Alabama lured out to sea and sank the Galveston blockader USS Hatteras. City and island remained in Confederate hands for the duration of the war.
The hits to US naval pride only continued. Approximately sixty miles up the coast, another Confederate naval attack surprised and defeated a US blockading force at Sabine Pass in 1862, and on September 8 of the following year a tiny earthwork battery turned back a massive combined operation that outnumbered the defenders roughly 100 to 1. In the fall of 1863, a two-pronged grand campaign, which consisted of a large overland expedition through western Louisiana and a substantial amphibious landing at the mouth of the Rio Grande that was accompanied by a follow-up movement up the coast, also failed (through a variety of reasons) to knock Texas out of the war. The decision-making involved in all of these events, many of which had military and political repercussions felt far and wide, is examined in Edward Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations.
Fast approaching two-dozen volumes, University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series possesses a unique analytical framework that has proven its value over time. Rather than repeat background material that has already been covered numerous times here on this site, please refer to previous CWBA reviews (such as this one here) for the series definition of a "critical decision" and brief explanation of the flow and structure of the steps involved in the decision analysis.
With published expertise [see Battle on the Bay: The Civil War Struggle for Galveston (1998) and Sabine Pass: The Confederacy's Thermopylae (2004), both gold standard histories of their topics] and over thirty years of ongoing research at his disposal, Cotham is the ideal author for this particular series installment. Calling upon that unique body of knowledge and using it to identify key moments of contingency, Cotham's approach to critical decision selection along with his situational summaries, option formulations, result(s)/impact discussions, and visions of alternate scenarios all display levels of nuance that a less robustly informed contributor tasked with the matter at hand would find very difficult to match. At first glance, it might appear unlikely that one could come up with this high a number of critical decisions (21) for a series of mostly small-scale events that unfolded in the war's tertiary theater (and this reviewer still struggled with one or two), but Cotham's keenly developed arguments and analysis consistently remove most lingering doubts.
The typical book in the series addresses a campaign and/or battle fought between major eastern or western theater field armies, making tactical-level critical decision analysis a common feature. However, Cotham notes that in his own area of study it was faraway decisions that most often and most deeply impacted the course of events. Also, an unusually high number (for the series as a whole) of his volume's critical decisions are personnel related. As Cotham amply demonstrates, leadership selection alone went a long way toward explaining why the underdog Confederates were so successful and how it was that Union forces failed in such disastrous fashion. President Davis's selection of John B. Magruder, that general's reputation under a dark cloud from allegations related to underperformance during the Seven Days, matched man and moment with results few could have foreseen, and the officers Magruder chose as his own principal subordinates no less so. On the other side, US naval hero David Glasgow Farragut, commander of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, made leadership appointments on the Texas coast that he would come to bitterly regret. As Cotham outlines, key officers at Galveston and Sabine Pass served their faraway superior poorly, delivering some of the few black marks against Farragut's otherwise sterling Civil War record.
Magruder proved to be a particularly interesting case to examine. So many Confederate generals thrust into unenviable coastal command situations similar to what Magruder faced wallowed in pessimistic passivity when tasked with pitting their own meager manpower and resources against Union combined operations having the overpowering capability of concentrating superior land and naval forces at nearly any point of their choosing. Magruder broke the mold, confidently seizing the initiative and making his own luck with boldness, creative planning, and decisive leadership. During this shining moment of his Civil War career, all of his decisions struck gold. Like Robert E. Lee did at Chancellorsville, Magruder employed against a dangerously superior enemy at Galveston a complicated battle plan with a lot of moving parts. Such high-risk plans often produced disaster, but, as Cotham effectively reminds us, it could also be an important factor in achieving success against long odds. Unfortunately for the rest of Magruder's Civil War career, his signal success along the Texas coast in 1863 did little to restore his profile as general worthy of being entrusted with coveted commands on major fronts.
Much like historian Donald Frazier has recently done in his Texas and Louisiana series of military history books, Cotham insightfully outlines significant connections (through decisions made and their results) between events in the Trans-Missisippi theater and future plans for the war on the other side of the river. Most notable among them are those involved in delaying the targeting of the key Gulf blockade-running port of Mobile, Alabama.
A mixture of modern maps and others borrowed from the atlas to the O.R. accompany Cotham's text. In the other series titles, the featured tour appendix is designed to be closely tied to the critical decisions presented before it. With his own subject matter more geographically dispersed than the others and with so many of its critical decisions produced from great distances, Cotham elected instead to include a walking tour of Galveston Civil War sites and some brief recommendations for hardy souls willing to take the 133-mile roundabout drive to Sabine Pass.
Joining the top rank of the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War collection of titles, Edward Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns, in addition to its atypical features recited above, carries some notable series firsts. The author points out that his book is the first to have a major focus on ship vs. ship and ship vs. shore movements and encounters, and one can also add that it is the first Trans-Missisippi theater volume in the series. Another one, an 1864 Red River Campaign book, is soon to follow, with hopefully even more in the works.
Thursday, November 7, 2024
Booknotes: Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns
New Arrival:
• Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations by Edward T. Cotham, Jr. (U Tenn Press, 2024). Currently sitting at twenty volumes balanced between east and west (with more on the immediate schedule), University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America's Civil War continues to release titles at a steady pace. One thing that has invigorated the series is the successful recruitment of top-level published subject matter experts, such as contributors David Powell for Chickamauga and Robert Tanner for the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign. The latest in that line of strong gets is Edward Cotham, the author of Battle on the Bay: The Civil War Struggle for Galveston (1998) and Sabine Pass: The Confederacy's Thermopylae (2004), the latter the winner of the 2005 Laney Prize. Both books are Civil War Texas classics and rank high among the very best studies of the war west of the Mississippi. Those publications and Cotham's decades of research and thoughtful consideration of the topics at hand make him the ideal author behind Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations, which is also noteworthy for being the first Trans-Mississippi installment of the series. In the book, Cotham explores the series of critical decisions that guided the course of events along the most important stretch of Texas coastline north of the Rio Grande. Coverage includes the series of contests for control of Galveston, Texas's best deep water port, between 1861 and 1863 along with events culminating in the September 8, 1863 battle for Sabine Pass. Both Sabine Pass and the New Year's Day 1863 Battle of Galveston were startlingly improbable Confederate victories. From the description: "The Galveston Campaigns were a series of naval and overland battles that pitted Confederate General John B. Magruder and his often-improvised Confederate forces against General Nathaniel P. Banks and a variety of Union army and naval forces. A Federal fleet entered Galveston Bay on October 4, 1862, and the city surrendered after the expiration of a four-day truce. However, on New Year’s Day of 1863, Magruder coordinated a bold new attack to retake Galveston using a land bombardment and two cottonclad Confederate gunboats. Aided by victories at the Battle of Sabine Pass and two purely naval engagements in Texas waters, the city would remain in Southern hands and end the war as the last major Confederate port."
More: Edward Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal commanders during the campaigns and examines how these decisions shaped their outcome. Rather than offering a history of the operations, Edward Cotham concentrates on a sequence of decisions made by commanders on both sides of the contest to provide a blueprint of each campaign at its tactical core. Identifying and exploring the critical decisions in this way allows students of the battles to progress from a knowledge of what happened to a mature grasp of why events happened." I am a fair bit into it right now and like what I'm seeing so far.
• Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations by Edward T. Cotham, Jr. (U Tenn Press, 2024). Currently sitting at twenty volumes balanced between east and west (with more on the immediate schedule), University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America's Civil War continues to release titles at a steady pace. One thing that has invigorated the series is the successful recruitment of top-level published subject matter experts, such as contributors David Powell for Chickamauga and Robert Tanner for the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign. The latest in that line of strong gets is Edward Cotham, the author of Battle on the Bay: The Civil War Struggle for Galveston (1998) and Sabine Pass: The Confederacy's Thermopylae (2004), the latter the winner of the 2005 Laney Prize. Both books are Civil War Texas classics and rank high among the very best studies of the war west of the Mississippi. Those publications and Cotham's decades of research and thoughtful consideration of the topics at hand make him the ideal author behind Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations, which is also noteworthy for being the first Trans-Mississippi installment of the series. In the book, Cotham explores the series of critical decisions that guided the course of events along the most important stretch of Texas coastline north of the Rio Grande. Coverage includes the series of contests for control of Galveston, Texas's best deep water port, between 1861 and 1863 along with events culminating in the September 8, 1863 battle for Sabine Pass. Both Sabine Pass and the New Year's Day 1863 Battle of Galveston were startlingly improbable Confederate victories. From the description: "The Galveston Campaigns were a series of naval and overland battles that pitted Confederate General John B. Magruder and his often-improvised Confederate forces against General Nathaniel P. Banks and a variety of Union army and naval forces. A Federal fleet entered Galveston Bay on October 4, 1862, and the city surrendered after the expiration of a four-day truce. However, on New Year’s Day of 1863, Magruder coordinated a bold new attack to retake Galveston using a land bombardment and two cottonclad Confederate gunboats. Aided by victories at the Battle of Sabine Pass and two purely naval engagements in Texas waters, the city would remain in Southern hands and end the war as the last major Confederate port."
More: Edward Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal commanders during the campaigns and examines how these decisions shaped their outcome. Rather than offering a history of the operations, Edward Cotham concentrates on a sequence of decisions made by commanders on both sides of the contest to provide a blueprint of each campaign at its tactical core. Identifying and exploring the critical decisions in this way allows students of the battles to progress from a knowledge of what happened to a mature grasp of why events happened." I am a fair bit into it right now and like what I'm seeing so far.
Friday, July 26, 2024
Booknotes: Decisions of the Vicksburg Campaign
New Arrival:
• Decisions of the Vicksburg Campaign: The Eighteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Larry Peterson (U Tenn Press, 2024). From the description: "Vicksburg, nicknamed the Gibraltar of the Confederacy, was vital to Confederate supply lines, troop movements, and access to port cities on the Gulf of Mexico. The fortified city had been under constant attack since 1862 as Admiral Farragut assaulted Vicksburg after capturing New Orleans, and Major General Halleck enlisted then Major General Grant to devise an overland campaign to support a naval engagement. As Vicksburg was heavily garrisoned and resupplied regularly, Federal plans came up short again and again. But the pugnacious Grant would eventually devise a bold plan to cross the Mississippi River and advance along the western bank, use a feint by General Sherman’s forces and a raid by Colonel Grierson’s cavalry to draw out Confederate troops, then recross the river and capture Vicksburg." Larry Peterson's Decisions of the Vicksburg Campaign is the latest volume in UT Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series. For those unfamiliar with the series format, the volume "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal commanders during the battle and how these decisions shaped its outcome. Rather than offering a history of the battle, Larry Peterson hones in on a sequence of critical decisions made by commanders on both sides of the contest to provide a blueprint of the battles for Vicksburg at their tactical core. Identifying and exploring the critical decisions in this way allows students of the battles to progress from a knowledge of what happened to a mature grasp of why events unfolded as they did." The book takes into the account the entire length the 1862-63 campaign. Organized into six time frames each consisting of 2-4 critical decisions, the first set of decisions involves top-level strategy and command, the second the late '62 Central Mississippi phase of the campaign, the third the maneuvers down the Louisiana side of the Mississippi (and the navy's run past the river batteries), the fourth the army's crossing below Vicksburg, the fifth the whirlwind series of battles that captured Jackson and hemmed Pemberton's army inside the Vicksburg fortifications, and the last section covers the siege and surrender. The bulk of the decisions types are operational and tactical in nature, with Grant, the far more aggressive of the two opposing commanders, having the most. There are fourteen maps, an extended driving tour of the volume's critical decision analysis (similar in format to the classic War College guides), and orders of battle. Placed at the end of the book is an appendix discussing the Davis administration's summer 1863 options (one of which was to reinforce Pemberton in Mississippi rather than support the proposed offensive movement north into Pennsylvania). It is not included in the main part of the book because the author feels it is a Gettysburg Campaign decision and not a Vicksburg Campaign one. In the end, given the state of Confederate railroads, the author does not feel that reinforcements, even if dispatched immediately after the momentous mid-May strategy conference in Richmond, could have arrived in time to make a difference (especially with the passive Joseph E. Johnston in overall theater command).
• Decisions of the Vicksburg Campaign: The Eighteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Larry Peterson (U Tenn Press, 2024). From the description: "Vicksburg, nicknamed the Gibraltar of the Confederacy, was vital to Confederate supply lines, troop movements, and access to port cities on the Gulf of Mexico. The fortified city had been under constant attack since 1862 as Admiral Farragut assaulted Vicksburg after capturing New Orleans, and Major General Halleck enlisted then Major General Grant to devise an overland campaign to support a naval engagement. As Vicksburg was heavily garrisoned and resupplied regularly, Federal plans came up short again and again. But the pugnacious Grant would eventually devise a bold plan to cross the Mississippi River and advance along the western bank, use a feint by General Sherman’s forces and a raid by Colonel Grierson’s cavalry to draw out Confederate troops, then recross the river and capture Vicksburg." Larry Peterson's Decisions of the Vicksburg Campaign is the latest volume in UT Press's Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series. For those unfamiliar with the series format, the volume "explores the critical decisions made by Confederate and Federal commanders during the battle and how these decisions shaped its outcome. Rather than offering a history of the battle, Larry Peterson hones in on a sequence of critical decisions made by commanders on both sides of the contest to provide a blueprint of the battles for Vicksburg at their tactical core. Identifying and exploring the critical decisions in this way allows students of the battles to progress from a knowledge of what happened to a mature grasp of why events unfolded as they did." The book takes into the account the entire length the 1862-63 campaign. Organized into six time frames each consisting of 2-4 critical decisions, the first set of decisions involves top-level strategy and command, the second the late '62 Central Mississippi phase of the campaign, the third the maneuvers down the Louisiana side of the Mississippi (and the navy's run past the river batteries), the fourth the army's crossing below Vicksburg, the fifth the whirlwind series of battles that captured Jackson and hemmed Pemberton's army inside the Vicksburg fortifications, and the last section covers the siege and surrender. The bulk of the decisions types are operational and tactical in nature, with Grant, the far more aggressive of the two opposing commanders, having the most. There are fourteen maps, an extended driving tour of the volume's critical decision analysis (similar in format to the classic War College guides), and orders of battle. Placed at the end of the book is an appendix discussing the Davis administration's summer 1863 options (one of which was to reinforce Pemberton in Mississippi rather than support the proposed offensive movement north into Pennsylvania). It is not included in the main part of the book because the author feels it is a Gettysburg Campaign decision and not a Vicksburg Campaign one. In the end, given the state of Confederate railroads, the author does not feel that reinforcements, even if dispatched immediately after the momentous mid-May strategy conference in Richmond, could have arrived in time to make a difference (especially with the passive Joseph E. Johnston in overall theater command).
Wednesday, May 29, 2024
Various Things (Battle-Related)
1. I've often wondered whether the Command Decisions in America’s Civil War series had any plans to venture into the Trans-Mississippi theater. That question has now been answered with the appearance of a pair of T-M titles in the pipeline. In my mind, the 1864 Red River Campaign (in conjunction with its Camden Expedition component) lends itself particularly well to the format, and Michael Lang will tackle that one with his Decisions of the Red River Campaign: The Fifteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation. When it comes to series fit, the relatively tiny scale of most T-M operations can be a concern, but Edward Cotham's Decisions of the Galveston Campaigns: The Twenty-One Critical Decisions That Defined the Operations addresses that by encompassing not one but a series of coastal campaigns hinged upon a single strategic point. Current scheduling puts their release dates at the end of this year to the beginning of the next, but that can change.
2. You might recall Paul Brueske's The Last Siege: The Mobile Campaign, Alabama 1865 (2018), which I liked quite a bit as the latest, and arguably best, single-volume treatment of the land campaign against Mobile. The author's next book will drill down deeper into one of that campaign's key components, the two-week siege of Spanish Fort. Digging All Night and Fighting All Day: The Civil War Siege of Spanish Fort and the Mobile Campaign, 1865 is tentatively set for a Fall '24 release. 3. Chris Mackowski's A Tempest of Iron and Lead: Spotsylvania Court House, May 8-21, 1864 is another Savas Beatie battle book that has popped up on the radar. We already have very good Spotsylvania books from Rhea and Matter (along with a host of others that address the battle in whole or in part), but my attitude toward new ones is always 'the more the merrier.' 4. Nearly thirty years have now passed since the last full-length study of the 1863 Chancellorsville Campaign, but its lesser-known components have received more detailed attention over the interim. Latching onto the "forgotten" battles motif are both Chris Mackowski & Kristopher White's Chancellorsville's Forgotten Front: The Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church, May 3, 1863 (2013) and now Erik Nelson's upcoming contribution to Kent State UP's Civil War Soldiers & Strategies series titled The Forgotten Battles of the Chancellorsville Campaign: Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks’ Ford in Spring 1863 (November 2024). 5. That's it for now. I'll leave you with another November title, William Marvel's The Confederate Resurgence of 1864. Marvel is one of my favorite Civil War historians, always managing to find some thought-provoking new angle of approach to apply to his topics of interest. His latest book "examines a dozen understudied Confederate and Union military operations carried out during the spring of 1864 that, taken cumulatively, greatly revived white southerners’ hopes for independence." In Marvel's view, those often improbable series of early-1864 Confederate gains bucked up army and civilian morale for the vastly greater trials of the ensuing summer and fall, significantly prolonging the war.
2. You might recall Paul Brueske's The Last Siege: The Mobile Campaign, Alabama 1865 (2018), which I liked quite a bit as the latest, and arguably best, single-volume treatment of the land campaign against Mobile. The author's next book will drill down deeper into one of that campaign's key components, the two-week siege of Spanish Fort. Digging All Night and Fighting All Day: The Civil War Siege of Spanish Fort and the Mobile Campaign, 1865 is tentatively set for a Fall '24 release. 3. Chris Mackowski's A Tempest of Iron and Lead: Spotsylvania Court House, May 8-21, 1864 is another Savas Beatie battle book that has popped up on the radar. We already have very good Spotsylvania books from Rhea and Matter (along with a host of others that address the battle in whole or in part), but my attitude toward new ones is always 'the more the merrier.' 4. Nearly thirty years have now passed since the last full-length study of the 1863 Chancellorsville Campaign, but its lesser-known components have received more detailed attention over the interim. Latching onto the "forgotten" battles motif are both Chris Mackowski & Kristopher White's Chancellorsville's Forgotten Front: The Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church, May 3, 1863 (2013) and now Erik Nelson's upcoming contribution to Kent State UP's Civil War Soldiers & Strategies series titled The Forgotten Battles of the Chancellorsville Campaign: Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks’ Ford in Spring 1863 (November 2024). 5. That's it for now. I'll leave you with another November title, William Marvel's The Confederate Resurgence of 1864. Marvel is one of my favorite Civil War historians, always managing to find some thought-provoking new angle of approach to apply to his topics of interest. His latest book "examines a dozen understudied Confederate and Union military operations carried out during the spring of 1864 that, taken cumulatively, greatly revived white southerners’ hopes for independence." In Marvel's view, those often improbable series of early-1864 Confederate gains bucked up army and civilian morale for the vastly greater trials of the ensuing summer and fall, significantly prolonging the war.
Thursday, April 18, 2024
Booknotes: Storming the Heights, Revised Second Edition
New Arrival:
• Storming the Heights: A Guide to the Battle of Chattanooga, Revised Second Edition by Matt Spruill (U Tenn Press, 2024). Jay Luvaas and Harold Nelson's The U.S. Army War College Guide series pioneered a Civil War battlefield touring and staff ride format that has stood the test of time. I believe that the most recent volume published under the War College imprimatur was Bowery and Rafuse's Guide to the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (Kansas, 2014); however, the format itself has also flourished elsewhere with University of Tennessee Press and Matt Spruill. Originally published in 2003, Spruill's Storming the Heights: A Guide to the Battle of Chattanooga has now been reissued in a newly revised edition that takes into account the substantial changes to the physical landscape that have occurred over the past two decades. I love that cover art selection, too. From the description: "In this newly revised second edition of his classic guidebook, Matt Spruill revisits his standard-setting tours of the Chattanooga National Military Park, providing updates and new directions after twenty years of park improvements. He recounts the story of the November 1863 battle of Chattanooga using official reports and observations by commanding officers in their own words. The book is organized in a format still used by the military on staff rides, allowing the reader to understand how the battle was fought and why leaders made the decisions they did." Readers of the publisher's Command Decisions in America's Civil War series will recognize the shared elements between these guides and the newer series' own extensive touring feature. The original War College series and its iterations have never been compact in nature (indeed, this particular volume is well over 450 pages in length!), so it's always been recognized that they are for serious tramping (with prep reading involved) and not exactly conducive to rush tours. Not having access to the first edition, I unfortunately can't make any direct comparisons between the two Chattanooga versions that can be summarized here. More from the description: "Unlike other books on the battle of Chattanooga, this work guides the reader through the battlefield, allowing both visitor and armchair traveler alike to see the battle through the eyes of its participants. Numerous tour “stops” take the reader through the battles for Chattanooga, Wauhatchie, Lookout Mountain, Orchard Knob, Missionary Ridge, and Ringgold Gap. With easy-to-follow instructions, extensive and updated tactical maps, eyewitness accounts, and editorial analyses, the reader is transported to the center of the action." The book is stocked with a great number of period and modern photographs, and it provides dozens of tactical and operational-scale maps for readers to follow. In addition to orders of battle and brief information about Chattanooga's national cemetery, the appendix section houses extensive side tours of Lookout Valley and of the entire route of the Union supply line from Bridgeport. "With this second edition, Storming the Heights will continue to be the go-to guide for Civil War enthusiasts interested in touring this sacred ground."
• Storming the Heights: A Guide to the Battle of Chattanooga, Revised Second Edition by Matt Spruill (U Tenn Press, 2024). Jay Luvaas and Harold Nelson's The U.S. Army War College Guide series pioneered a Civil War battlefield touring and staff ride format that has stood the test of time. I believe that the most recent volume published under the War College imprimatur was Bowery and Rafuse's Guide to the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (Kansas, 2014); however, the format itself has also flourished elsewhere with University of Tennessee Press and Matt Spruill. Originally published in 2003, Spruill's Storming the Heights: A Guide to the Battle of Chattanooga has now been reissued in a newly revised edition that takes into account the substantial changes to the physical landscape that have occurred over the past two decades. I love that cover art selection, too. From the description: "In this newly revised second edition of his classic guidebook, Matt Spruill revisits his standard-setting tours of the Chattanooga National Military Park, providing updates and new directions after twenty years of park improvements. He recounts the story of the November 1863 battle of Chattanooga using official reports and observations by commanding officers in their own words. The book is organized in a format still used by the military on staff rides, allowing the reader to understand how the battle was fought and why leaders made the decisions they did." Readers of the publisher's Command Decisions in America's Civil War series will recognize the shared elements between these guides and the newer series' own extensive touring feature. The original War College series and its iterations have never been compact in nature (indeed, this particular volume is well over 450 pages in length!), so it's always been recognized that they are for serious tramping (with prep reading involved) and not exactly conducive to rush tours. Not having access to the first edition, I unfortunately can't make any direct comparisons between the two Chattanooga versions that can be summarized here. More from the description: "Unlike other books on the battle of Chattanooga, this work guides the reader through the battlefield, allowing both visitor and armchair traveler alike to see the battle through the eyes of its participants. Numerous tour “stops” take the reader through the battles for Chattanooga, Wauhatchie, Lookout Mountain, Orchard Knob, Missionary Ridge, and Ringgold Gap. With easy-to-follow instructions, extensive and updated tactical maps, eyewitness accounts, and editorial analyses, the reader is transported to the center of the action." The book is stocked with a great number of period and modern photographs, and it provides dozens of tactical and operational-scale maps for readers to follow. In addition to orders of battle and brief information about Chattanooga's national cemetery, the appendix section houses extensive side tours of Lookout Valley and of the entire route of the Union supply line from Bridgeport. "With this second edition, Storming the Heights will continue to be the go-to guide for Civil War enthusiasts interested in touring this sacred ground."
Wednesday, March 13, 2024
Review - "Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation" by Robert Tanner
[Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation by Robert G. Tanner (University of Tennessee Press, 2023). Softcover, 17 maps, photos, illustrations, appendix section, notes, bibliography, index. Pages:xviii,200. ISBN:978-1-62190-769-5. $29.95]
University of Tennessee Press's Command Decisions in America's Civil War continues to provide a fresh and unique methodology through which to rethink Civil War campaigns and battles that already have extensive narrative history coverage. Published last year, Robert Tanner's Decisions of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign: The Sixteen Critical Decisions That Defined the Operation tackles one of the war's most dynamic military operations.
For those new to the series, a critical decision is defined as "a choice of such magnitude that it shaped not only the events immediately following it, but also the campaign from that point forward" (xiii). Analytical discussion proceeds through five stages—"Situation," "Options," "Decision," "Result(s)/Impact," and "Alternate Decision/Scenario." "Situation" describes the state of affairs at a crossroads moment in the course of the campaign or battle. It provides readers with the background information necessary to recognize and evaluate the decision "Options" (most frequently two or three in number) that immediately follow. The historical "Decision" is then outlined, usually very briefly, before the "Result(s)/Impact" section recounts what happened historically and how those events shaped the rest of the battle/campaign and beyond. The best "Situation" and "Result(s)/Impact" sections reference earlier decisions in meaningful ways, making clear the cascading consequences of critical decisions made earlier. Not present for every decision, the optional "Alternate Decision/Scenario" section delves into alternative history conjecture based on choices not made.
An active campaign that involved a great many troops in aggregate (especially on the Union side) but only resulted in relatively small battles at any given moment, the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign was rife with drastic order of battle changes (as major formations on either side regularly entered and exited the Shenandoah) and momentous strategic and operational pauses and resets of both geographical positioning and initiative. All of that is well represented in Tanner's critical decision selection and characterization, which has very few (two) tactical-level decisions and a great many others involving strategy, operations, and (re)organization.
The sixteen decisions compiled in the book are organized into six chapters with a time scale stretching from February 1862 to mid-June of that year. Together, they "examine decisions made at the campaign's outset, the Battle of Kernstown and a subsequent major reorganization of Union forces, Confederate plans and marches during April and early May 1862, Federal concentration outside the valley while Confederates concentrated and attacked in the Shenandoah during the pivotal second half of May, the Union's counterstrike against the Confederate offensive, and decisions to end the campaign" (xiv). Option numbers are typically in the two or three range (mostly the former), consistent with the rest of the series. There is a five-option decision, perhaps unprecedented in the series, that really illustrates well the sheer number of critical concerns, of both dangerous and opportunistic varieties, that confronted Jackson at a key moment. Modern armchair observers frequently dispute the brilliance of the Valley Campaign's result as being a function of B and C-team leadership opposition, but the author's critical decision analysis staunchly reinforces the book's argument that deliberative Confederate agency at numerous watershed moments was just as significant as Union bungling when it came to determining victory or defeat in the valley.
That there are eight critical decisions for each side supports the notion that both opposing leaderships possessed ample opportunities for seizing overall initiative. That a great many of the decisions were made by Abraham Lincoln also clearly demonstrates the degree to which the frustrated U.S. president personally seized the directing reins of the Union war effort in Virginia during the time of this campaign, to frequently poor result. Excepting Chapter Three, in which all three critical decisions are Confederate-sourced, Lincoln figures in all the remaining five chapters (by direct decision-making in four of those and in heavily shaping the George McClellan decision made in the remaining one). Throughout all six chapters, Tanner appropriately stresses interconnectivity when it comes to assessing decisions and events in the Shenandoah, Allegheny mountains, north and central Virginia, and Virginia Peninsula fronts. Showing how and why what happened in the Shenandoah Valley during the spring months of 1862 had a tremendous impact on military fortunes across Virginia is a strong element of Tanner's campaign analysis.
The series has always stressed to its readers that decision options are selected for their capacity to set or change the course of a campaign, and thus should not be seen as necessarily good or bad (or right or wrong). Indeed, in order for a choice to represent a real option it must have some strong basis for consideration, and Tanner does an exceptionally fine job of articulating the opportunities, feasibility, risk-levels, and potential pitfalls involved with each decision-making process. Properly eschewing the no-brainer approach, every option is assigned one or more supportable reasons for it to exist in the mind of the decision maker. Not all of the books in the series achieve this process as strongly as Tanner's does here. One of the best examples of that quality can be found in Tanner's dispassionate and keenly analyzed assessment of John C. Fremont's much-pilloried decision not to move on Harrisonburg during the late May-early June Union offensive aimed at trapping and destroying Jackson's army in the valley. In addition to the president himself, subsequent writers and historians have often been dismayed by Fremont's failure to fulfill Lincoln's directive, but Tanner pretty convincingly shows that the wording of the order was more ambiguous than Lincoln apparently intended. That factor, combined with pressing issues of time, distance, supply and logistical constraints, lack of information regarding an overall plan (including the positions of other friendly columns), and other considerations, rendered Fremont's ultimate decision far from being a cut and dried example of egregious blunder or a direct disobeying of orders (though Tanner justly condemns Fremont for not seeking clarification).
The series defines critical decisions very narrowly, but the reality is that no two individuals, no matter how well informed in regard to the topic at hand, would come up with the exact same list of options and scenarios. As one example here, in Chapter Two, one might be justified in deeming the higher-level operational decision to regain lost contact with federal forces in the Lower Shenandoah, the bulk of which were understood to be leaving, to be a more 'critical' decision than the tactical-level one presented in the book in which Jackson must decide to either attack immediately or on the following day.
Some analyses offer tidbits not often appreciated in the literature's extensive discussions of those events. A good example is Tanner's coverage of Edwin Stanton's assignment of General William S. Rosecrans to find Louis Blenker's "lost" division and expedite the effort in getting the recently formed Mountain Department shipshape. Also mentioned is the Secretary of War's brusque rejection of Rosecrans's unsolicited suggestions regarding coordinated operations in the East and the absence of a single guiding force with a military background. It's a small part in the play to be sure, but something worthy of consideration in assessing the larger matter of Lincoln declining to assign another general to oversee affairs in the theater, instead taking on that momentous responsibility himself.
With their ample illustration of city and town locations, rail and road networks, rivers, and other key terrain features, ten maps assist the reader in visualizing the situations at hand and the options available. Seven additional maps are attached to the extensive driving tour. The tour, which is focused upon visiting sites directly related to the critical decisions explored earlier, is an important facet of all series volumes.
Seeing this series installment come from Robert Tanner was a pleasant surprise given the amount of time that has elapsed since his last book-length publication. His Stonewall in the Valley, a major work mostly examining the campaign from the Confederate perspective, was first published way back in 1976 and was re-released in a revised edition in 1996. That was followed in 2001 by the conversation-inspiring analytical study Retreat to Victory?: Confederate Strategy Reconsidered. In the Acknowledgments section of this book, Tanner notes that he cold-called Command Decisions in America's Civil War series creator Matt Spruill with a proposal for a 1862 Valley Campaign volume, so it's nice to see the series having the prestige and capability of getting a subject matter expert who had been away from publishing for quite some time to 'get back in the game' (so to speak). The result of that is one of the very best volumes the series has to offer.
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